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Ignace De Beelde
UNIVERSITEIT GENT
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BELGIAN
ACCOUNTING CODE DURING THE FIRST
HALF OF THE 2OTH CENTURY
Abstract: Continental European countries are familiar with standard-
ized charts of accounts. Practices in these countries have been quite
diverging however, ranging from the voluntary adoption of schemes
developed by professionals or associations to state-imposed charts. In
the development of these schemes, several Belgian accounting schol-
ars have played an important role, particularly from the end of the
19th century to the beginning of the 20th century. This paper links
the charts proposed in Belgium with attempts to develop unified ac-
counting and costing methods and efforts to introduce principles of
scientific management around the end of the Second World War. It
also seeks to explain why the introduction of decimalized charts took
longer in Belgium than other countries such as France.
INTRODUCTION
The observation of significant international differences in
financial accounting practices has triggered a large body of re-
search and different types of classifications of accounting sys-
tems across countries [for a summary see Nobes and Parker,
2002]. These classifications of accounting systems tend to place
those of Belgium and France in the same category. Although
there are many similarities between the accounting frameworks
of both countries, the historical development of accounting was
rather different. Currently, both Belgium and France have an
accounting plan. The French ‘plan comptable’ was introduced
after the Second World War and the state was strongly involved
in its implementation [Mommen, 1957, CNC, 1957]. It used a
decimal classification of the accounts with up to five-digit codes.
Development in Belgium was different: a three-digit decimal
chart of accounts only became compulsory in 1983, following
Acknowledgment: I am grateful to the two anonymous referees and the
editor for their comments which helped to improve the paper significantly.
Submitted August 2002
Revised August 2003
Accepted August 2003
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the implementation of the Fourth EC Directive.1 On the follow-
ing pages the causes of this divergence in development are dis-
cussed. It will be hypothesized that the dominance of the
Société Générale de Belgique, the major Belgian holding com-
pany, and its preference for the Godefroid [1864] classification
of accounts, explains the reluctance to arrive at an officially
imposed chart of accounts.
The second half of the 19th century and the 20th century
were periods of intensive thinking in Belgium about ways to
organize bookkeeping and financial reporting [Vlaemminck,
1956]. Before 1983 there were many proposals from accounting
professionals and academics, as well as private initiatives from
industrial bodies. This paper examines some of these initiatives.
The French ‘plan comptable’ is a typical example of ac-
counting charts as they are currently applied in continental Eu-
rope [Roberts, 1994]. It is a balance sheet oriented code because
many of its classes of accounts relate to that financial statement.
It is also an example of a dualist approach to accounting, be-
cause accounting for internal transactions, such as the calcula-
tion of unit cost, is not necessarily included in the system which
culminates in the financial statements. Most of the initiatives
that were discussed in Belgium had a monistic perspective and
focused on cost calculations. A second hypothesis developed in
this paper is that the early attempts to harmonize Belgian ac-
counting codes were driven by a desire to unify cost calculation
practices, rather than financial statements.
Literature Review on the Development of Charts of Accounts: The
development of charts of accounts was widely discussed in Bel-
gium during the 1950s. This reflected similar interest in other
European countries. The Anglo-American world appears to have
been less engaged with this discourse [Mommen, 1957]. Al-
though the number of academic articles devoted to the develop-
ment of accounting charts is generally limited, it is the German
accounting plans and the French ‘plan comptable’ which have
1 In a few industries there were already mandatory provisions with respect
to charts of accounts in Belgium in the 1960s. The best known example of such
regulations is a ministerial decree of 22 May 1965 which imposed uniform
accounting practices on the colliery industry, including a chart of accounts that
also served for cost accounting purposes (see also Olivier, 1979). This regulation
is not the focus of our analysis because it was driven by European interventions
in the coal industry. A similar situation existed in electricity production. Except
for these few examples, the state seems to have played no role before the 1970s.
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received most attention [e.g., Forrester, 1977; Standish, 1990;
Bechtel, 1995]. A series of articles in The European Accounting
Review broadened this focus to other countries such as Spain
[Chauveau, 1995], and Russia and Romania [Richard, 1995b].
Summarizing this literature, Richard distinguished three
phases in the structuring of accounts [1995a]. The first phase is
‘formal monism’ during which financial and management ac-
counting are integrated in one accounting system. This is fol-
lowed by a transitional phase. The focus of ‘formal monism’ was
accounting unity, excluding all types of partitioning within an
accounting system. Then follows a period of “exclusive recourse
to the principle of formal dualism” [Richard, 1995a: 89]. Such
systems were characterized by the creation of different sub-
systems within the accounting system, giving the same results in
different ways and linking subsystems to each other using what
were called ‘mirror accounts’. Typically, one subsystem focused
on the preparation of financial statements and another sub-
system provided more detailed information that could be used
for management purposes. Geertman [1949] uses the same ter-
minology and refers to Löwenstein who apparently introduced
these terms. In his discussion of the first phase in the structur-
ing of accounts, Richard stressed the important role of Belgian
accountants such as Godefroid and Blairon. Their contributions
are discussed in the following paragraphs.
THE EMERGENCE OF CLASSIFICATION IN ‘CHAPTERS’2
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the legal requirements
with respect to accounting and financial reporting to sharehold-
ers in Belgium were very limited. From 1872, the Commercial
Law (Book 1, Title III, art. 16-19) prescribed that each merchant
had to keep a journal, an inventory book and a book containing
copies of all in and outgoing correspondence. Companies were
subject to a number of additional requirements, listed in Book 1,
Title IX of the Commercial Law. The board of directors had to
present a balance sheet and a profit and loss statement to the
general meeting of shareholders. The balance sheet had to re-
port assets and liabilities separately. However, no specific for-
mat was prescribed. The law merely specified that a distinction
2 The charts reproduced in this paper are reported on the ‘articles’ level, or,
for the decimalised charts, on a two-digit level. The original charts generally
were much more detailed, with for example, account numbers of up to four or
five digits.
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had to be made between fixed and current assets and between
equity, bonds, guaranteed debts (such as those guaranteed by
mortgages) and unguaranteed debts. Neither did the Commer-
cial Law impose any format requirements or minimum content
of the profit and loss account. It was further prescribed that
these financial statements should include ‘necessary deprecia-
tion’, but again, the law did not include guidelines. Apart from
these few rules, there were no other mandatory accounting re-
quirements such as standards. Contemporary observers strongly
criticized the insufficiency of these regulations, but without suc-
cess. The statute was not fundamentally changed until 1975 [see
for example, Van Ryn, 1954]. The absence of detailed regula-
tions gave companies and accountants a significant degree of
freedom in reporting practices. Consequently, different ways of
reporting and of structuring accounting systems emerged.
The Ideas of H. Godefroid: As suggested earlier, an author who
had a significant impact on the development of accounting
codes in Belgium was H. Godefroid. Godefoid’s Cours de
Comptabilité Pratique, Industrielle et Commerciale was published
in 1864. Godefroid began his book by stating that: “Of all the
books on bookkeeping that have been published, and that are
being published every year, there is not one that discusses a
complete accounting system as it is understood nowadays in the
industrial world” [1864, p. 5].
This orientation towards industry, as opposed to commerce,
turned out to be a key factor in the development of the codes
discussed in this paper. Because of the importance of manufac-
turing and extractive industries in Belgium and elsewhere,
Godefroid sought to address the lack of appropriate textbooks
on accounting. His chart of accounts, reproduced in Table 1
below, was designed for the traditional heavy industries of the
period, collieries and iron and steel plants. Godefroid organized
the accounts in his system in chapters (‘chapitres’) and articles
(‘articles’). He explained, “It is certain that the division and cat-
egorization of the accounts in titles, in chapters, in articles, is
the clearest method, the simplest, the most natural, that one
could adopt to give anyone access to the dark catacombs of the
accounting entries” [Godefroid, 1864, p. 65].
A structure based on a division in chapters, with further
subdivisions in articles, seems to have been an innovation in
industrial and commercial accounting. Mommen [1957] consid-
ered the structure to be a significant improvement on past prac-
tices. However, this vocabulary was already used in the public
13
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sector in France in relation to the registration of receipts and
payments. Lemarchand [1999] states that in 18th century
France public sector accounting imported the account concept
from commercial accounting as a permanent unit of classifica-
tion, mainly oriented towards controlling cash flows between
the state and those who financed it. Although the history of the
public sector in Belgium has never been studied from this per-
spective, the common language and the close connections be-
tween France and Belgium make it probable that this terminol-
ogy was also known in Belgium. This specific vocabulary might
have been transferred from state organizations to the private
sector in Belgium during the 19th century.
In Godefroid’s scheme, the initial chapter included the ‘first
establishment’ accounts (essentially, types of fixed assets). A
chapter that reported general expenses followed. The third chap-
ter was called ‘General stores’ and included, for example, coal,
coke and metals. The fourth chapter allowed separate account-
ing for divisions. The fifth ‘Particular accounts’ chapter reported
equity, various debtors and profits and losses. The sixth chapter
included cash and the investment portfolio. This structure is
illustrated in Table 1.
Godefroid strongly criticized the fact that existing textbooks
emphasized accounting frameworks which had been developed
for commercial, as opposed to industrial activities. Conse-
quently, these textbooks did not discuss how to account for ac-
tivities conducted by different divisions, an essential characteris-
tic of larger industrial companies:
We thought it useful to prepare a simplified accounting
course, based on practice and experience, taking as our
perspective accounting for a large company that in-
cludes different types of industries, such as: iron pro-
duction, machine construction, coal and minerals ex-
ploitation and glass production. By bringing these
different industries in one centralizing system based on
the same principle, it will become easy to understand
the whole mechanism of the accounting entries
[Godefroid, 1864, p. 8].
Existing textbooks also failed to offer consistent ways of
dealing with different types of expenses incurred by industrial
firms. One of Godefroid’s objectives was to propose a unified
and rational solution to this problem:
It is necessary for the manager to be able to trace and
track all types of production. In this way, one can be
14
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CHAPTER 4. Divisional accounting
Art. 1 Collieries
Art. 2 Mines
Art. 3 Blast furnaces
Art. 4 Rolling mills
Art. 5 Constructions workshops
Art. 6 Glassworks
Art. 7 Balance via particular
accounts
CHAPTER 5. Particular accounts
Art. 1 Equity
Art. 2 Shares
Art. 3 Reserves
Art. 4 Various debtors
Art. 5 Profit and loss
Art. 6 Divisional profits
CHAPTER 6. Financial service
Art. 1 Cash
Art. 2 Portfolio
TABLE 1
Chart of Accounts in Godefroid, 1864
CHAPTER 1. First establishment
Art. 1 Buildings and real estate
Art. 2 Equipment
Art. 3 Furniture
Real estate divisions
Art. 1 Collieries
Art. 2 Mines
Art. 3 Blast furnaces
Art. 4 Rolling mills
Art. 5 Constructions workshops
Art. 6 Glassworks
Preparatory works
Art. 1 Collieries
Art. 2 Mines
Art. 3 Blast furnaces
Art. 4 Rolling mills
Art. 5 Constructions workshops
Art. 6 Glassworks
CHAPTER 2. General expenses
Art. 1 Discounts and interests
Art. 2 Interest on working capital
Art. 3 Salaries
Art. 4 Office supplies
Art. 5 Travel expenses and commissions
Art. 6 Taxes and patents
Art. 7 Cars
Art. 8 Insurance
Art. 9 Petty costs
Art. 10 Various expenses
Art. 11 Balance via particular accounts
CHAPTER 3. General stores
Art. 1 Coal
Art. 2 Mines
Art. 3 Coke
Art. 4 Castine
Art. 5 Pig iron
Art. 6 Cast iron
Art. 7 Iron
Art. 8 Forged iron
Art. 9 Boilers
Art. 10 Machines
Art. 11 Mechanical objects
Art. 12 Consumables
Art. 13 Transfer from previous year
15
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certain of all items that are part of the unit cost (‘prix
de revient’), the angular stone of the building . . . to
each finished product should be charged related labor
costs, the value of raw materials used in production,
consumables, direct and indirect expenses, in other
words, maintenance expenses for buildings, that have
to be depreciated, wear and tear of equipment, salaries,
etc [Godefroid, 1864, p. 9].
As Godefroid’s chart was oriented towards industrial activi-
ties one of its main objectives was to produce reliable cost calcu-
lations. It did not focus on the preparation of balance sheets: the
balance sheet accounts were mainly found in a few chapters
such as chapter 5 ‘Comptes particuliers’ which included ac-
counts such as capital, reserves and debtors. Chapter 2 broke
down overhead expenses, chapter 4 also related to expenses,
chapter 1 included ‘preparatory works’ that were normally
charged to the profit and loss account, and the fixed and current
asset accounts in chapter 1 and 3 were not reported in such
detail in the balance sheet (inventories and divisionary fixed
assets). The structure of chapters 1, 3 and 4 further shows that
this chart was developed for large heavy industry companies.
The Role of the Société Générale de Belgique: Mommen [1957]
concluded that Godefroid’s chart helped unify accounting sys-
tems in different companies. However, Mommen believed that
this unification was only partial because: the chart was not
based on a ‘general logic of economic flows’, the structure of the
chapters was developed for one type of company only, and the
classification could not be used as a rational basis for the bal-
ance sheet or for accounting education. However, the chart did
attract attention in the steel industry. The Société Générale de
Belgique, heavily involved in steel production, choose to further
develop the Godefroid scheme and use it as the basis for the
classification of the accounts it imposed on the industrial com-
panies under its control.
Godefroid’s ideas remained influential in Belgium via the
chart of accounts developed by the Société Générale. The
Société Générale de Belgique, originally founded in 1822 as
‘Société Générale des Pays-Bas pour favoriser l’industrie
nationale’, was the main Belgian holding company of its day
[Crombois, 1994; Watelet, 1993; Laureyssens, 1986, 1989;
Bonin, 1988; Van Der Wee, 1982; Janssens, 1985]. Around 1837,
it controlled approximately 25% of Belgian heavy industry,
mainly colliery companies, furnaces and steel and iron factories.
16
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Its influence increased through the 19th century and around the
mid-20th century it had controlling interests in Belgian financial
institutions, the production of coal, iron and steel, metalworks,
non-ferrous metals, electricity, transport, glassworks, the build-
ing industry, chemicals, textiles, paper, as well as about 70% of
the economy of Congo [Joye, 1964]. Coalmining was one of the
major industries for the Société Générale and this explains why
the accounting rules it developed were geared towards colliery
companies. Eventually, the scheme was also used in collieries
not controlled by the Société Générale and in other industries
[NCAB, 1964, De Beelde, 1995].
The Société Générale chart used account classes (called
‘comptes généraux’ or ‘chapitres’) and accounts (‘articles’). It is
illustrated in Table 2. For all account classes and accounts the
Société Générale provided a description of contents, often with
the name of other accounts to be used jointly when registering
an accounting entry.
The affinity with Godefroid’s scheme is obvious. The chart
did not refer to ‘classes of accounts’ but to ‘general accounts’. It
was not described as a ‘plan’ but was referred to as the ‘rules’ of
the Société Générale (règles de la Société Générale). The chart
still incorporated many expense accounts, which were often bal-
anced at the end of each accounting period, generally twice a
month. Examples are the general accounts, ‘travaux prépara-
toires’ (preparatory works), ‘frais d’exhaure’ (drainage expenses),
‘frais d’extraction’ (extraction expenses) and ‘transports à la sur-
face’ (above ground transport). Generally these accounts were
debited for all related expenses and credited at the end of the
period through the coal account. Consequently, the coal account
registered, on its debit side, production expenses and, in a later
phase, also the general expenses and selling expenses. Proceeds
from sales were recorded on the credit side. Taking account of
inventory movements, it was possible to calculate profit and to
transfer this to the profit and loss account. Archival evidence
shows that actual practice was more complex and divergent [De
Beelde, 1995].
In addition to the determination of profit, this system al-
lowed a calculation of unit cost within the traditional account-
ing system. In this way it comprised an integrated accounting
system or an example of ‘formal monism’ [Richard, 1995a].
Again, archival evidence for the coalmining industry shows a
more complex situation in practice. Even in the firms that used
the Société Générale system, information in the cost sheets was
more detailed than the data found in general ledgers or other
17
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CHAPTER 7. Coal
CHAPTER 8. Stores (Warehouse)
Oil and greases
Iron and metals
Wood
Cords
Other objects
CHAPTER 9. General workplaces
CHAPTER 10. Derivatives of coal
Coke
Deposits
CHAPTER 11. Particular accounts
Internal  accounts
Shares
Bonds
Legal reserve fund
Additional reserves
Provisions
Profits and losses
Work force
Social charges
. . .
Third party accounts
Debtors
Creditors
CHAPTER 12. Financial service
Cash
Notes on hand
Securities owned
Société Générale
TABLE 2
Chart of Accounts of the Société Générale
CHAPTER 1. First establishment
Art. 1 Concessions,  land and buildings
Art. 2 Office furniture
Art. 3 Service equipment
Art. 4 Plants
Art. 5 Railway network
Art. 6 Electric installations
Art. 7 Drainage pits
Art. 8 Extraction and ventilation pits
Art. 9 Coal treatment installations
Art. 10 Cokes factory
Art. 11 Various installations
CHAPTER 2. Preparatory works
CHAPTER 3. Drainage expenses
CHAPTER 4. Extraction expenses
CHAPTER 5. Surface transport
CHAPTER 6. General Expenses
Debit
Art. 1 Interests and financial expenses
Art. 2 Wages and salaries
Art. 3 Selling expenses
Art. 4 Offices supplies and  petty costs
Art. 5 Various consumption
Art. 6 Taxes
Art. 7 Rents and damages
Art. 8 Maintenance of houses and buildings
Art. 9 Maintenance of roads and streets
Art. 10 Various expenses
Credit
Art. 1 Discounts and interests
Art. 2 Fines
Art. 3 Various rents
Art. 4 Revenue from roads
Art. 5 Various revenue
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preserved accounting books. In the La Haye Colliery, for ex-
ample, there were monthly summaries of operations, detailing
expenses for each pit, balance sheets and data on sales [AEL,
Entreprises, Gosson, nr. 206]. The documents mention ‘Trans-
ferred to accounting’, suggesting that they were created in an-
other department. After a series of mergers in 1930-1931, the
company became the Gosson - La Haye - Horloz réunis Colliery
and in the post-merger period the cost reports became even
more detailed [AEL, Entreprises, Gosson, nrs. 299-300 and 641-
675]. Some of these documents were titled ‘report of the works
director’, clearly demonstrating the intervention of production
rather than accounting staff. In some mines both the accounting
departments and the production engineers calculated a (differ-
ing) cost price, whereas in other mines they apparently co-oper-
ated. This shows that even if we have formal monism, the actual
calculation of unit cost could take place outside the accounting
system.
Companies operating in the coal industry outside the direct
control of the Société Générale generally also based their ac-
counting code on this scheme, but often adapted it slightly [De
Beelde, 1995]. Archival records show that some mines imple-
mented a further analytical breakdown of some of the pre-
scribed accounts. Although this accounting code was essentially
designed for colliery companies the application of the chart was
not resticted to concerns in this sector. It is reported to have
been used in many other industries [Mayer, 1964] and the text-
book by Ansotte and Defrise [1910] includes many examples of
charts for other types of industries based on the colliery scheme.
As late as 1964, the chart was still used by some companies in
the Hainaut region of Belgium [NCAB, 1964].
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DECIMAL
CLASSIFICATION OF ACCOUNTS
Its adoption by the Société Générale encouraged a focus on
the classification of accounts in ‘chapters’ in Belgium. During
the 20th century, this was gradually replaced by a decimal clas-
sification of accounts.
The development of decimal classifications was widely dis-
cussed in the first half of the 20th century. This discourse can
also be traced to the contribution of Melvin Dewey, who devised
a general decimal classification scheme in 1873 and whose work
was well known in Belgium. Dewey’s scheme served as the basis
for the universal bibliographic repertory that was to be devel-
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oped by the International Institute for Bibliography (Institut In-
ternational de Bibliographie, IIB), created in Brussels in 1895 by
H. La Fontaine and P. Otlet. The IIB published a first version of
Manuel du répertoire bibliographique universel in 1905. Between
1927 and 1929, a new version was published as the Universal
Decimal Classification. The focus of Otlet and La Fontaine was
not originally on accounting. Their objective as documentalists
was much broader: “How best was order to be introduced into
this proliferating, disorderly mass in such a way that progress in
the world of learning could continue efficiently and effectively?
… How could the international flow of information . . . become
more open and more effective?” [Boyd Rayward, 1990, p. 2].
As part of their ambition to provide a structure that would
allow the classification of all knowledge, Otlet and La Fontaine
also turned to accounting. Paul Otlet, as Secretary-General of
the IIB, published a short article in 1905 on accounting schemes
[Otlet, 1905]. He worked with other accounting scholars in the
Société Académique de Comptabilité de Belgique [Mommen,
1957]. On October 29, 1909 the Société Academique published a
report which argued for a rational classification of accounts.
Otlet’s ambitions extended further. His greater object was the
international harmonization of accounting codes. During the
2nd Accounting Congress in Charleroi in 1911, he founded –
with 26 other persons – an International Accounting Association
(Association Internationale de Comptabilité). The major aim of
this association was the unification and internationalization of
accounting systems and the adoption of a universal accounting
scheme.
During the Accounting Congress of August 1910, held in
Brussels during the International Exhibition, a decimal account-
ing code was presented but received a limited response. During
the Fifth International Accounting Congress in Brussels, 1926,
Otlet again presented a report on the future of accounting and
its relation to the development of a system that would organize
all knowledge of the world [Otlet, 1926]. In 1929, during a con-
gress organized with the Association of Accountants in
Catalonia, a decimal classification of accounts was also pre-
sented [Forrester, 1996]. Other conferences followed and discus-
sions on accounting plans continued. Two major lines of
thought emerged. Followers of Otlet argued for an international
chart of accounts that would be linked to an overall record of
the world. To them, the harmonization of accounting was a
subset of a wider, more ambitious, objective. Others focused on
accounting plans that were developed in national contexts, and
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for which the objectives were more narrowly defined, referring
to accounting principles as the basis for accounting plans.
Otlet’s ideas never gained widespread acceptance in Belgium
and his significance gradually waned during the 1930s. He lost
his influence on the Institut International de Bibliographie and a
conflict with the Belgian government and the outbreak of the
Second World War impacted negatively on the activities of the
other organizations in which he was involved [Boyd Rayward,
1990]. Otlet died in 1944.
Hector Blairon’s Chart: The ‘accounting principles based’ ap-
proach was to play an important role in the further evolution of
the classification of accounts in Belgium. In 1926 the first edi-
tion of Hector Blairon’s influential textbook, Cours complet de
comptabilité des industries manufacturières, was published
[Blairon, 1926]. Mommen [1957] shows that the first versions of
his ‘plan comptable’ go back to 1912 and were based on
‘chapitres décimalisés’. Table 3 shows the chart of accounts
Blairon used in his classes in 1921, as published by Mommen in
1957 [see also Haulotte, s.d.].
Blairon’s accounting code represented a major change al-
though it originally kept the title of ‘chapters’ for the general
accounts. Compared with the Société Générale scheme, the
structure of Blairon’s code is more systematic and closely
equates to the structure of the balance sheet. The earlier chart
places capital, other types of equity, bank accounts, all debtors/
creditors, wages to be paid, and profits and losses together in
one ‘chapter’, ‘Comptes particuliers’. The older chart also used
what was called a ‘mixed coal account’. Although this account
recorded movements in the coal inventory, the measurement of
inventory was not its only objective. Because it valued coal leav-
ing inventory at selling price, it was also used to determine the
results for each accounting period. Contrary to this, Blairon
separated, at the ‘chapter’ level, equity, fixed assets, available
assets and realizable assets, and brought debtors and creditors
together in a separate chapter. The structure of the expense
accounts could also be considered more ‘modern’, because
Blairon distinguished manufacturing costs, maintenance ex-
penses, general overhead expenses and selling expenses. His sys-
tem offered further clarity by having a separate chapter for allo-
cation accounts (wages, depreciation, and general expenses) and
by specifying separate accounts for unit cost calculation, the
inventory account being focused only on the measurement of
inventory.
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CHAPTER 5. General administration and
selling expenses
50 General administration expenses
51 Administrative expenses
52 Taxes and insurance
53 Selling and marketing expenses
CHAPTER 6. General plant expenses and
maintenance expenses
60 Factory expenses
61 Mainentance expenses
CHAPTER 7. Allocation accounts
70 Allocation of salaries
71 Allocation of transport
72 Allocation of depreciation
73 General expenses monthly
allocated
CHAPTER 8. Production accounts
80 Consumption of raw materials
81 Consumption of consumables
82 Direct wages
83 Part in general administration
expenses
84 Factory expenses
85 Maintenance expenses
86 Allocation of depreciation
CHAPTER 9. Sales accounts
90 Finished goods sales
91 Raw materials sales
92 Consumables sales
93 Commerical sales
TABLE 3
 Chart of Accounts by H. Blairon, 1921
CHAPTER 0. Equity and provisions
00 Capital
01 Reserves
02 Various provisions
03 Depreciation
04 Financial revenues
05 Financial expenses
06 Various profits
07 Various losses
08 Monthly results
09 Annual results
CHAPTER 1. Fixed assets
10 Land
11 Buildings
12 Fixed equipment
13 Movable equipment
14 Small equipment
15 Furniture
16 Intangibles
17 Formation expenses
CHAPTER 2. Available assets
20 Cash
21 Notes to receive
22 Securities and participations
23 Postal account
24 Stamps
25 Cash transports
CHAPTER 3. Warehouses
30 Raw materials
31 Consumables
31 Finished goods
31 Commercial sales warehouse
CHAPTER 4. Debtors and creditors
40 Debtors
41 Creditors
42 Banks
43 Sales agents
44 Salaries payable
45 Accounts shareholders
46 Taxes to be paid
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The decimal classification of accounts was further devel-
oped in subsequent editions of Blairon’s textbook. ‘Account
class’ replaced the term ‘chapter’ and the number of accounts
was further (and significantly) increased. Four classes of ac-
counts included balance sheet-related accounts while the others
formed the profit and loss account. The most developed versions
of the code allowed a detailed and separate registration of all
types of expenses at individual product level. It is obvious that
this code made possible a detailed cost calculation for each indi-
vidual product on a monthly basis.
TABLE 4.
Chart of accounts of H. Blairon, 1926
00 Capital
01 Reserves
02 Provisions
03 Depreciation
04 Financial revenues
05 Financial expenses
06 Various profits
07 Various profits and losses
08 Monthly results
09 Annual results
10 Land
11 Buildings
12 Commercial equipment
13 Transport equipment
14 Goodwill
15 Formation expenses
. . .
20 Cash
21 Postal cheques
22 Bank account
23 Securities receivable
24 Securities portfolio
25 Tax stamps
30 Warehouse
40 Debtors
41 Creditors
42 Banks
43 Sales agents
44 Depositories
45 Securities payable
46 Taxes payable
50 Exploitation expenses
59 Selling expenses
72 Allocation account for periodical
expenses
73 Allocation account for depreciation
90 Sales
(Extension for industrial companies; Blairon details these accounts up to four digits)
50 General administration expenses
51 Administrative expenses
52 Social charges
59 Selling expenses
60 General industrial expenses
61 to 69 Industrial expenses for spectific production processes
70 Allocation of salaries
71 Allocation of transport expenses
72 Allocation of periodic expenses
73 Application of depreciation
80 Production expenses for specific products
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Blairon was a strong supporter of formal monism:
The industrialist does not have two distinctive account-
ing systems: one in which all operations with third par-
ties are registered, and another that reflects the internal
movements that follow from the production operations.
All economic movements, whatever they are, are cen-
tralized in one unique accounting system; that is why it
is necessary that, within this one accounting system,
there is a perfect unification of both groups of opera-
tions; this unification is only possible if the part of the
accounting chart that relates to the transactions with
third parties is based on exactly the same principles as
the part that relates to the industrial operations in their
strict sense [1926, p. 9].
Blairon argued that both internal and external transactions
should be included in one accounting system. A consequence of
this was that there could only be one valuation basis, historical
full cost. Historical full cost remained dominant in the Belgian
accounting literature during the first half of the 20th century
[see for example, Walravens, 1942; Lambert, s.d.; Leemans and
Labar, 1949]. The general allocation bases for overhead costs
were the number of units produced, the direct cost or the cost of
direct labor or direct machine hours, or a mixture of these,
depending on type of production and number of products.
Blairon did not discuss standard costing in the first edition of
his book in 1926. In 1944 and 1951 the textbook included the
text of a lecture given by Blairon in 1936, in which he referred to
Taylor, Gantt and Harrington Emerson and concluded that stan-
dard costing was useful for businesses that manufacture mass
products in a continuous way and for those operating in service
industries.
FROM BLAIRON TO THE ‘UNIFICATION
OF ACCOUNTING CODES’
The chart of accounts in the different editions of Blairon’s
work was widely used in Belgium [Berny, 1920; Bastin, 1944]
and his textbook was highly acclaimed until the 1960s [NCAB,
1964]. Although there was no legal initiative with respect to
accounting codes, there was probably de facto harmonization
from the 1930s to the 1950s because of the widespread use of
schemes based on the Société Générale rules and Blairon’s pro-
posals. Archival evidence for the coalmining industry shows that
both systems were used concurrently [De Beelde, 1995].
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The Blairon’s scheme was brought to the fore in 1944 when
the Belgian National Committee for Scientific Management
(Belgisch Nationaal Comité voor Wetenschappelijke Organisatie/
Comité National Belge de l’Organisation Scientifique, abbreviated
as BNCSM) presented a proposal for a national accounting code
[BNCSM, 1946]. The BNCSM was created in 1926 to stimulate
scientific management practices and the exchange of informa-
tion and experience in this area. It had about 3000 members by
the 1950s [Vlaemminck, 1956].
The BNCSM’s proposal was prepared by a commission es-
tablished in 1942. The formation of the commission was a re-
sponse to a request by the Central Industrial Committee (the
major industrial association) in August 1941 and interest at the
Ministry of Economic Affairs where a similar committee was
created on 4 September 1942. The BNCSM initiative was report-
edly taken to prevent the occupying German forces from impos-
ing the Goering Plan on Belgian industry [NCAB, 1964]. The
main task of the BNCSM Commission was to propose a chart of
accounts and a cost calculation method that would be appli-
cable to the whole of Belgian industry. This aim was clearly
ambitious. It was envisaged that over time the costing method to
be developed would bring all Belgian concerns up to the level of
the best managed companies.
The composition of the commission revealed the impor-
tance attached to its remit. Its members were either representa-
tives of important companies and associations or were senior
professionals [BNCSM, 1946]. The commission consisted of four
accounting experts: H. Blairon, H. Delhove (the President of the
Société Fiduciaire de Belgique), Ch. Hanon de Louvet (a profes-
sor and accountant) and P. Verleysen (Accountant and Secretary
of the President of the Société Générale). Representatives of the
bodies of professional accountants and bookkeepers were: J.
Dumon (President of the Société Académique de Comptabilité
de Belgique), P. Mahieux (Secretary of the Chambre des Experts
Comptables et Comptables de Belgique), R. Mayer (President of
one of the regional sections of the Société Royale Chambre
belge des Comptables) and N. Paquet (President of another re-
gional section of the S.R. Chambre belge des Comptables). Ma-
jor industrial associations were represented by: M. Arendt (Di-
rector of the S.A. Electricité et Electromécanique), A. Bouton
(Accountant of the Federation of the Belgian Chemical Indus-
try), W. Dierickx (Head of the Department ‘Prices’ of the Central
Committee of the Belgian Industry) and F. Parmentier (Director
of the S.A. Usines Cotonnières de Belgique, the largest Belgian
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textile manufacturer). H. Lepersonne and R. Caussin repre-
sented the BNCSM.
As a basis for its work, the commission used a chart of
accounts “that had been used in a large number of companies
since 1917” (a reference to the chart Blairon had developed - see
Mommen, [1957]). This chart was changed in some respects,
sent to the main Belgian industries for comment, and reconsid-
ered. Finally, in 1944, a general chart of accounts and method of
cost calculation was proposed. In 1946, a Dutch version of the
code was published under the title ‘Unification of Accounting
Methods and Cost Calculation’ [BNCSM, 1946].
The proposals of the BNCSM represent a clear example of
the integration of financial and cost accounting. However, the
focus was more on costing. In the introduction to the report
reference was made to previous attempts to harmonize costing
methods, including the work of its French counterpart, CEGOS
(the Commission Générale d’Organisation Scientifique du Tra-
vail, created in 1929 [see Vlaemminck, 1956; Bouquin, 1997]).
Reference was also made to general accounting charts used in
certain industries (such as coal mining, metal working, electric-
ity production). The report stressed the importance of introduc-
ing a general and scientifically based method of cost calculation.
It also stated that cost calculation was a task for accounting
rather than production departments. As indicated above, archi-
val evidence for the coal industry shows that in a number of
companies unit cost was calculated by production departments.
The BNCSM commission’s report suggested that the system
adopted should consider the characteristics of Belgian industry
and should not be too expensive to introduce.
The method of cost calculation proposed by the BNCSM
was defined as ‘production unit cost’, excluding dividends or
interest expenses. The whole process of cost calculation had to
be integrated in a single accounting system incorporating finan-
cial reporting. Consequently, the unification of cost calculation
methods would be linked to the accounting codes. The account-
ing code which resulted from the study of the commission in-
cluded a series of accounts which were ordered in such a way
that they followed the logical sequence of transactions. It was
argued that these accounts should be found in the accounting
codes of all Belgian companies, with the same names and in the
same order. The accounts would be decimally classified, includ-
ing account classes 0 to 5, 7 and 9, the classes 6 and 8 being
reserved for industrial accounting. The basic code proposed by
the Commission was two-digit, but the specification also
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included a more detailed code at a three-digit level. Small and
medium sized companies could use the two-digit code, but
larger companies should use the full scheme and could extend
and adapt it to their specific activities.
The following objectives of the accounting code were listed
[BNCSM, 1946, pp. 17-18]: the periodic creation of reports with
respect to rights and obligations of the company; the periodic
calculation of sales and expenses relating to the accounting pe-
riod; the periodic valuation of stock; the determination of pro-
duction unit cost; the allocation of indirect costs; and the con-
trol of efficiency of production. The first two items were said to
be part of all accounting systems, whereas the last four objec-
tives were related to industrial accounting. Essential conditions
for an effective industrial accounting system were perceived as a
perpetual inventory system, an effective allocation of wages to
products or orders, recording numbers of units produced, a ra-
tional allocation of expenses, a correct calculation of unit cost
and a systematic comparison of cost of goods sold and sales for
each product sold. Cost allocation tables were to be included in
the accounting system and based only on data generated by this
accounting system. Expenses should first be registered by type
and then by center, identified by means of one or more digits to
be added to the account number. The chart of accounts is
shown in Table 5.
The chart of accounts proposed by the BNCSM commission
allowed a monthly calculation of results and made standard
costing possible by creating ‘difference accounts’ in class 7.
Overall, the chart was very similar to that proposed by Blairon.
In its comments on the chart, the commission said that the
accounting chart was based on the “dynamics of the transac-
tions: all movements find [in this chart] a logical sequence from
the input of capital until the realization of exchange values”
[BNCSM, 1946, p. 25]. Its logical structure was explained as
follows. The creation of the capital of a company is the point of
departure (account class 0). Before production starts the com-
pany has to invest in fixed assets (class 1). What remains is
available to cover expenses necessary for production (class 2).
This is followed by the acquisition of inventory, in order to start
production (class 3). Purchases and sales lead to the creation of
debtors and creditors (class 4). The production process will not
only include expenses related to the acquisition of inventory, but
after a short time also wages, maintenance, heating etc. These
represent production expenses and the selling expenses (class 5).
At the end of the process, goods produced will be sold and the
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TABLE 5
Chart of Accounts, BNCSM, 1946
CLASS 0. EQUITY AND RESULTS
00 Capital
01 Reserves and provisions
02 Reserves
03 Depreciation
04 Financial revenue
05 Financial expenses
06 Various revenue
07 Various expenses
08 Monthly results
09 Annual results
CLASS 1. FIXED ASSETS
10 Land
11 Buildings
12 Installations: general and
auxiliary
13 Installations: main activities
14 Equipment
15 Furniture
16 Transport equipment
17 New installations
18 Financial fixed assets
19 Intangibles
CLASS 2. AVAILABLE ASSETS
20 Cash
21 Postal account
22 Bank accounts
23 Stamps
CLASS 3. REALIZABLE ASSETS
Different types of inventory, one account
for each type
CLASS 4. DEBTORS AND CREDITORS
42 Debtors (trade)
43 Creditors (trade)
44 Various debtors
45 Various creditors
46 Shareholders and board members
47 Bond holders
48 Banks
49 Agents and representatives
50 Creditors to be paid
60 Participations
CLASS 5. GENERAL AND SELLING
EXPENSES
40 General expenses
41 Administrative expenses
52 to 58 Expenses regarding internal
services
59 Selling expenses
CLASS 6. PRODUCTION EXPENSES
60 Production expenses, general
level
61 Production expenses, specific
production processes
CLASS 7. ALLOCATION ACCOUNTS
70 Allocation of salaries
71 Allocation of transportation
expenses
72 Allocation of periodically paid
expenses to each month
73 Allocation of depreciation
expenses
74 Allocation of social charges
CLASS 8. PRODUCTION ACCOUNTS
For each type of product, specific accounts
registering direct and allocation of indirect
expenses
CLASS 9. SALES ACCOUNTS
For each type of product, specific accounts
registering sales
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owner of the company will wish to measure performance (class
9, debited for expenses, credited for sales proceeds). Profits that
are not distributed will increase the value of class 0, and the
scheme starts again in the next accounting period. In this way
the chart represents flows of resources through the company.
There are indications that the proposals of the BNCSM
were accepted by at least one major Belgian industry. In a publi-
cation by three Belgian textile industries, the Belgian Associa-
tion of Cotton Spinners (Association Belge des Filateurs de
Coton), the Belgian Association of Weaving (Association Belge de
Tissage) and the Union of Finishing Industries (Union des Indus-
tries de l’Achèvement), in 1946, a specific chart was proposed
which was identical to the one presented in the BNCSM scheme
[ABFC-ABT-UIA, 1946]. The focus of the textile manufacturers
was on introducing a uniform method of unit cost calculation.
This publication includes references to Belgian traditions,
American practices, the work of Cégos in France and the sugges-
tions published by the ‘Syndicat Général de l’lndustrie
Cotonnière Française’ in 1942. With respect to the accounting
chart, the textile industries stated that: “the accounting chart
corresponds to the one proposed by the BNCSM. That code has
already been accepted by a large majority of the Belgian indus-
trialists in such a way that, if a uniform chart would be im-
posed, it would probably be that chart” [ABFC-ABT-UIA, 1946,
p. 16].
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE ACCOUNTING CHART
OF THE FLEMISH ASSOCIATION OF ENGINEERS
In 1944 there was also an initiative by the Flemish Associa-
tion of Engineers. They published a chart of accounts, created
by a commission called ‘Unification of Accounting Methods’
(“Eenmaking der Boekhoudmethodes”), part of a larger commis-
sion of scientific management (“Commissie voor Weten-
schappelijke Bedrijfsleiding”), and the result of cooperation
between the “Vlaamsche Ingenieursvereeniging” and the
“Vlaamsche Accountantsvereeniging” [TIVI, 1944]. This com-
mission consisted mainly of managers of industrial companies
and the railways. The sub commission that developed the chart
consisted of practicing accountants. The chart developed does
not appear to have been successful [NCAB, 1964]. A partial and
tentative explanation for this is that the document was prepared
by Flemish associations in December 1943, during the German
occupation [TIVI, 1944]. After the war, many Flemish organiza-
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tions were considered to have collaborated with the Germans,
and their initiatives were not supported in the post-war environ-
ment. However, the chart, which is shown in Table 6, is dis-
cussed here because it differed significantly from the charts re-
ferred to above.
The chart devised by the Flemish Association of Engineers
used a decimal classification of accounts. It was admitted that
this was not generally accepted in practice and that it would not
automatically lead to improvements in practice. The authors
doubted that harmonization would be possible for the registra-
tion of internal transactions (industrial accounting). Therefore,
they directed their attempt to harmonize accounting practices to
the commercial accounting subsystem. Consequently, a basic
premise of the proposed chart was that it should be possible to
organize the commercial accounting classes (classes 0 to 5) as
independent from the industrial accounts (classes 6, 7 and 8). In
this way the supporters of the plan considered it suited to com-
mercial companies and small and medium sized enterprises. A
further advantage was that such harmonization would ease the
collection of national economic statistics. The order of the dif-
ferent accounts fitted with the structure of the balance sheet and
was considered to improve the quality of the published state-
ments.
The way in which the accounts were brought together in
classes in this scheme differ significantly from the other charts
discussed so far. All equity and liabilities accounts were in-
cluded in one class. Contrary to what was considered normal
practice by many accountants in the 1930s and early 1940s,
depreciation was not listed among the equity accounts but sub-
tracted from asset book value. A similar approach was used for
provisions. Inventories were classified in the same class as long
and short term debtors, securities and cash. This resulted in one
working capital class (except for long term debtors). A very spe-
cific category was class 3. It included several ‘correcting ac-
counts’, that is, depreciation and provisions. These two accounts
registered the ‘bookkeeping depreciation and provisions’ (the de-
preciation and provisions determined by the management of the
company at the end of the year). These amounts were not neces-
sarily equal to the amounts that were included in the unit cost
during the year. Each month, the latter were registered on the
debit side of the appropriate account of class 4 via a credit entry
on accounts 32-37.
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CLASS 5. RESULTS
50 Sales
51 Cost differences
52 General costs
53 Financial profits
54 Various profits
55 Financial expenses
56 Various costs
57 Inventory adjustments
58 Monthly result
59 Annual result
CLASS 6. ALLOCATION OF COSTS
60 General costs
61 Selling expenses
62 Production expenses
CLASS 7. PRODUCTION
70 Product 1
71 Product 2
...
79 Internal consumption
CLASS 8. ALLOCATED EXPENSES
80 Department A
81 Department B
...
CLASS 0. EQUITY AND DEBTS
00 Capital
01 Reserves
02 Long term debts
03 Commercial short term debts
04 Various creditors
05 Subsidiaries
CLASS 1. FIXED ASSETS
10 Land and buildings
11 Equipment and furniture
12 Transport equipment
13 Intangibles
14 Formation expenses
15 Assets under construction
CLASS 2. REALIZABLE AND AVAILABLE
ASSETS
20 Inventories
21 Shareholders
22 Long term receivables
23 Commercial receivables
24 Various debtors
25 Securities
27 Cash
28 Bank accounts
29 Money transfers
CLASS 3. CORRECTING AND INTERMEDI-
ATE ACCOUNTS
30 Depreciation
31 Provisions
32 Wages payable
33 Periodic expenses to allocate
34 Allocated depreciation
35 Allocated provisions
36 Maintenance fund
37 Allocated expenses not to be paid
38 Off balance sheet accounts
CLASS 4. EXPENSES BY NATURE
40 Wages
41 Salaries
42 Social expenses
43 Consumption of consumables
44 Consumption of water, gas,
electricity
45 Maintenance
46 Depreciation
47 Taxes, insurance
48 Various expenses
49 Direct costs
TABLE 6
Chart of Accounts, Flemish Association of Engineers, 1944
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Charts of accounts can be observed in most continental Eu-
ropean countries. Currently, they have a statutory basis in na-
tions such as France, Belgium, Greece, Portugal and Spain
[Roberts, 1994]. During the period studied in this paper Belgium
did not have a mandatory chart of accounts. All initiatives re-
mained private and voluntary with industrial groups imposing
the use of common codes in the companies that they controlled.
The Anglo-Saxon literature generally is quite critical about the
use of mandatory charts of accounts, stressing compromises of
form over substance, a bias towards financial reporting and a
mechanistic view of accounting. It appears that those who advo-
cated the initiatives discussed above were aware of these risks
and stressed that flexibility was an essential characteristic un-
derlying the charts that they proposed. The charts developed by
the Société Générale, the BNCSM and even the elaborate
schemes of Blairon gave much attention to cost calculations,
advancing what they considered best practice while at the same
time stressing that adaptations to the specific characteristics of
companies and industries might be necessary. The chart of the
Flemish Association of Engineers attempted only to harmonize
the structure of financial accounting charts, leaving maximum
flexibility to companies with respect to industrial accounting
subsystems. The focus on flexibility and on cost accounting
might be a consequence of the nature of the bodies that devel-
oped these charts. Even though the specific commissions that
worked out the charts might consist mainly of accountants, the
larger commissions that supervised them generally consisted of
managers and engineers and often focused on the introduction
of scientific management rather than on the technicalities of
accounting.
When compared with France, a country whose approach to
accounting is generally quite close to Belgium, decimalized
charts of accounts took a longer time to achieve practical appli-
cation in Belgian industrial firms. This paper has linked the
persistence of more traditional classifications of accounts in
‘chapters’ with the impact of the Société Générale de Belgique.
The scheme that was developed by Godefroid in the 19th cen-
tury continued to be further developed and was applied in a
wide range of industries. It was gradually replaced by decimal
classifications, of which the schemes developed by Hector
Blairon were the most influential. The ideas of Otlet on the
international harmonization of accounting, in which charts of
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accounts could play a key role, seem to have gained less ground.
This is probably a consequence of the context in which both
Blairon and Otlet developed their ideas. Otlet’s ideas on ac-
counting seem to have been linked with a much broader objec-
tive, bringing order into knowledge of the world and developing
an all-encompassing system. From this perspective, the interest
of Otlet in accounting was logical, as accounting is a way of
bringing order into the numerous transactions taking place in
and between economic entities. However, Otlet’s ultimate objec-
tive was probably distant from the day-to-day concerns of many
businessmen and accountants who seem to have been struggling
with more pressing issues such as the calculation of unit cost
and the determination of the profitability of products. The
framework advocated by Blairon was strongly oriented towards
such concerns, and its focus on cost determination made it
easier to link his proposals with work undertaken by various
commissions in a context of attempts to encourage scientific
management and the reconstruction of the Belgian economy
after the Second World War.
The different charts that were advanced included quite de-
tailed divisions for expenses. This was a consequence of their
orientation toward industrial companies, and the importance
attributed to cost calculations. Discussions of the charts in text-
books and the documents in which they were espoused, focused
more on cost calculation than on balance sheet preparation. To
some extent, this could be expected. Preparing a balance sheet
from a sufficiently detailed chart of accounts is less difficult
than the allocation of all types of expenses and the determina-
tion of the profitability of individual products, especially bearing
in mind the dominance of historical full cost concepts. A further
explanation might be found in the typical ownership structures
of larger industrial companies in Belgium. Holding companies,
of which the Société Générale was the most important, domi-
nated. These companies received detailed information on tech-
nical aspects of production, sales, budgets and expenses. Often
data were available on a monthly or even fortnightly basis. Trad-
ing of shares on stock exchanges by small investors was limited,
and consequently, the role of the annual financial statements
seems to have been less significant.
As stated above, most of the work on charts of accounts was
explicitly linked with principles of scientific management. The
introduction to the BNCSM commission’s publication stated
that finding a specific method of cost calculation “is part of
the general measures that should introduce the principles of
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scientific management and standardization in all areas of the
economic activity” [BNCSM, 1946, p. 9]. The chart of the Flem-
ish Association of Engineers was also the work of a commission
on scientific management.
The focus on cost calculation also suggests a link with mod-
els in other countries, especially Germany. Schmalenbach
[1961] contrasted his dynamic balance sheet with a static bal-
ance sheet. A dynamic balance sheet focuses on the presentation
of the internal movements of resources in a company. The most
important of these movements are those that have an impact on
the financial results of the company. The focus of most of the
schemes discussed above on tracing and allocating expenses is
in line with Schmalenbach’s emphasis on the dynamic aspects
of accounting.
Most of the Belgian charts discussed in the paper were mo-
nistic, including all internal and external transactions and using
the same basis of valuation for these transactions. This is in
accord with the situation in major continental European coun-
tries during the first half of the 20th century. Schmalenbach’s
1927 accounting chart, for example, also integrated cost ac-
counting in the overall accounting system [Jouanique, 1990].
Durand [1992] states that one of the consequences of the French
accounting chart of 1947 was that France moved to a strong
separation between financial and cost accounting. Before 1947,
the issue of whether industrial transactions should be included
in the same system as that for constructing the financial state-
ments was widely discussed, not only in France but also in the
US and the UK. Durand links these debates with the scientific
management movement and the role of accountants and engi-
neers, two professional groups that frequently had different
views on the relation between financial accounting and cost cal-
culation. The same was observable in Belgium. In collieries, for
example, cost calculations were performed by engineers in-
volved in production, by accountants, or by both. This often led
to different costings in different documents. Nevertheless, the
dominant position in Belgium remained that cost calculation
and financial reporting had to be included in one system. In
1946, the BNCSM stated: “As the fundamental basis for its work,
the Commission has accepted the principle that the general ac-
counting system should not only include exchange transactions
with third parties, but also the internal movement of values used
in the production process” [BNCSM, 1946, p. 16]. A harmoniza-
tion of accounting charts was considered to be a prerequisite for
the harmonization of costing methods. This is quite different
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from developments in France. Only in the 1960s did Belgian
accountants align themselves with developments elsewhere and
accept the separation of financial and industrial accounting, re-
ferring explicitly to the French model [NCAB, 1964].
In conclusion, this paper has traced the development of ac-
counting charts in Belgium from the late 19th to the middle of
the 20th century. It explained the rather slow emergence of deci-
malized charts in Belgium as due to the dominant position of
the Société Générale de Belgique and its method of structuring
the accounts of companies under its control, a system imitated
in many other industries and companies. Two tendencies appear
to have led to the gradual replacement of the ‘chapter’ structure
of charts of accounts by decimal classifications. These were
firstly, the introduction of scientific management principles and
related attempts to harmonize costing methods within monistic
accounting systems; and secondly, the efforts of Otlet and La
Fontaine to harmonize accounting internationally. The paper
hypothesized that the relative isolation of Otlet explains why he
was not successful in securing the implementation of his ideas,
whereas the other stream of thought apparently had more im-
pact due to its alignment with industrial and economic develop-
ments. However, these ideas on the harmonization of costing in
Belgium were never enforced by the state. On the contrary, dur-
ing the 1960s attempts to harmonize accounting increasingly
focused on the balance sheet and the registration of expenses by
nature, eventually leading to the three digit statutory accounting
chart, imposed under the Royal Decree of 12 September 1983.
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Abstract: Considerable differences exist between Germany and Anglo-
American countries in the development of the statutory audit, the
emergence of professional associations of auditors, and the legal and
organizational forms of audit firms. This paper examines historical
developments in Germany from the late 19th century, to the formal
regulation of auditing and the audit profession in 1931. Its main
objective is to provide a better understanding of the comparatively
slow development of the audit in Germany and reveal attitudes to-
wards the audit and the forms of audit firms. A secondary objective is
to examine the use of agency theory frameworks for this type of
historical research. The study draws on primary and secondary
sources, both of which have been underutilized by previous authors.
The paper finds that many of the unique features of the development
of auditing in Germany and the solutions adopted there can be traced
to historical differences concerning the objectives of the audit, the
structure of the audit market and the foundations of the audit profes-
sion. It further adds to the critique of agency theory assumptions in
historical contexts.
INTRODUCTION
The histories of the statutory audit and the auditing profes-
sion in Germany contrast significantly with their development
in Anglo-American contexts. In the UK, for example, the statu-
tory corporate audit was first introduced in 1844, abandoned
(for most sectors) in 1856 and reintroduced by the Companies
Act, 1900. During the 19th century the accounting profession
emerged as a number of separate associations – the earliest
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being the organizations formed in Edinburgh and Glasgow in
1853. In Germany, however, both the statutory audit and profes-
sional associations were to appear much later. While market
demand for the audit developed slowly during the late 19th to
early 20th centuries, and audit firms and professional associa-
tions emerged to meet this demand, the annual audit of finan-
cial statements remained voluntary in Germany until 1931. This
was despite active lobbying for state regulation by the heteroge-
neous profession. A further contrast between the British and
German audit markets is the different legal and organizational
forms that have been preferred for audit firms. German audit
firms, especially larger ones, have traditionally favored a corpo-
rate form of organization. Independent practices of sole proprie-
tors or loose forms of partnerships (which mainly served the
sharing of resources and were not legal entities) were alternative
forms. Partnerships in the British sense are a very recent devel-
opment in Germany. In the UK on the other hand sole propri-
etorship and partnership were the only legal forms available to
audit firms until 1991.
The objective of the present paper is to shed light on the
comparatively slow development of the statutory audit in Ger-
many, examine the different attitudes to the legal and organiza-
tional forms of audit firms, and to analyze the development of
German auditing and audit firms prior to their statutory regula-
tion in 1931. Specifically, the paper aims to examine the validity
of suggestions that the German audit profession was created by
the state, unlike that in the UK, which is claimed to have been
created by market forces. In examining the origin of the German
audit profession, the paper traces the history of two very differ-
ent groups, whose disputes over market share and audit regula-
tion may have contributed to the need for government interfer-
ence. Further, the paper focuses on the background to the
preference for the corporate form of audit firms in Germany
and examines contemporary arguments for and against this
form. This issue was significant because it divided the two
branches of the profession in Germany. The paper does not at-
tempt to take an overtly comparative approach between Ger-
many and the UK. While professionalization issues have been
explored for the latter [see for example, Willmott, 1986; Walker,
1995; Matthews et al., 1998], much less is written on the German
case [but see Meisel, 1992; Markus, 1997; Gietzmann and Quick,
1998]. The present contribution seeks to extend understandings
of the peculiar development of the institutions of auditing in
Germany.
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While the author is aware of alternative approaches to his-
torical scholarship the paper is loosely based on an agency
theory framework. This approach is adopted for a number of
interrelated reasons. Firstly, agency theory claims to explain the
development of the independent external audit in the UK and
US. Secondly, Watts and Zimmerman [1983] use historical data,
namely an examination of the development of the independent
audit, as evidence to support their theory. Further, an agency
theory approach has been used in historical research by, for
example, Gray and Calvasina [1995, p. 35] in the expectation
that it would “enhance our understanding of agency rela-
tionships and foster[s] greater recognition of the limitations
and hazards of historical research using an agency literature
framework” [see also Mills, 1993]. Thus a subsidiary objective of
this paper is to consider the limitations of Watts and
Zimmerman’s assumptions, specifically in a historical, non-
Anglo-American setting and to extend the critique of agency
theory.
Further, and of particular relevance to the focus of this pa-
per, there exists a considerable body of literature on agency
theory which confidently declares that the partnership form of
business organization is most suited to professional audit firms.
However, a rudimentary knowledge of the profession outside
the US and UK suggests that the corporate form has been popu-
lar among audit firms in other countries [see, for example, the
avant project – the unpublished working draft – to the Eighth
European Union Company Law Directive, Working Party on Au-
diting, 1972]. These contrasts raise questions about the agency
theory framework and invite critical scrutiny.
A combination of primary and secondary sources on the
history of German auditing and the audit profession were used
for this study. Secondary sources comprised literature in En-
glish and German. Primary sources used were German legisla-
tion, and commentaries and contemporary views expressed in
academic or professional literature. Business journals were es-
tablished early in Germany. Their content reflects the emphasis
on academic education in business subjects, the early creation
of business schools, and the fact that it was common for practi-
tioners as well as academics to publish in these journals. As well
as journal articles, contemporary academic theses and textbooks
provided material for the current study. Many of the latter
reveal somewhat amateurish scholarship and are often
unashamedly biased. A further rich source was provided by
publications in years immediately following the period under
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investigation, where authors contrasted recent changes with
historical experiences.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The
next section introduces the agency theory framework. Then fol-
lows an overview of the history of the German profession from
its beginnings until 1931, when the annual external audit be-
came a legal requirement for large corporations and the profes-
sion was regulated by statute. This section focuses in particular
on the conflicts between the two branches of the audit profes-
sion during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These con-
flicts related to regulation, organization and market share. The
penultimate section discusses the main findings with reference
to the agency theory framework. The final section presents a
brief summary and conclusions.
THE AGENCY THEORY FRAMEWORK
Agency problems and costs arise from the separation of
ownership and control in modern companies. This separation
gives rise to agency relationships between the owners and those
who manage the company on their behalf. Jensen and Meckling
[1976, p. 308] define an agency relationship “as a contract under
which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf
which involves delegating some decision making authority to
the agent”. Problems arising from this relationship relate to the
fact that the agent, as utility maximizer, may not act in the
interest of the principal.1 Agency and related theories claim that
agency problems between shareholders and management led to
the development of the independent external audit (as a moni-
toring and bonding mechanism) and that the legal form of part-
nership avoids or minimizes agency problems within the audit
firm. Financial reporting is the means by which management
(the agents) discharge their accountability to the shareholders
(the principals). Watts and Zimmerman [1986] claim that: “[t]he
demand for accounting arises from its use in contracts that
1 The principal can attempt to limit this effect by creating incentives for the
agent to act in the principal’s interest, and by monitoring the agent’s behaviour,
or arranging for this to be done on his behalf (giving rise to monitoring costs).
The agent may also expend resources to reassure the principal that he will not
act against his interest (bonding costs). In spite of these safeguards, however,
the agent’s decisions cannot be guaranteed to maximise the principal’s welfare,
which gives rise to an additional cost to the principal (residual loss) [Jensen and
Meckling, 1976].
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reduce the firm’s agency costs. However, those contracts are of
little use in reducing agency costs unless their provisions are
monitored and enforced. Auditing is one of the ways in which
the contracts are monitored” [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p.
312].
The assumption that auditing is one of the ways of reducing
agency costs led Watts and Zimmerman to examine the sugges-
tion that “independent audits are expected in the earliest firms
where the manager did not supply all the capital” [1983, p. 613].
They found that monitoring and auditing existed early in the
history of business organizations, and eventually developed into
the audit as required in British legislation during the 19th cen-
tury. They also stated that early audits were carried out by insid-
ers (directors/shareholders). The independent audit, carried out
by professionals, did not develop until the mid 19th century in
the UK and the early 20th century in the US, and predated the
legal requirement. Watts and Zimmerman [1983, p. 614] con-
cluded that “the use of professional auditors was due to changes
in the market for auditing”. These changes resulted from in-
creased numbers of companies, increased company size, and the
reduced cost of ensuring auditor competence and independence.
The latter was the result of the formation of professional asso-
ciations from the middle of the 19th century [Watts and
Zimmerman, 1983]. Watts and Zimmerman dismiss the alterna-
tive suggestion that independent audits in the UK and US were
created by government regulation. Contracting theory claims to
explain not only the existence of audits but also the significance
attributed to audit firm reputation and the existence of profes-
sional associations, the organizational form chosen and the au-
dit firms’ size and industry specialization. These three claims
are explored below.
Reputation and Professional Associations: According to Watts
and Zimmerman [1986, Chapter 13], audits only have value if
they lead to a reduction of agency costs. This will only be the
case if the market is convinced of the auditor’s competence (to
discover a breach of contract) and independence from manage-
ment (i.e. the likelihood that he/she will report a breach of con-
tract). The market will only be convinced of the auditor’s inde-
pendence if there are sufficient incentives for the auditor to be
independent. Such incentives include reputation (and the ability
to charge higher fees) and the existence of professional societies
(since a system of accreditation can support the auditor’s repu-
tation for competence and independence, which is signaled by a
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“brand name” such as “chartered accountant”) [Watts and
Zimmerman, 1986]. Further, since in professional partnerships
(including audit firms) there are usually few assets available to
serve as a bond against the risks of adverse selection or moral
hazard [Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 523], reputation and
membership of a professional association can serve as the
auditor’s collateral (since loss of reputation and/or loss of mem-
bership in a professional body would lead to a loss of fee in-
come) [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986]. Further, the fact that
partners are residual profit owners increases their motivation to
build a strong reputation.
Organizational Form: An advantage of the partnership is that
unlimited liability provides, in the form of the partners’ personal
assets, a larger bond than would be available in an incorporated
audit firm with limited liability [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986,
p. 317; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 523]. This is especially
because audit firms tend to have few assets which could serve as
a bond. Thus: “. . . if auditors incorporate with limited liability,
they reduce the amount of assets available as a bond on their
actions. The market will appropriately reduce its assessed prob-
ability of their independence. Ceteris paribus, unlimited part-
nerships provide a greater bond on the auditors’ independence”
[Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 317]. However, a disadvantage
of this is that in a partnership with unlimited liability, risk is not
divisible or transferable.2 This will lead investors to spend addi-
tional resources on monitoring, or not invest at all [Milgrom
and Roberts, 1992, p. 522]. Further: “[t]his factor constrains
partnerships from expanding the number of partners and reduc-
ing the amount invested by each to permit better diversification.
Similarly it makes it expensive for partnerships to expand into
different lines of business or into new geographical markets be-
cause such moves increase the cost of monitoring” [ibid.]. How-
ever, the need for outside capital is generally limited due to low
capital requirements – the most important asset of a partnership
is human capital. Further, in the partnership form individual
partners are jointly and severally liable. Liability for the other
partners’ work provides a strong incentive for mutual monitor-
ing [Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 523]. Mutual monitoring by
partners who are liable for each other’s actions, provides further
2 It may be transferable through insurance. However, it has been argued by
the UK profession that it is difficult to obtain sufficient cover at a reasonable
cost.
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incentives for increasing competence and independence and re-
duces the risk of an individual auditor bending to management
influence [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986].3
Greenwood, Hinings and Brown [1990] argue, with respect
to large professional partnerships, that these contrast with other
large organizations in that ownership and governance structures
are different, and because work is carried out almost exclusively
by “self-contained” professionals. Greenwood et al use the ac-
countancy industry as an example and find that: “In summary
the task of accounting firms is professional in that it requires
the application of professional knowledge to complex situations,
and the work itself is individualized, geographically dispersed,
and geographically differentiated” [Greenwood et al, 1990, p.
733]. As a result, authority and decision making structures in
partnerships differ from those in corporations.
Size: Fama and Jensen [1983a] consider size to be an important
factor in the context of the separation of ownership and control
(or risk-bearing and decision making). In professional partner-
ships most decisions are made locally: “At this level, however,
decision management and decision control are not separate. To
control the resulting agency problems, the residual claims in
professional partnerships, large and small, are restricted to the
professional agents who have the major decision-making roles”
[Fama and Jensen, 1983a, p. 316]. In small partnerships, as with
sole traders and close corporations, decision-makers are usually
the residual risk bearers. However, in large professional partner-
ships, residual claims are diffused; residual risk-bearing and de-
cision management may be separate. This requires the existence
of strong mutual monitoring systems common in other complex
organizations. Yet, because all the residual claimants are experts
in the professional partnership’s activities, there is little demand
for monitoring by outside experts [Fama and Jensen, 1983a].
Further, monitoring by outsiders (non-experts) is difficult
[Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 523]. Finally, decision control
systems are similar between all such types of organization –
open corporations, large professional partnerships, financial
mutuals and nonprofits etc. [Fama and Jensen, 1983a, but see
3 For example, Watts and Zimmerman [1986, pp. 316-317] argue: “It is inter-
esting that before the development of the professional audit firm the audit was
conducted by a committee of shareholders. The committee form makes it more
difficult for the manager to bribe the auditor, particularly with mutual monitor-
ing by the committee members”.
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Greenwood et al., 1990, above]. Firm size may also be related to
independence and competence, since larger firms provide
economies of scale for the development of brand-names, offer
larger bonds and better opportunities for mutual monitoring
[Watts and Zimmerman, 1986].
The validity of many of these explanations for the develop-
ment of the external corporate audit and the organization of
audit firms could, and to some extent have been, subject to
criticism in the UK context. While it is not within the scope of
this paper to provide a critique of agency theory in Anglo-Ameri-
can settings, it should be noted that critics of positive theory, of
which agency theory forms a part, challenge its philosophical
foundations [Tinker, Merino and Neimark, 1982; Chua, 1986]
and the neo-classical assumptions which underpin agency
theory [Chua, 1986; Hunt and Hogler, 1990]. The theory’s meth-
odology is also challenged, in particular, the fact that few at-
tempts have been made to test the theory through conventional
scientific approaches of falsification [Christenson, 1983]. Fur-
ther, Hunt and Hogler [1990] question Jensen and Meckling’s
[1976, p. 310] assumption that the firm is a “legal fiction which
merely serves as a nexus for contracting relationships” and con-
sider it a weakness that agency theory appears unable “to ad-
dress issues that do not revolve around identifiable, market-
based contracting relationships, or to analyze imbalances of
power inherent in the social context of an organization” [Hunt
and Hogler, 1990, p. 443; see also Chua, 1986]. They also criti-
cize the theory for its ideological foundation and the assumption
that accountants behave as objective, unbiased experts, with no
concern for policy and social consequences [see also Tinker, et
al., 1982; Chua, 1986; Broadbent, Dietrich, and Laughlin, 1996].
Observations on the suitability of agency theory in an account-
ing history context will be made later in the paper.
In summary, this section has aimed to provide a brief over-
view of explanations offered by agency and contracting theories
for the existence of the independent external audit, and of cer-
tain features of audit firms and regulation. The following sec-
tion explores the development of the audit and audit firms in
Germany as a basis for the subsequent discussion of the applica-
bility of the agency theory framework.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUDITING AND
AUDIT FIRMS IN GERMANY
Early “Audits”: The modern audit in Germany emanated from
the internal audit, and the employment by the courts of legal
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experts and professional trustees [Meisel, 1992, p. 39]. The need
for internal audit arose in the 15th century with the develop-
ment of large merchant houses (such as the Fugger and the
Welser) and of state-owned companies, and resulted from the
physical separation of owners from remote branches of their
firms [Meisel, 1992, pp. 35-38]. From the 16th century, and in-
creasingly in the 17th and 18th centuries, external “audits”4 were
carried out by gerichtlich vereidigte or beeidete Bücherrevisoren
(auditors sworn in court). These were expert witnesses in legal
disputes [Meisel, 1992, pp. 39-46], who were engaged to review
and correct financial information [Henning, 1990].
The first business corporations developed during the 17th
century in The Netherlands, France, and England. However, it
was not until the second half of the 19th century that the
Aktiengesellschaft (AG – public share company) began to domi-
nate the economy in Germany. Its growth was due to increased
demand for capital required by industrial expansion, in the
transport sector in particular [Meisel, 1992, pp. 60-61]. The early
AGs were subject to a Konzessionssystem (licensing system), that
is, they required a license and were subject to state supervision
[Meisel, 1992, p. 62]. This was the case in the first German law
regulating AGs, the Prussian Gesetz über Aktiengesellschaften
(Stock Corporation law) of 1843 [Meisel, 1992, p. 61]. Specific
accounting and publication requirements for AGs were laid
down in the Aktienregulativ of 1856 [Schröer, 1993; Schneider,
1995]. However, there was no legal requirement for an external
audit (although internal, or voluntary external audits, were not
uncommon [Schröer, 1993]).
4 A brief note is required on the translation of terminology across languages
and time. The term “audit” is used here in a wider sense than understood in the
context of the modern external audit in the UK or US. However, there are no
exact equivalents in translation between languages, and the old German term for
auditor does not mean exactly the same as “auditor” or “chartered accountant”.
Each of these are technical terms that can only be fully understood within their
unique contexts. The problem is exacerbated by translation across time. Mills
(1989) warns against the possibility that we may be misled by vocabulary in
historical contexts. The old German term approximately equivalent to “audit” is
Revision (the modern German term (since 1931) is Wirtschaftsprüfung). The
texts examined here use the terms Revision and Prüfung, which are treated as
synonyms [Meisel, 1992]. Especially during the 1920s, German authors tend to
use the terms (Bücher-)Revisor/Revision in translation when they discuss the UK
auditor and audit. While German authors were more or less aware of the differ-
ences in status, organisation, techniques, etc., they appear in principle to con-
sider the German Bücherrevisor to be comparable to the British auditor [e.g.
Raschenberger, 1929; Schwäbische Treuhand-Aktiengesellschaft, 1931].
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The first company law for all German states was created
with the Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch (ADHGB –
General German Commercial Code) of 1861. This represented
the first codification of the internal organization of the AG –
regulating the Generalversammlung (general meeting), the
Vorstand (management board) and the (optional) Aufsichtsrat
(supervisory board5) [Meisel, 1992, p. 63]. The latter, if ap-
pointed, was responsible for monitoring management and the
auditing of the accounts [Article 225]. The law was reformed in
1870 [Gesetz betreffend die Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien
und die Aktiengesellschaften]. Changes included the removal of
the licensing system and its replacement by a new Norma-
tivsystem (“normative” system). This meant AGs no longer re-
quired licensing by the state and were no longer subject to state
supervision [§ 2 Article 249a; see also Quick, 1990; Meisel, 1992,
p. 63] but instead, once registered, they were subject to general
rules and regulations. The new regulation was intended to pro-
vide better protection for shareholders; the individual company
should be subject to continuous supervision and control through
its owners [Reich, 1979]. The supervisory board became obliga-
tory; it had to consist of at least three members selected from
the shareholders [§ 1 Article 209 (6)]. Article 225a required that
the supervisory board monitor the management of the AG. It
also gave its members rights of access to documents and infor-
mation, required them to audit the accounts and proposals for
profit distribution and to report to the annual general meeting
[ibid., see also Klausing, 1933, pp. 172-173; Karoli, 1934]. The
members of the supervisory board were jointly and severally
liable for certain breaches of the law such as the unlawful distri-
bution of profits [Article 225b]. The board would at times em-
ploy professional auditors to fulfill their duties [Quick, 1990].
Advancing industrialization and the financial inflow of
French reparations after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871
contributed a dramatic increase in company formations and
corporate expansions and mergers [Meisel, 1992, p. 64]. Associ-
ated with these changes was the increasing separation of owner-
ship and control and growing shareholdings by banks
[Gietzmann and Quick, 1998, p. 88]. Easier access to the vehicle
of the AG, and its de facto weaker regulatory system, appears to
5 The two-tier board structure, which remains a feature of modern German
public companies, allows different stakeholder groups to be involved in the
governance of the firm.
47
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2003, Vol. 30, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2003
39Evans: Auditing and Audit Firms in Germany before 1931
have been one of the factors leading to the subsequent economic
crisis of the early 1870s (Gründerkrise) which was associated
with increased formation of AGs, bankruptcies, liquidations,
speculation and fraud [Reich, 1979; Meisel, 1992, p. 63]. The
extant law was too vague in its requirements regarding the su-
pervisory board’s monitoring duties, and supervisory board
members often failed to perform even these duties. Their boards’
understanding of financial statements was also doubted
[Gietzman and Quick, 1998]. Further, the growing involvement
of supervisory board members in the management function
threatened their independence [Karoli, 1934], thereby “calling
into question whether there did in fact exist an independent
two-tier form of corporate governance” [Gietzmann and Quick,
1998, p. 88].
The crisis during the 1870s led to calls for the introduction
of a statutory audit [Haibt, 1998]. This demand was not met
when the law was further amended in 1884, in the form of a new
Gesetz betreffend die Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien und die
Aktiengesellschaften.6 The new law extended the rights and duties
of the supervisory board regarding monitoring, auditing and re-
porting.7 The general meeting or, under specific circumstances a
minority of 10 percent of the shareholders, could demand the
appointment of external auditors [§ 1 Article 239a]. The 1884
law did introduce one form of compulsory audit – an audit of
the company formation process by the supervisory board and
the management board. Article 209h, which dealt with this
6 The Begründung (explanatory memorandum) to the 1884 law is an interest-
ing source of data regarding company foundations and failures from 1870. Be-
fore the 1870 law, Prussia had a total of 203 AGs. A further 843 new AGs were
founded in the following three years alone. The memorandum laments the fact
that the average (initial) share capital of the AGs had fallen from almost 11
million Marks among the old AGs to a third of this, and that some AGs had
share capital of less than 100,000 Marks. Many of the new AGs were conversions
of private enterprises, rather than new company foundations [Begründung].
Frauds had apparently been expected to follow the change from the licensing
system, but not to the extent that they actually occurred [ibid.]. The abuses of
the system led to serious consideration of the abolition of the legal form of AG
[ibid., p. 242].
7 For example, Article 225 (translation) states that “the members of the
supervisory board may not delegate their duties to other persons”. Article 225a
prohibited the same individuals from being members of the supervisory board
and management board. Article 226 made the members of the supervisory board
and management board jointly and severally liable for damages arising from the
breach of certain legal provisions.
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audit, required the appointment of besondere (“special”), exter-
nal auditors where members of either board were also founders
of the company, had made contributions in kind to the com-
pany,8 or had negotiated particular advantages for themselves
[see also e.g. Beigel, 1924; Karoli, 1934, see also below]. The
benefit of this audit was subsequently questioned because the
“clients” were the company founders, who would have been in a
strong position to influence the auditors [Hintner, 1926, p. 21;
see also below].
Apart from these specific audit provisions, the external
audit remained voluntary. The law assumed the competence and
integrity of the supervisory board and the intelligence of the
general meeting, with its potential power to appoint indepen-
dent auditors [Quick, 1990]. However, this right was rarely used,
“since it was generally perceived that this might signal to the
financial community that the organization was experiencing fi-
nancial difficulties” [Gietzmann and Quick, 1998, p. 88]. The
general meeting had been intended as the highest decision-
making organ; in practice it did not fulfill this expectation
[Reich, 1979]. Further, after the 1884 law, the supervisory board
was still perceived to be an impossible hybrid, and remained
involved in the companies’ management and/or did not meet its
control function [Karoli, 1934; Reich, 1979]. Its members con-
tinued to lack the necessary expertise and time required for
effective monitoring. While the board often drew on the services
of professional auditors, this did not happen in all cases.
One interesting and far-reaching change implemented by
the 1884 law was the raising of the minimum value of a share to
1000 Mark [Article 207a]. This effectively closed the AG to small
and medium-sized enterprises and made it the typical legal form
of large enterprises. It also led to the increasing role of banks as
providers of capital [Reich, 1979]. The lack of access to the
limited liability legal form for small and medium-sized enter-
prises resulted in the creation of the Gesellschaft mit
beschränkter Haftung (GmbH – private limited company) in
1892.
A new Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB – Commercial Code) in
1897 introduced few new accounting and auditing rules
[Schröer, 1993], although §§ 192-194 somewhat strengthened
the position of those charged with the audit of the foundation
8 Sacheinlagen (“contributions in kind”) rather than Bareinlagen (“cash sub-
scriptions”).
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process.9 While conceding that this audit had proved successful,
Voß [1927, p. 17] argued that the legal provisions were not suffi-
cient to ensure that the legislator’s intentions had been met, in
particular because the audit was usually carried out by the com-
panies’ management and the supervisory boards, and only under
specific conditions by “special” auditors. Voß considered this to
be a defect in the law, frequently used as a “loophole”, which
allowed companies to circumvent the requirement to appoint
external auditors. For example:
Straw men have been placed onto the management
board or supervisory board; that has in fact happened,
for example when auditors had been appointed by the
chamber of commerce, who did not suit the company
concerned, or one has – and that is the main point at
issue – set up a so-called veiled Sachgründung [com-
pany formation based on non-cash capital contribu-
tions]; that is, initially a company was founded through
Bargründung [company formation by cash subscrip-
tion], but it was planned from the start that this com-
pany should purchase certain assets - the Sachgründung
was therefore carried out as the second step, by a de-
tour [ibid., translation, see also footnote 8].
Such cases of deliberate deception apart, the perception was
that the control function of the supervisory board had not im-
proved since the 1884 law. Römer [1905, p. 262, translation]
complained: “How can somebody who holds 35 supervisory
board positions or who has never seen a book of account, let
alone kept one – and we have such supervisory board members!
– be able to discharge their incumbent statutory duties of con-
trol?”
Apart from the compulsory audit of the company founda-
tion process, approximately 60% of German AGs were, by the
1920s, undergoing either a form of internal or voluntary exter-
nal audit [Klausing, 1933, pp. 173-174].10 It appears though that
9 It described what specifically was to be audited and dealt with potential
conflicts between auditors and founders, which had to be decided by the respon-
sible chamber of commerce [see also Gareis, 1900, pp. 180-184 and Hintner,
1926, pp. 20-21]. Further, the auditor was granted the right of access to all books
and records, cash balances, stock etc. [§ 267, 1; see also Hintner, 1926].
10 Leffson [1988] estimates that by 1900 almost 60% of German AGs were
voluntarily undergoing an external audit. An internal audit would have been
carried out by members of the supervisory board or employees of the auditee,
i.e. by parties who were not independent. An external audit, on the other hand,
would have been performed by an independent individual or company carrying
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initally the external audit was of limited benefit and mainly
consisted of a comparison of the accounts with books and
records [Quick, 1990]. Many enterprises which would have ben-
efited from an independent external audit due to the limited
competence of their management were either not audited or
arranged for a “Scheinrevision”. The latter referred to an audit
opinion which was “bought” from “so-called” auditors in order
to present the appearance of orderly accounting and manage-
ment, until the company finally collapsed [Klausing, 1933, p.
174].
Auditors and the Emergence of Audit Firms : External audits were
mainly carried out by vereidigte Bücherrevisoren (sworn in audi-
tors) and notaries [Meisel, 1992, p. 76]. Originally the
Bücherrevisoren (BR)11 were sworn-in by the courts only in rela-
tion to specific appointments, but during the second half of the
19th century they were increasingly granted this status on a
permanent basis. In 1895 approximately 140 individuals were
thus licensed in Germany. A further 20 auditors were appointed
by the chambers of commerce of the cities of Hamburg, Bremen
and Lübeck [Penndorf, 1932; Meisel, 1992, p. 91]. In 1900 the
Gewerbeordnung (Trade Regulations Statute) was amended to
permit the licensing of auditors by authorities other than the
courts, most notably the state and the chambers of commerce
[Klausing, 1933, p. 174; Meisel, 1992, pp. 94-95]. However, ques-
tions regarding the quality of some of the individuals thus ap-
pointed soon arose [Quick, 1990]. For example, there appears to
have been a lack of commercially educated, independent BR
fully conversant with double entry [Klausing, 1933, p. 174].
Although audit work was only part of the BRs’ work [Römer
1905, pp. 119-120], at around the turn of the century they began
to face competition from the new Treuhandgesellschaften (THG -
trust companies). The first such company was the Deutsche
Treuhand Gesellschaft (originally: Deutsch-Amerikanische
Treuhandgesellschaft), which was founded in 1890 and based on
the example of American trust companies [Meisel, 1992, pp. 6-
7]. The Deutsche Treuhand Gesellschaft was founded by the
out similar work for other clients (but see below regarding the problem of firms
related to the auditee). As it was voluntary, the scope of the audit would have
varied, depending on the supervisory board’s requirements. The auditors would
have reported to the supervisory board, which may have referred to the auditors’
report in its report to the General Meeting.
11 In 1943 the name was changed to vereidigte Buchprüfer.
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Deutsche Bank AG, the Bankhaus Jacob S.H. Stern and others,
and was intended as a finance and trust company for the benefit
of shareholders in foreign enterprises [Hintner, 1926, pp. 14-15,
115; Meisel, 1992, p. 7]. After 1900 the Deutsche Treuhand
Gesellschaft was often involved in company reconstructions,
which usually required the help of auditors12 and it soon devel-
oped its own audit department. When economic conditions im-
proved and company reconstructions became rarer, this audit
department made its services available to the general public
[Meisel, 1992, p. 7; Haibt, 1998]. The audit was offered as a
preventative device, a periodic control to support the monitoring
function of the supervisory board. The audit was utilized to
assess potential threats to the financial stability of the company
and determine how these could be averted [Henning, 1990],
and thus to prevent company collapses [Hintner, 1926, p. 16].
Hintner [ibid.; with reference to Lansburgh, 1908] points out
that this function was very successful. The Deutsche Treuhand
Gesellschaft carried out 27 such external audits in 1903, 70 in
1904, and more than 400 in 1907.
From 1906 auditing was the Deutsche Treuhand Gesell-
schaft’s main activity [Hintner, 1926, p. 59; Rosendorff, 1906].
Its success led to the formation of similar companies, especially
by banks [Haibt, 1998; see also Klausing, 1933, p. 174]. By the
early 20th century audit work was the main occupation of many
THGs [Haibt, 1998], but in spite of the firms’ changing remit
their old organizational and legal forms were retained. They also
became the model for new THG foundations [Hintner, 1926, p.
119]. While company collapses in 1900-1903 led to renewed
pressure for the introduction of a statutory external audit, the
foundation of the THGs initially appears to have abated this.
The numbers of BR and of audit THGs increased considerably.
However, a lack of formal regulation of the emerging profession
meant that there was no control over quality, and there was
concern that poorly qualified individuals might damage the
reputation of those more competent to perform audits
[Gietzman and Quick, 1998]. Römer [1905, p. 270, footnote 1,
translation] complained:
12 They had to establish firstly whether a successful reconstruction was pos-
sible, then may have been involved in carrying out regular audits, i.e. to attest
the accounts in order to establish, for example, whether conditions imposed by
creditors were complied with [Hintner, 1926, pp. 15-16].
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How Bücherrevisoren are sometimes “trained” in Ger-
many and Austria, or how it is at least attempted to
“train” them is shown by the following two advertise-
ments, of which one was repeatedly published in Aus-
trian, the other in Berlin papers:
No. 1. “For 50 Marks anybody can [train to] become a
good Bücherrevisor with me. If he does without instruc-
tion in Geschäftswesenheit (!),13 including commerce
and Aktiengesellschaft, and without the trial audit of
forged company accounts, the fee only amounts to 30
Marks!” – No. 2. “Audit course including exam and di-
ploma 30 Marks!” – Is that not more than shameful? I
have often been asked by young and old people how to
become Bücherrevisor in Germany, and I have only ever
had one answer: “By accident!” That such a state is
unworthy of Germany does not need saying.
Another statement from a provincial newspaper highlight-
ing the same problem also appears in Römer [1905, p. 271,
footnote 1, translation]: “Warning! Recently unemployed indi-
viduals, who understand neither double entry bookkeeping nor
accounts preparation, have frequently been promoting them-
selves as Bücherrevisoren. Are they “Bücherrevisoren”? When will
this issue be remedied?”
From the end of the 19th century, and especially during the
first decades of the 20th century, common standards for audit
work and standardized fee rates were developed [Beigel, 1924, p.
43]. Further, a number of professional associations were
formed, representing the THGs and the BR respectively [Meisel,
1992, pp. 129-150; Markus, 1997, p. 3-9; Haibt, 1998]. These
included the Verband Deutscher Bücherrevisoren (VDB) which
was founded in 1896. It was hoped that membership of this
association would raise the reputation of its members
[Penndorf, 1932].14 The Verband Deutscher Treuhand- und
Revisionsgesellschaften was created in 1920 in order to represent
the interests of the smaller THGs not linked to banks. The fact
that the small audit firms created associations effectively forced
the larger firms to do the same in order to be able to represent
their interests before relevant authorities and the public. Thus
13 Note that this is not a meaningful term in German. In general the German
in the original advert is poor.
14 According to Hintner [1926, pp. 54-55], by 1925 the VDB had 842 mem-
bers, while the number of sworn-in BR active in Germany at about this time was
estimated as approximately 2000.
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the Reichsbund Deutscher Treuhand-Aktiengesellschaften was cre-
ated to represent the large THG AGs [Hintner, 1926, pp. 82-84].
Although pursuing contrasting agendas in other respects,
the different associations united in their demand for the legal
regulation of the external audit [Meisel, 1992, pp. 151-167;
Markus, 1997, pp. 12-13]. They were supported in this by the
banks, the legal profession [Quick, 1990; Haibt, 1998], academ-
ics and the trade press [Klausing, 1933]. At the same time de-
mands were made for standardized regulation of the education,
training, appointment and licensing of members of the audit
profession [ibid.]. By 1924 the VDB had drafted suggestions for
legislation governing the regulation of the audit and the educa-
tional, ethical and other criteria for entry to the profession. A
second version was later drafted jointly with representatives of
other associations of BR. However, both these attempts were
rejected because of concerns that they were intended to protect
the interests of the BR by implementing restrictive practices
detrimental to the public interest [Gietzmann and Quick, 1998,
pp. 88-89]. Voß [1927, p.1, translation], a syndic of the VDB, and
thus an interested party, commented as follows:
. . . the discussion of the problem in the public domain
has been infected by the most diverse interests. One can
choose to retain the corporation law in its current con-
tent, one may choose to reform it, in any case economic
interests are at risk, which appear to be diametrically
opposed and whose representatives in turn, and in ex-
cluding each other, claim their interests alone represent
those of the public.
Thus the diverging interests of the various professional
groups comprised an obstacle to the regulation of the audit and
the profession [Klausing, 1933, p. 176]. Their views on how the
profession should be controlled differed considerably, on issues
such as legal and organizational forms, self-regulation or state-
control, and the regulation of education, training and licensing
[see also Meisel, 1992, p. 151]. Other (and earlier) arguments
against the introduction of the statutory audit related to a per-
ceived lack of suitably qualified auditors [Klausing, 1933, pp.
175, 177]. Weber-Boun [1904, p. 30, translation] compared inter
alia the training of British accountants with the situation in
Germany. He concluded that Germany was not ready for regula-
tion because “suitable individuals in sufficient number are not
available, a shortfall which at best could only be corrected in a
number of years”.
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The lack of comprehensive regulation of the audit resulted
in a reluctance by foreign lenders and investors to provide capi-
tal to German firms unless they had been audited by the lenders’
or investors’ own auditors [Markus, 1997, pp. 13-17; Haibt,
1998]. Foreign capital was required as a result of the economic
crisis following World War I. This led a number of Anglo-Ameri-
can audit firms to establish branches in Germany [Markus,
1997, pp. 14-17]. It also gave rise to suggestions to introduce an
external audit based on Anglo-American models (which were
rejected) [Haibt, 1998]. However, the economic crisis of the
1920s led to renewed pressure for the introduction of the statu-
tory audit [Meisel, 1992; Quick, 1990; Haibt, 1998]. It also en-
couraged increasing state intervention in the economy. In 1925
the state-owned Deutsche Revisions- und Treuhand-AG
(Treuarbeit) was created, which increasingly carried out audits
of enterprises in which the state owned shares, and additionally
gained appointments through the representatives of private en-
terprise on its own supervisory board. Many of these audits had
previously been carried out by BR working as sole-proprietors
or in small firms [Haibt, 1998, p. 33].
By the late 1920s the German audit (at its best) had devel-
oped from being a formelles (“formal”) audit, concerned with
presentation and legal compliance, to a materielles (“material” or
“substantial”) audit, concerned with examining the economic
validity of measurements and valuations and assessing the situa-
tion of an enterprise as a whole [Schwäbische Treuhand-
Aktiengesellschaft (Schitag), 1931]. However, until it was regu-
lated by law, the scope of the audit remained under the control
of the supervisory board which commissioned it, and was often
limited [Schitag, 1931]. The state still hesitated to introduce re-
forms until spectacular collapses took place between 1929 and
1931 (especially that of Favag, summer 1929). These convinced
the legislature that the control function of the supervisory board
and the voluntary or internal audit were insufficient, that the
audit profession required regulation, and that a compulsory an-
nual audit was required [Klausing, 1933, p. 177].
Further, by this time the different associations of BR and
THGs had, after long negotiations, jointly founded the Institut
für das Revisions- und Treuhandwesen (August 1930), which in
early 1932 became the Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer [ibid.]. The
statutory audit was finally introduced (although initially only for
very large companies), the profession of Wirtschaftsprüfer (WP)
formally “created”, and additional accounting and publication
requirements implemented with the reform of the corporation
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law through the presidential decree Verordnung des Reichs-
präsidenten über Aktienrecht, Bankenaufsicht und über eine
Steueramnestie in 1931. The new law contained specific rules on
the appointment, independence and rights and duties of the au-
ditor [Quick, 1990; see also Meisel, 1992, pp. 168-203; Markus,
1997, Chapter 2].
Bücherrevisoren versus Treuhandgesellschaften: As indicated
above, the differing objectives and ensuing power struggle be-
tween the two “faces” of the profession, the BR and the audit
THGs, encouraged regulation by the state and contributed to the
delay in introducing the statutory audit. Disputes between the
groups centered on two main issues: the THGs’ increasing share
of the audit (and related services) market, to which their link
with the banks and/or state was a contributing factor, and the
question of organizational and legal forms. In relation to the
latter, the question arose as to whether a corporation (AG or
GmbH) could be a suitable legal form for the so-called freie
Berufe (“free professions”)15 with their ideologies of indepen-
dence, public service, responsibility, and individual judgment.
Two publications in the 1920s illustrated the different positions
– Beigel’s [1924] Lehrbuch (teaching textbook) on accounting
and auditing contained a political condemnation of the THG
audit corporations, which he considered reflected the political
agenda of capitalism. Beigel considered THGs to be “obedient
servants of capitalist-speculative interests” [ibid., pp. 14, 52].
Hintner’s [1926] more moderate Habilitationsschrift16 stressed
the advantages of the bank-owned THGs. He distinguished three
types of audit THG AGs: bankmässig orientierte (those owned by
banks); erwerbsmässig orientierte (those founded by individual or
small numbers of BR), and; konzernmässig orientierte (those
founded by commercial enterprises/groups) [ibid., 1926, p. 60].17
One of the important differences between the different types
of legal forms and sizes of audit firms related to their financial
capital. On behalf of the large bank-owned THGs it was argued
that their share capital, which was usually considerable,
15 For a discussion of the differences between the terms “profession” (in the
UK) and “freie Berufe” (in Germany) see Vieten [1995, p. 487] or Kocka [1990, p.
62].
16 Second thesis required of those aspiring to an academic career.
17 At around Hintner’s time of writing there were 22 bankmässig orientierte
THG AGs, 85 erwerbsmässig orientierte THG AGs, and 12 konzernmässig
orientierte THG AGs [ibid., pp. 62-78].
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provided a security or bond against damages caused by auditors’
mistakes.18 The reputation of the associated banks themselves,
as well as that of the audit firms, also provided a source of non-
financial security. An established audit corporation had incen-
tives to avoid damage to reputation as much as an individual
practitioner. The reputations of the management and supervi-
sory board members offered an additional bond. This provided
incentives for the large firms to implement careful personnel
and monitoring policies. The konzernmässig orientierten THGs,
especially if older, also often had a reputation which could act
as security. But, according to Hintner [1926] the share capital,
and thus the financial bond, was considered to be too low.19 He
suggested that the title THG AG might have been intended to
mislead the market as to the size of the enterprise.
According to Beigel, it would have been impossible to sue
auditors for errors, because the law held the supervisory board
solely responsible and liable for the supervision of management
[see HGB 1897 §§ 246-249]. In his view, the financial bond was,
therefore, of limited significance. He further stressed that the
audit was carried out by employees of the corporations. An error
by one of these employees would have led to a reprimand or
perhaps dismissal, but did not threaten the existence of the cor-
poration. While the unincorporated sole practitioner had no
large financial bond to offer, Beigel [1924, pp. 31-32, 52-53]
stressed that the loss of reputation might have meant the loss of
one’s livelihood. Hintner conceded that the sole practitioner,
with his personal liability, provided a stronger bond than the
small THG AGs, whose owners risked only their share capital
and damage to the reputation of the firm. Both corporations
and individuals could increase the guarantees they provided
through insurance, but it was not always easy for individual
auditors to obtain such cover [Hintner, 1926, p. 94].
One of the strongest perceived advantages of the BR was the
personal relationship of trust with the client. This was linked to
18 Hintner also pointed out that it was common for only 25% of the share
capital to be paid up. This suggests that it was mainly intended as a security for
the client rather than being required for the running of the company.
19 For example, he considered RM 5,000-10,000 to be too low. For the bank-
related THGs the share capital ranged from RM 5000 to RM 1,200,000, with an
average of approximately RM 120,000. For the erwerbsmässig orientierten the
average was less than RM 40,000 and for the konzernmässig orientierten RM
157,000. Note that these sums cannot be compared with those in footnote 6
because, following the hyperinflation of the early 1920s, a new currency, the
Rentenmark (RM, later Goldmark) was introduced in 1923.
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personal liability. The relationship between the employees carry-
ing out audits on behalf of the THGs and the THGs’ clients was
less strong. Hintner considered this to be an advantage, because
it strengthened independence. Further, large THGs attempted to
provide continuity in the staff that served particular clients, in
order to create personal trust relationships similar to those of-
fered by the sole BR. They had, however, the opportunity to
rotate staff if necessary to protect independence [Hintner, 1926,
p. 94]. BR also relied on employees to carry out audit work on
their behalf. Beigel [1924, p. 54] argued that they merely used
their employees, under supervision, to carry out minor tasks
while the employees of the THGs used a formulaic approach,
and the audit report was signed by the THGs’ directors without
any audit work being reviewed in detail.
A further controversial point was the competence and skill
available to the different types of audit organizations. The
knowledge and abilities of the BR varied considerably. Accord-
ing to Hintner, many did not have the necessary skills. Voß
[1927] lamented the fact that, while BR appointed by state or
regional authorities (such as the chambers of commerce) were
subject to some degree of regulation and disciplinary sanctions,
in general the title Bücherrevisor was not protected. Anybody
could call themselves Bücherrevisor, found an audit firm and
carry out audit work, without having to provide any evidence of
suitability for this work. Voß stated: “It is no secret that there
are many among these individuals who have a criminal record
or who otherwise had a shady reputation and who are probably
least likely to be suited, in particular for such a trust-based
profession as that of the auditor” [ibid., p. 29, translation]. Be-
ing formally licensed was thus a desirable goal for sole practitio-
ners because it would raise their reputation in the eyes of the
public [Hintner, 1926, p. 53]. However, there seemed to be little
consistency in what was required of BR by the chambers of
commerce. Hintner [1926, p. 23] points out that the strong posi-
tion of the THGs in the audit market was partly due to the fact
that they had access to better trained personnel than was the
case for the BR and their larger capital base permitted them to
obtain better staff and allow a certain degree of industry special-
ization. Further, more experienced staff could leave routine
tasks to their assistants. Also, a separation of audit from closely
related work would not be feasible nor desired by clients. Thus a
knowledge of both tax and legal matters was required, which
could be more easily provided by the larger firms.
One of the main criticisms of the THGs concerned auditor
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independence. It was argued that the audit firms founded by
banks and commercial/industrial groups lacked independence
from their clients. Clients often belonged to the same group and
were given little choice in the appointment of auditors. So, for
example, Römer [1905, p. 138, translation] stated: “It is prob-
ably of more concern that the German Treuhandgesellschaft as
auditor cannot be considered independent according to the En-
glish meaning: it should not have pitched its tent in the palace of
the Deutsche Bank and should have turned towards the pure
banking business less energetically!”
Hintner [1926, p. 100] by contrast, argued that attacks on
the independence of the bankmässig orientierten THGs were un-
justified, because the banks would have no interest in influenc-
ing an audit opinion (but see below). With regard to the
konzernmässig orientierten THGs he argued, though, that the au-
dit was merely equivalent to an internal audit function, as audit
clients were owners (and members of the supervisory board) of
the audit firm and could thus influence the scope of the audit
and the audit process. This might not have been known to exter-
nal shareholders of the auditee [ibid., pp. 100-101].20 On the
other hand, the more substantial capital base of the large THGs
strengthened their independence because it rendered them less
dependent on the fees of an individual client [Hintner, 1926, p.
95]. Theermann [1930, p. 43, translation], a director of a THG
AG, claimed that bank-owned audit firms were less dependent
than the firms without such links because the latter were eco-
nomically dependent on those who made appointments:
I would even like to claim that a bank audit firm often
faces the auditee more “independently” in that it re-
ceives the audit appointment directly from the supervi-
sory board and does not have to make an effort with the
auditee to obtain the appointment. . . . many “free” au-
ditors are finding themselves in the most difficult per-
sonal economic struggle and for this reason very often
are “unfree” when facing their clients. Many criminal
court cases of recent times give a sad verdict on this.
A concern related to the lack of independence was client
confidentiality. Beigel claimed that THGs would breach confi-
dentiality by disclosing sensitive information to the banks with
which they were linked:
20 See also Klausing, 1933, p. 241, for a critique of the apparently common
practice to disguise or window dress such links between auditor and auditee.
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To the outside these companies present themselves as
independent organizations, and the firms which place
themselves, with their books and balances, into their
care for the purposes of auditing appear not to know
that a double role is taken in this, in that the results of
the audit are presented to the client; then however also
the bank21 will receive a report regarding the turnover,
credit and asset situation, in short covering everything
which may be of interest to it. In suitable cases the
audit firm receives particular instructions from the
bank regarding which points to keep a special eye on
during the audit [Beigel, 1924, pp. 22-23, translation].
Further: “Businessmen as well as Aktiengesellschaften have
repeatedly complained about the fact that private commercial
activities had become known to non-authorized agencies” [ibid.
p. 24, translation].22 23 However, Hintner [1926, pp. 121-127]
disagreed and claimed that many THGs had developed internal
rules to prevent breaches of client confidentiality.
Part of the objection to the corporate form appears to have
been related to the THG AGs’ large size. The GmbH is a corpo-
rate form more suitable for small and medium-sized enterprises
and has a lower minimum capital requirement. Share owner-
ship is not anonymous and can be more easily monitored and
controlled. According to Hintner [1926, pp. 81-82] the number
of GmbH audit firms increased dramatically after World War I,
but many disappeared just as rapidly. Hintner considered this
legal form unsuitable because it lacked the financial backing to
provide security, no longer guaranteed the personal relationship
with the client which the sole practitioner offered, and was not
publicly accountable. Further, the auditor was usually the
21 Beigel uses the term Großbank (lit.: “large/major bank”).
22 As further evidence Beigel [1924, pp. 28-29] quotes as follows from the
journal Die Bank: “Concerning the fees which the audit firms are claiming … the
costs of the audit are that highly calculated, that really only candidates for
company foundations can normally afford the luxury to charge an audit firm
with the audit of its management. A number of years ago, for example, the
Deutsche Treuhandgesellschaft was involved in a court case because a foundry
would not accept its fees (500 M. for the first, 100 M. for each of the following
days). Later, incidentally, the fees of some firms were somewhat reduced. It
showed that knowledge of others’ balance sheets brings so many indirect advan-
tages, that a little bit of fee income more or less is not relevant” [Buxbaum, 1910,
quoted in Beigel, 1924].
23 It was alleged, for example, that banks founded audit THGs in order to use
them to identify investment targets. This claim is dismissed by Hintner [1926] as
crude and unfeasible, and as not justified by the behaviour of the banks.
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founder, shareholder and director, while friends or family mem-
bers formed the management board. No supervisory board was
required. In other words, no monitoring or control needed to be
provided [ibid.]. Some GmbHs attempted to enhance their repu-
tation (and bonds) through membership of professional associa-
tions. Size-related advantages of the THGs meant that the big
firms were often more suitable for larger clients and that higher
staff numbers allowed better mutual monitoring and control, as
well as specialization and the ability to tackle larger appoint-
ments (see above). On the other hand, the larger THGs would be
less profitable than sole practitioners because salaried staff
commit resources; high salaries were necessary to attract and
retain quality staff. The larger THG also incurred greater
overheads [Hintner, 1926].
From the early 1900s onwards, but especially in the second
and third decades of the 20th century, the audit market, which
had initially belonged exclusively to the BR, became divided: the
bankorientierten THGs were mainly involved in audits of compa-
nies in which banks had invested and were represented on the
supervisory boards, i.e. their appointment was not a voluntary
choice by the client. The small private business, on the other
hand, preferred the BR as auditor, because relationships of per-
sonal trust with an individual were more important. The secured
market share of the THGs restricted the BRs scope for expan-
sion. Competition for the independent sole practitioner also
arose from the foundation of small independent THGs, which
were unable to compete in the market with the larger bank- and
group owned THGs and instead pursued the audits of smaller
enterprises [Hintner, 1926, pp. 128-127].
DISCUSSION
The Audit Requirement and Professionalisation: An examination
of the development of the corporate audit in Germany reveals
early similarities with the experience of the UK. For example,
the internal audit contributed to the development of the external
audit; early audits were carried out by shareholder/director
committees; the development of the audit profession predated
the statutory audit requirement; voluntary audits predated regu-
lation, and; the profession attempted to introduce some degree
of self-regulation. For Watts and Zimmerman, such features
provide evidence in support of contracting theory. Nevertheless,
it appears that despite the above parallels, auditing, the audit
profession, and audit firms developed differently in Germany.
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For example, it is usually suggested that the “modern” German
profession was created by the state, while the UK profession was
created by practitioners [see Vieten, 1995, pp. 504, 487]. Also,
the earliest associations of accountants in Britain were officially
recognized (through Royal Charter) eighty years before the Ger-
man profession achieved a similar status through state recogni-
tion [ibid., p. 494].
Perhaps the most important causes of differences relate to
the respective economic contexts, particularly the growth of
joint stock corporations [Matthews et al., 1998, p. 242]. Hintner
[1926, p. 137] claimed that in England,24 unlike in Germany, no
fixed share capital had to be raised to found a corporation, and
that the existence of much private wealth enabled enterprises to
raise capital from investors without the help of banks. The Brit-
ish capital market always differed from that of other European
countries because: “it started earlier, benefited from the ready
availability of local finance, was granted a cheap and easy
mechanism for incorporating with limited liability, and oper-
ated in a laissez-faire environment in which the audit was the
main safeguard that the market, through contractual arrange-
ments between investors and management, came to insist on”
[Matthews et al., 1998, p. 245].
These factors are related to a further important difference,
namely the respective corporate governance arrangements. In
Germany, companies were traditionally financed by banks, and
the banks were usually represented on companies’ supervisory
boards. Thus the banks had a much closer involvement with
corporations, including the company formation process, than
was the case in the UK. Banks (in theory) exerted a degree of
monitoring over their investments from which other stakehold-
ers benefited [Hintner, 1926, p. 136; see also Gietzman and
Quick, 1998]. The foundation by the banks of the audit THGs
was a means to facilitate such monitoring [Hintner, 1926, p.
137]. In the UK and US, by contrast, management motivation
was (and is) effected through “a market for corporate control”
and fear of takeovers [Gietzmann and Quick, 1998, p. 83].
Hintner [1926, pp. 130-136] suggested that the audit developed
more slowly in Germany than in England because German law
provided better protection for shareholders and creditors
through provisions relating to the supervisory board, accounting
24 Note that German authors frequently focused specifically on England, or
used the term “England” with reference to the whole of the UK.
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and publication requirements, and minimum share capital.
Therefore the need for an audit would only have been felt in
exceptional cases, such as when there was suspicion of fraud or
other particular problems were being experienced. The British
law, however, lacked the protection for shareholders provided
by the German law, and shareholders created their own protec-
tion by demanding an external audit. Therefore, according to
Hintner [ibid., p. 136], the re-introduction of the statutory audit
in the UK in 1900 was merely the codification of existing prac-
tice. On the other hand, with the exception of the bank initia-
tives, due to the form of corporate governance the demand for
the audit in Germany was limited, and this restricted the growth
of the audit industry [ibid., p. 129]. Further, as discussed above,
in Germany the auditors’ reporting responsibilities were to the
supervisory board rather than to the shareholders, and the scope
of their work was usually more restricted [Gietzmann and
Quick, 1998, p. 85].
A further difference relates to the role played by the state in
the professionalization process. While in the UK professions
tended to develop “spontaneously” as a result of initiatives by
voluntary associations, in Germany they were created as a result
of “reform from above” through state initiatives [Neal and Mor-
gan, 2000, pp. 9, 46]. Parliamentary democracy developed in
Germany later than in the UK, and the reforms of the Napole-
onic regime continued to shape administration and jurispru-
dence [ibid., p. 21]. The result of this was that “bureaucratic
authority and constitutional government developed hand in
hand”, “social reforms were the result largely of the civil service
rather than any popular movement” and “[i]n Germany profes-
sional practitioners were far more inclined to look to the state to
organize and regulate the professions” [ibid., p. 9].25 For ex-
ample, Hintner [1926, pp. 141-166] argued that the audit profes-
sion should be subject to formal external supervision. Given its
authoritarian nature the support of the state was required. How-
ever, in spite of the German profession’s efforts to obtain regula-
tion, the state remained reluctant. Gietzman and Quick [1998, p.
90] speculate that this may have been because the members of
the profession were unable to “credentialize their expertise” and
25 The most popular means of organising associations was in the form of
Vereine (associations, societies), which are regulated by law and require registra-
tion and approval of their articles. This permits the authorities to control the
associations’ activities [Neal and Morgan, 2000]. The associations of auditors
were generally registered as Vereine.
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that therefore the profession chose a deliberate strategy of in-
volving academic and state bureaucracies in their development.
As a result these bureaucracies, including higher education, be-
came more influential and led the profession to develop with a
different identity from those in Anglo-American countries
[ibid.]. In consequence “German auditors found it less problem-
atic to view the state and thus society as in part constituting the
client, unlike the more parochial view of British auditors” [ibid.,
pp. 90-91].
Education also formed part of the German and British pro-
fessions’ differing strategies. In Germany, business schools were
founded as early as 1898 – the Handelshochschule in Leipzig was
the first and offered a course for auditors in 1907. Others soon
followed [Karoli, 1934, p. 23]. In the UK, initiatives to introduce
accounting at universities remained rare: “the subject was
largely ignored by British universities while, for their part, the
accounting associations remained entirely committed to their
own pupillage and examination system of qualification”
[Matthews et al., 1998, p. 260].
Vieten suggests that when the state eventually intervened in
Germany, the recognition of the auditing profession was an at-
tempt to control companies and to allow the state to protect the
economic system and society in a much wider sense than was
the case in the UK where the emphasis was on the protection of
shareholders and creditors. According to Neal and Morgan
[2000, p. 20; also Vieten, 1995, p. 487], given the governments’
laissez-faire policies, the professions in Britain would have been
expected to regulate themselves, as there were few26 precedents
for state regulation. Thus professional status was linked in Brit-
ain to membership of elite organizations, rather than to state
recognition, as was the case in Germany. The creation of asso-
ciations also provided a limited safeguard against competition.
In summary, and with reference to the agency theory
assumptions outlined earlier in the paper, it can be concluded
that a separation of ownership and control existed in German
enterprises before, and increasingly after the development of the
AG. This appears to have been the case to a lesser extent than in
the UK for two reasons. Firstly, there were fewer public compa-
nies. Secondly, companies were financed differently, by finan-
cial institutions rather than individual external shareholders
[see Zysman, 1983]. The financial institutions were represented
26 Rare exceptions existed (for example, medicine).
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on companies’ supervisory boards, were thus party to inside
information and in a position to monitor management’s behav-
ior. This reduced the separation between ownership and control
and the pressure for financial reporting and the independent
external audit as means of discharging the manager-agents’ ac-
countability. This indicates that existing agency problems were
not tackled in the same way in Germany. Monitoring was sup-
posed to be carried out by the supervisory board. As late as
1930, von Falkenhausen (a lawyer, 1930, p. 442, translation)
commented critically: “It is thought that the English regulations
can be implemented into German law, without considering that
the “auditors” of the English law have to fulfill a large part of
the functions of the German supervisory board. … a new inde-
pendent control organ [would] have no separate scope, its pow-
ers would overlap to a large extent with those of the supervisory
board”.
For monitoring to lead to a reduction of agency costs, the
market (or the principal) has to be convinced of the monitoring
agency’s competence and independence. However, the supervi-
sory boards were consistently criticized for their members’ lack
of expertise and involvement in companies’ management. The
explanatory memorandum to the 1884 Gesetz betreffend die
Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien und die Aktiengesellschaften
actually argued that some involvement by supervisory board
members in the management activities of the company would
enable them to better meet their supervision and monitoring
duties [p. 289]. However, this involvement became increasingly
problematic, especially when finance from non-German sources
was required and foreign investors had to be attracted. The su-
pervisory boards began to appoint professional auditors to help
with the discharge of their responsibilities. The external audit
also struggled to convince the market of the auditors’ compe-
tence and independence. In particular the smaller BRs seemed
to suffer from a poor reputation regarding a lack of competence,
or at least a perceived lack of consistency in the quality of the
service provided. They were further unable to serve larger cli-
ents and to compete in a market increasingly controlled by com-
plex groups, including influential banks and their related audit
firms. The majority of the larger THGs, while perhaps able to
offer a better quality product, suffered from a lack of indepen-
dence. They could certainly not be considered as independent in
the sense expected of British auditors [see Römer, 1905, quoted
above]. However, with the exception of foreign investors, there
appears to have been less need to convince the market, as
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a market share was guaranteed through group structures and
networks. It appears that the audit was only one of a number of
ways of dealing with agency problems, and that the supervisory
board remained the main mechanism, supported by more de-
tailed company law. It remained liable for the monitoring of the
company, even when external auditors were appointed [see
above, also Gietzman and Quick, 1998, p. 85 and Beigel, 1924].
Further, while according to agency theory auditing is one of the
ways of reducing agency costs, in Germany an independent ex-
ternal audit appears to have been expensive [see e.g. Buxbaum,
1910], unless it could be provided by a firm within the same
group.
If self-regulation had been more successful, professional as-
sociations might have been a means of reducing the cost of
ensuring auditor competence and independence and the audit
might have provided better value for money. However, in Ger-
many the profession failed to sufficiently convince the market or
the state of their members’ competence. Nevertheless, there ap-
pears to have been a perception that an audit regulated by the
government would ensure the required quality and reduce
agency costs.
The audit developed differently from that in the UK. Its
scope in Germany was narrower and the auditors saw the super-
visory board, rather than the shareholders, as their main princi-
pal. It can be argued that an external audit was not really re-
quired to the same extent as in the UK, because, as suggested
above, due to different corporate governance arrangements the
separation between ownership and control was limited.
Agency theory and related assumptions regarding the orga-
nizational and legal forms of audit firms are now examined in
the German context, under the headings established earlier in
the paper.
Reputation and Professional Associations: As outlined above,
reputation and membership of professional associations can
serve as the auditor’s collateral bond [Watts and Zimmerman,
1986, Chapter 13]. Further, membership of a professional asso-
ciation signals the auditor’s competence and independence
[ibid.]. In the UK professional associations have a long history,
as has professional self-regulation. Velayutham [1996] argues
that corporatization is detrimental to professional self-
regulation because this is achieved through the control of indi-
viduals, i.e. firms that take the form of partnership are more
easily regulated through their individual owners. As we have
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seen, in Germany the different professional groups also began to
form associations long before the profession was regulated by
the state. The question arises whether these associations were
founded for the same reasons, intended to serve the same pur-
poses as their British counterparts, and whether their creation
supports Watts and Zimmerman’s arguments.
It appears that the motives for professional organization
were perhaps more heterogeneous in Germany than in the UK.
Clearly, the motivation of the BR, who founded the earliest asso-
ciation (the VDB), was similar to that of their UK counterparts.
It could also be argued in support of Watts and Zimmerman’s
assumption that the BR intended to raise their members’ reputa-
tion by standardizing audit quality and education requirements,
thus signaling their competence. As suggested by Hintner
[1926], those firms who had little to offer by way of financial
bonds would have benefited from organization – essentially let-
ting reputation and membership of an association serve as a
bond. The associations formed by the smaller THGs seemed to
have been driven by similar considerations. The Verband
Deutscher Treuhand- und Revisionsgesellschaften, for example,
did not accept bank-owned THGs as members because of con-
cerns over independence [Haibt, 1998]. However, it appears that
in the UK reputation and membership of professional associa-
tions were more important than in Germany because English
law did not provide much guidance to the auditor and the audit
opinion was to a larger extent based on subjective professional
judgment. Thus the reputation of the auditor was crucial in
adding credibility to the audited accounts [Hintner, 1926, p.
140]. Hintner seems to consider the “good name” of the auditor
in the UK as synonymous with the title of chartered accountant.
In Germany, for the large audit corporations, especially
those owned by banks, the motivation for forming professional
associations was probably different. They did not require non-
financial bonds to the same extent as the BR, and while they
were not independent, they had less need for a reputation of
independence. However, when the BR and the smaller THGs
attempted to achieve regulation of the audit and the profession,
the larger THGs required an organization to represent their in-
terests. Following Velayutham’s [1996] suggestion, their result-
ant associations would have found it more difficult to regulate
their members and would have been unlike the associations
formed by the British profession.
Probably to a greater extent than the British profession, in
the 1920s the German associations lobbied the government for
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audit regulation. This may have been an attempt to gain market
control. It may also have been due to the fact that, while the
German profession looked towards the UK profession as a
model [see e.g. Karoli, 1934, p. 21], its members misunderstood
the role of the state (and of the Royal Charter) in the UK.
Karoli’s interpretation of the developments in the UK suggest
that he believed there to be a considerable degree of state inter-
ference [1934, pp. 19-20]. It is possible that such perceptions of
state initiatives in the UK was an additional reason why German
auditors lobbied for state intervention. It is perhaps more likely
that, as a result of the environmental and cultural differences
discussed above, the German profession employed a different
strategy to “credentialize its expertise” by relying on academic
education and state regulation [Gietzmann and Quick, 1998, p.
90].
Organisational Form: Agency theory/contracting theory makes
the following claims: unlimited liability provides larger collat-
eral bonds in the form of the partners’ personal assets [Watts
and Zimmerman, 1986, Chapter 13]; unlimited liability signals
the auditors’ independence to the market [ibid.]; risk is not di-
visible or transferable, hence larger resources are required for
monitoring and only limited capital is available for expansion
and diversification [Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 522]; joint
and several liability provides strong incentives for mutual moni-
toring [ibid.]; mutual monitoring increases incentives for com-
petence and independence [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, Chap-
ter 13]; and, audit firms have few assets - the most important
asset being human capital [Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, pp. 522-
523].
In 1926 Hintner [pp. 120, 138] argued that the large accoun-
tancy firms in the UK were comparable to the German audit
corporations because they, too, relied on the division of labor.
They were managed by a number of owners and often employed
a staff of up to 100, and as a rule more than 10. The only and
purely external difference, according to Hintner, was that the
German audit firms were legal entities, while the English firms
were partnerships. This was an oversimplification. Many of the
agency theory/contracting theory assumptions do not apply to
German THGs, especially the large ones linked to banks or com-
mercial groups. If formed as an AG, they would have had to
meet the considerable capital requirement legally prescribed for
this form. If founded by the government or banks, the raising of
this capital would not have been a problem and, as argued
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above, would be available as a substantial collateral bond. The
limitation of liability would have reduced the incentives for mu-
tual monitoring. The need for monitoring would have been (in
theory at least) partially met by the supervisory boards, al-
though it is unlikely that these were involved in monitoring the
audit work itself as they lacked the expertise and would have
been prevented by confidentiality rules. Firms founded and
owned by banks could not be considered to be independent,
especially if their shares were held by audit clients. However,
this also meant that they were less dependent on a free market
and, therefore, did not need to signal their independence and
competence in order to compete. The German legal definition of
the audit client differed from that in Anglo-American countries
as a result of the role of banks in corporate governance
[Gietzmann and Quick, 1998, p. 82].
Finally, Fama and Jensen [1983b, p. 334] suggest that the
residual claims of professional partnerships are characterized by
flexible sharing rules, inalienability and limited horizons. These
features distinguish them from the residual claims of other or-
ganizations and are retained when professional partnerships be-
come corporations.27 This does not apply to German THGs dur-
ing the period under investigation, since it was possible to sell
ownership shares in an audit firm to non-auditor outsiders (al-
though Hintner, [1926, p. 60] claims that this was not common).
Size: Agency theory/contracting theory suggests that larger firms
can offer larger bonds, provide greater opportunities for mutual
monitoring and may be better able to develop brand names
[Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, Chapter 13]. This situation ap-
plied to German corporate firms. However, while in the UK,
with its large professional partnerships, the residual claimants
were also audit experts, this was not the case in German audit
corporations. This had implications for the need for monitoring,
which was to some extent carried out by the audit firms’ super-
visory boards. Also the suggestion that decision control systems
would be similar for different types of organizations did not
apply in Germany, but the crucial factor appears to have been
less the size or even the legal form of the audit firm, but rather
whether it was owned and controlled by auditors or by external
owners. Other size-related factors were the ability of the larger
audit firms to provide specialization and offer a range of
27 This appears to be supported by van Lent’s [1999] evidence regarding
KPMG in the Netherlands.
69
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2003, Vol. 30, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2003
61Evans: Auditing and Audit Firms in Germany before 1931
services, which enabled them to increase their market share.
Further aspects of size have already been covered, where rel-
evant, under the other two headings above.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper examined the development of auditing and atti-
tudes to the legal and organizational forms of audit firms in
Germany prior to the formal regulation of the audit and the
audit profession in 1931. It concluded that there were parallel
developments in the UK and US, drawn on by Watts and
Zimmerman [1983] as evidence for certain agency theory as-
sumptions, and that, in particular, a separation of ownership
and control and similar agency problems existed. However, due
to different financing and corporate governance arrangements
in Germany these occurred to a lesser extent than in the UK and
US. Further, it was not generally accepted until relatively late
that an independent external audit would provide the best solu-
tion to these problems. When the independent external audit
was considered, it was only in addition to the monitoring func-
tions of the earlier German solution, the supervisory board, and
its acceptance appears to have been strongly influenced by the
British example. Thus auditing developed much later in Ger-
many as a secondary device to facilitate the supervisory board’s
monitoring duties.
The paper’s findings suggest that explanations offered for
the partnership form of audit firms by agency theorists may be
over-generalizing the role of professional organizations in famil-
iar Anglo-American cultural contexts. These theories may also
have limited explanatory value in relation to different cultures
and traditions. The findings of this paper suggest that different
attitudes to the organizational features of audit firms appeared
only partly to be determined by legal form. Perhaps greater ex-
planatory value is offered by the factor of size. This is supported
by Fama and Jensen’s [1983a, 1983b] claim that certain features
of professional firms are retained even when these firms incor-
porate. Van Lent’s [1999] more recent findings regarding KPMG
in the Netherlands also suggests that the organizational/gover-
nance structure did not change significantly when the firm in-
corporated. However, an alternative, and possibly even more
significant explanatory factor for audit firms’ features is owner-
ship, i.e. by auditors versus external non-auditors, and thus the
question whether decision makers are also the residual risk-
bearers. The ownership of KPMG in the Netherlands did not
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change when the firm altered its legal form, and thus its gover-
nance did not change.
Further, as the audit market in Germany during the period
under investigation was structured differently from that in the
UK or US, it was less important to signal independence because
appointments were often arranged through the banks as joint
owners/capital providers of audit firms and clients. Finally, the
objective of the audit differed. In Germany the emphasis was
(and to some extent still is) more on compliance with law and
regulations, and less (as in Anglo-American countries) on the
assessment of fair presentation or true and fair view. This was
linked to different ownership and corporate governance struc-
tures in German compared to Anglo-American audit clients. As a
result, German auditors acted as agents to the supervisory
boards rather than to the shareholders [Gietzmann and Quick,
1998, p. 83] and were intended to aid the supervisory board in
discharging its accountability to shareholders. This again sug-
gests that independence was seen to be less important.
With regard to the paper’s subsidiary objective, the exami-
nation of the limitations of Watts and Zimmerman’s and more
general agency theory assumptions, it appears that, although
Watts and Zimmerman [1983] utilize historical evidence in sup-
port of their approach, agency theory is flawed as a basis for
historical theorization. The findings of the current study rein-
force Gray and Calvasina’s [1995, p. 35] warning against “ex-
tending modern rational expectations and assumptions to ear-
lier periods of history”. On closer examination and in the light of
recent developments, much of the agency theory explanation for
the legal and organizational form of audit firms is also suspect
in the UK and US contexts. For example, Lee [1993, p. 111]
argues that the suggestion that auditor liability is an incentive
for competence and independence [see Watts and Zimmerman,
1986, pp. 316-318]: “is inconsistent with recent developments in
the US and elsewhere to incorporate audit firms with limited
liability – that is, the position taken by such bodies as the AICPA
in the US that incorporation is permissible as a means of re-
stricting the exposure of auditors to the considerable financial
loss of litigation”.
It may be concluded that agency theory is less suitable as a
foundation for historical theorization than approaches which
analyze historical events within their social contexts [see Mills,
1993]. In other words, agency theory, its philosophical and
methodological shortcomings aside, is too narrow to form a sat-
isfactory basis of explanation. This highlights the importance of
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analyzing developments in the history of German auditing in
their particular contexts. The present paper has attempted to
provide an overview of these developments. Further detailed
study is required to better understand the complex history of
auditing and the organizational forms of audit firms in Ger-
many.
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Abstract: The impact of World War II on cost accountancy in the U.S.
may be viewed as a double-edged sword. Its most positive effect was
engendering greater cost awareness, particularly among companies
that served as military contractors and, thus, had to make full repre-
sentation to contracting agencies for reimbursement. On the negative
side, the dislocations of war, especially shortages in the factors of
production and capacity constraints, meant that such “scientific man-
agement” techniques as existed (standard costing, time-study, specific
detailing of task routines) fell by the wayside. This paper utilizes the
archive of the Sperry Corporation, a leading governmental contractor,
to chart the firm’s accounting during World War II. It is concluded
that any techniques that had developed from Taylorite principles
were suspended, while methods similar to contemporary perfor-
mance management, such as subcontracting, emphasis on the design
phase of products, and substantial expenditure on research and devel-
opment, flourished.
INTRODUCTION
It has long been hypothesized by accounting historians that
advanced cost accounting theory, featuring time-studies, stan-
dard costing, and variance analysis, was born in the U.S. in the
early 20th century during the age of Taylor and scientific
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management. More contentious is the argument that these
innovations flourished in industrial managerial practice in suc-
ceeding decades. Traditional histories of cost accounting, such
as Littleton [1933], Solomons [1952], Garner [1954], and Wells
[1978], among others, have supported standard costing specifi-
cally as a key component of what Solomons [1952, p. 8] labeled
“the costing renaissance.” Standard costing has become a virtual
surrogate for the methods that Taylor and others were espous-
ing. Later-day historians, representing the major paradigmatic
schools that have studied U.S. industrialization [Johnson and
Kaplan, 1987, pp. 49-50 for economic rationalism; Miller and
O’Leary, 1987, p. 238 for Foucauldianism; and Hopper and
Armstrong, 1991, p. 433 for Marxism/labor process], have all
seconded this judgment, albeit interpreting developments from
widely differing perspectives. There can be no question that the
theoretical basis of standard costing and variance analysis was
laid in the significant outpouring of the period, featuring the
work of Taylor [1903, 1911], Whitmore [1908], Emerson [1908-
09], Harrison [1930], and others.
Many accounting historians have advanced the argument
that Taylorism and scientific management were not merely theo-
retical successes at the turn of the 20th century, but practical
successes as well. Among the authors who have espoused this
view are many of the best known and respected names in ac-
counting history and cost accounting theory, including the au-
thors of the traditional histories mentioned above, as well as
more recent scholars of standard costing, Sowell [1973] and
Epstein [1978]. Standard costing and variance analysis are gen-
erally believed to have been one, if not the single, most impor-
tant innovation arising from the work of Frederick W. Taylor
[Epstein, 1978].
In fact, time-and-motion studies, the development of labor
standards, the calculation of variances, and the analysis of re-
sults were actually the contribution of engineers (like Taylor),
not accountants [Wells, 1978]. Nevertheless, the benefits of
these new systems have clear application to cost accounting for
purposes of both decision making and control. It is a natural
assumption that the U.S. industrial sector would have imple-
mented into practice the new methods advanced in the theoreti-
cal literature.
Only recently have several accounting historians begun to
question whether the theoretical success of scientific manage-
ment can be seen in a parallel expansion of scientific manage-
ment techniques in general practice, at least in the U.S.
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[Fleischman, 2000b; Fleischman and Tyson, 1999, 2000].1 These
works, based on archival research, revealed little evidence of
sophisticated cost accounting or standard costing prior to the
World War II period. The same theory/practice schism discussed
by Fleischman [2000 a, b] was also observed by DeBeelde [1995,
p. 91] in a study of the Belgian coal industry and by Anderson
[2003] in an investigation of World War II munitions provision-
ing in Australia that parallels this paper in some respects.
School is still out with regard the prevalence of scientific
management practice prior to World War II. Oakes and Miranti
[1996] found that Louis Brandeis had popularized Taylorism in
urging standard costing for regulating rates on U.S. railroads in
the pre-World War I era. Bhimani [1993] felt that World War I
had actually precipitated scientific management at Renault. By
contrast, McKinstry [1999] and Brown [1993] found no evidence
of standard costing in case studies of Albion Motors and
Meccano, Ltd. respectively. Edwards et al. [1995, p. 37, fn. 45]
observed the lag of scientific management’s advance in the U.K.
and France, both in terms of theory and practice, but in so
doing accepted the traditional view of its prevalence in the U.S.
In point of fact, Boyns [1998] referenced Ashton et al. [1995]
and Locke [1979] to support the contention that scientific
management’s real introduction into the U.K. followed the
Anglo-American Council of Productivity visits to the U.S. after
World War II. Zimnovitch [1997] came to a similar conclusion
in a study of standard costing at Saint-Gobain saying that the
introduction of U.S. methods in France awaited the “productiv-
ity missions” of 1948-51.
There have been several studies based on the actual records
of Frederick Taylor. Nelson [1974] conducted archival research
into the Taylor archive at the Stevens Institute of Technology
and found less than 50 firms mentioned by Taylor or his associ-
ates as having implemented elements of scientific management.
For half of the firms mentioned, Nelson found the archives to be
unclear regarding a company’s degree of adoption of scientific
management techniques. In a similar study, Epstein [1978]
found only 36 firms mentioned in the Taylor archives that
clearly exhibited adoption of Taylor’s methods. In 1915, R.F.
Hoxie, a University of Chicago economist, visited 30 firms
1 Loft [1986, 1990] observed a number of scientific management practices in
the British government’s provisioning processes during World War I, findings
that do not correspond to Marriner’s [1980] work.
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whose names had been supplied by Taylor and his competitor
consultants, Emerson and Gantt, as having implemented scien-
tific management principles. Hoxie [1920] reported back to the
U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations that there was consid-
erable variability in application and that no single firm had
implemented all elements of a system recommended by any of
the trio.
When Fleischman [2000b] merged these three lists (those of
Nelson, Epstein, and Hoxie), eliminating the duplicates, he
found only 80 firms that had been offered by Taylor and his
colleagues as examples of scientific management in practice; a
small group out of thousands of large U.S. businesses. At the
end of World War I, Morris Cooke, an engineer and proselytizer
for Taylor’s methods, was reputed to have said, “We could not
sell scientific management 30 years ago, and we can hardly sell
it today” [quoted in Haber, 1964, p. 120].
A large stumbling block when attempting to implement sci-
entific management techniques was the post-World War I rise of
industrial unions, a group both philosophically and practically
opposed to scientific management on several grounds. Time-
study in particular seemed to offend workers who found it hu-
miliating and saw it as a way to break tasks into tiny compo-
nents, essentially “deskilling” and devaluing labor. Taylor’s
failure to convince labor that scientific management was in its
best interest may have slowed the spread of standard costing
and other scientific management techniques during the years
between the two world wars [Hoxie, 1920; Nadworny, 1955;
Braverman, 1974; Epstein, 1978; Hopper and Armstrong, 1991;
Kanigel, 1997]. It has also been argued that scientific manage-
ment and standard costing were simply too complex and too
expensive for widespread adoption [Nelson, 1975; Montgomery,
1987]. Regardless of the reasons, there is only weak evidence
suggesting the widespread implementation of standard costing
prior to the end of World War II. In earlier research into two
episodes of large-scale governmental intrusion into the Ameri-
can industrial economy, the War Industries Board of World War
I and the National Recovery Administration of the Great Depres-
sion, Fleischman and Tyson [1999, 2000] found that little evi-
dence existed of standard costing systems in this country.
Despite the lack of evidence thus far, there are reasons to
expect that the advent of World War II might have provided
impetus for the increased adoption of sophisticated cost ac-
counting techniques. “Cost keeping,” the antecedent of modern
cost accounting, first arose in New England at the beginning of
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the 19th century in large industries such as mining, textiles, and
arms-making [Johnson, 1972; Porter, 1980; Tyson, 1990, 1992;
Hoskin and Macve, 1996; Fleischman and Tyson, 1998] – all
important industries in times of war. Prior to the Civil War, the
most sophisticated user of cost accounting control method was
the Springfield Armory, supporting the notion that arms manu-
facture lends itself to sophisticated cost accounting techniques
[Chandler, 1977; Hoskin and Macve, 1988, 1994, 2000; cf. Tyson
1990, 1993, 2000]. Several incidents of labor unrest can be
traced to governmental attempts to install time-and-motion
studies at government arsenals and other facilities, attesting to
the fact that the government was seriously interested in these
techniques and their application to military installations. Promi-
nent among these labor disruptions were those at the Naval
Shipyard at Mare Island and the Watertown Arsenal. The strike
at Watertown in 1911, reported to be a result of labor’s hostility
to time-and-motion studies, was so severe that Congress passed
legislation prohibiting time-studies in governmental arsenals
and shipyards, a prohibition that lasted from 1915 to 1949
[Montgomery, 1987, p. 221]. Nevertheless, increased patriotism
and labor shortages during World War II might have been ex-
pected to counter organized labor’s resistance to scientific man-
agement techniques. Finally, Loft [1986, 1990] has argued that
the World War I relationship between munitions suppliers and
the British government resulted in significant advances in cost
accounting practices in Great Britain. Montgomery [1979, pp.
121-122] argued that scientific management’s appeal increased
in the U.S. during World War I. Perhaps the World War II expe-
rience would be similar. The American industrial sector was
fully mobilized to support not only the country’s own war effort
but to function as well as “the arsenal of democracy”. Would
governmental contracting mandate a more careful attention to
costs than had been the case previously? Would the genesis of
standard costing in practice be in evidence at this rather late
date in U.S. cost accounting history?
Although certainly not without its problems [Johnson,
2000], Fleischman [2000a] has argued that it is largely through
the agency of archival research that the extent and existence of
such theory/practice schisms can be more fully identified and
evaluated. Accordingly, we have chosen the Sperry Corporation,
a leading manufacturer of aircraft components and a “prime”
governmental contractor, as a case study. Sperry has several
advantages as a subject for this study of scientific management
techniques during World War II. First, and most obvious, is the
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existence of a large archive of Sperry material housed at the
Hagley Library and Museum in Wilmington, Delaware.2 Second
is the fact that Elmer Sperry was, first and foremost, an engi-
neer and, thus, more likely to embrace scientific management
techniques. Third, Sperry Corporation had excellent labor rela-
tions. The archives are replete with examples of the president or
general manager of the company sending personal letters to
clerical and factory workers congratulating them on the births
of their children or sending well wishes to ill or hospitalized
employees. As early as 1940, 57% of Sperry’s workers had been
on the job for less than one year. By mid-1945, over 16,000
Sperry employees had entered the armed forces. Yet, throughout
the war, despite stressful working conditions and the constant
turnover in employees, there was not a single work stoppage or
labor dispute at a Sperry installation [Acc 1910, #024].3
THE WORLD WAR II ACCOUNTING ENVIRONMENT
To understand accounting developments at Sperry Corpora-
tion during World War II, it is necessary to grasp the larger
environment of the war’s impact upon existing methodologies
and the effect of large-scale governmental contracting on pre-
existing conditions. To this end, we surveyed the cost account-
ing journal literature of the wartime period as represented by
the National Association of Cost Accountants (NACA) Bulletins
and Yearbooks, the Accounting Review, and the Journal of Ac-
countancy.
Most speakers at the NACA annual conventions did not con-
vey much hope that cost accountancy had broached the schism
with theory, particularly with regard to standard costing. Howell
[1942, pp. 10-11], the NACA’s president in 1942, observed in his
presidential address, “It is astonishing to find the number of our
members who, while they recognize the vocabulary of standard
costs, do not comprehend its meaning”. He went on to suggest
that although standard cost accounting “marked a great advance
in the science of cost accounting,” it did have its “shortcomings
and obscurities”. Massell [1941, p. 6], a cost consultant with the
2 The reader is directed to the Hagley’s website at www.hagley.lib.de.us/
1915.htm.
3 References to the Sperry archive are by accession number (Acc 1910) and
item number (#024). Where large amounts of information are located within a
single accession number, references may also include box, file, and/or folder
numbers.
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Office of Production Management, pointed out to delegates that
costs and prices in defense contracting had not been very closely
related in the past and that cost estimating would have to be-
come “ more significant factor in price policy”. Bennett [1945, p.
118], with the accounting firm of Cooley & Marvin, summed up
the prewar milieu in flowery fashion: “Not many years ago the
advocates of standard costs were like voices crying in the wilder-
ness. They were looked upon sometimes kindly, more often not,
by the orthodox brethren as adherents of some strange and
slightly heretical faith”.
The National Industrial Conference Board conducted a sur-
vey in 1938 that revealed that only 152 of 818 respondents car-
ried work-in-process inventory at standard. McEachren [1940, p.
681] of Ernst and Ernst, in referencing this report, observed that
although these statistics were not conclusive about the extent of
standards utilization, they did “indicate that a large proportion
of manufacturing companies probably do not have a standard
cost system”. A number of speakers at wartime NACA conven-
tions suggested that standard costing was around, but that it
was not particularly effective because these systems were ad-
equate for control but not for pricing [Nourse, 1945, p. 37], were
inflexible in the face of changing conditions [Bullis, 1945, p. 12],
and had achieved a measure of sophistication only with regard
their engineering (physical) as opposed to their accounting
(bookkeeping) aspects [Bennett, 1945, pp. 125-127].
In our view, the state of the cost accounting art as America
went to war belied the prevalent theoretical outpouring of the
interwar period. Speeches to NACA delegates [Myers, 1943;
Caminez, 1944; Greer, 1944; Bennett, 1945; Burke, 1945], al-
though preaching to the choir, urged the value of standard cost-
ing and variance analysis in very rudimentary terms. One would
expect more substantial issues related to standards had the
methodology been more universally known. Finally, the stan-
dard costing addresses by Caminez [1944] and Bullis [1945]
were delivered in sessions respectively named “Tomorrow’s Cost
Accountant” and “The Job Ahead,” suggesting that current prac-
tice did not reflect the methodology thought to be so prevalent.
Government Contracting: The Legislation: The U.S. government,
in its role as the “arsenal of democracy,” was most concerned
that the “disastrous results” of war provisioning in World War I,
where cost-plus-percentage-of-cost contracting had fleeced tax-
payers of an extra $15 billion according to Baruch’s estimate,
should not be repeated [Taggart, 1941a, p. 35; Taggart, 1941b;
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see also Fleischman and Tyson, 2000]. In point of fact, the gov-
ernment had forbidden cost-plus contracts, opting instead for
cost-plus-fixed-fee (preferred at the onset of hostilities) and, sub-
sequently, fixed-price contracts with escalator clauses [Stewart,
1943, p. 20]. Moreover, the Office of Price Administration and
Civilian Supply (OPA) was founded in spring 1941 to spearhead
price stabilization and cost auditing efforts. Even earlier, on
June 28, 1940, Treasury Decision (TD) 5000 had specified those
costs that the government was not prepared to reimburse. The
“Green Book” (“Explanation of Principles for Determination of
Costs under Government Contracts”) reiterated TD 5000 in April
1942. Public Act 528, also of April 1942, was the primary “rene-
gotiation” statute that enabled the government to recapture “un-
intentionally realized excess profits” resulting from volume
manufacture and learning curve improvements in the manufac-
ture of war materiel [Seybold, 1942, p. 131].
Government Contracting: The Realities: It would appear on the
surface that this magnitude of governmental control would pre-
cipitate a greater cost awareness and control among contractors.
Indeed, the magnitude of data that governmental agencies re-
quired was staggering and the source of frequent complaint
[e.g., Bullis, 1945, p. 9]. Seybold of Westinghouse [1942, p.130]
spoke of the “unreasonable demands” of the questionnaires
whose completion required the time and attention of 100
people. Two very distinguished accountants, Kohler and Cooper
[1945, p. 270], decried the plethora of data-collecting agencies,
suggesting that the OPA should standardize the reporting pro-
cess. Wellington [1945, pp. 3-4], a public accountant with long
ties to the NACA, identified the crux of the problem to be that
the government was more interested in the formats in which
costs were presented for reimbursement rather than in the pro-
cesses by which costs could be controlled or reduced. Much of
the early war literature noted the difficulties that ensued from
the excessive number of field auditors and quality inspectors
representing the various governmental agencies involved in con-
tracting [Healey, 1941, p. 241; Seybold, 1942, p. 133; Camman et
al., 1943, p. 7]. Seybold called for a single cadre of auditors
rather than individual investigators from the Navy Department,
the Signal Corps, the Maritime Commission, the OPA, and those
charged with the enforcement of income tax, excess-profits tax,
state tax, the wage and hour law, etc.
Not only were the efforts of cost accountants deflected by
the government’s statistical mandates, the system reflected by
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the legislation did not function to induce cost-cutting attention.
As observed by Taggart, a University of Michigan professor and
the prime accounting figure in the National Recovery Adminis-
tration, the cost-plus-fixed-fee contracting, in effect for most of
the war, was intrinsically the same as the outlawed cost-plus
contract in terms of lacking incentives to reduce cost [Taggart,
1941a, p. 37]. Although Kelley [1942, p. 373] called for cost
standards to evaluate the efficiency of contractors, comparable
cost data, and uniform procedures for reporting costs, it never
happened. Rather, governmental agencies generally accepted
whatever accounting methods contractors had historically used
[Miller, 1942, p. 96]. It was believed that control would come via
the renegotiation process wherein governmental adjustors
would allow efficient and low-cost producers to retain a greater
profit margin [Hoyt, 1943, p. 95; Caminez, 1944, p. 147]. More-
over, as Caminez [1944, p. 147] pointed out, efficient contrac-
tors would also reap public-relations benefits and advantage in
termination- contract negotiation as the government’s need for
armaments was reduced when the war wound down. Once
again, renegotiation fostered loose cost control and pricing as it
was thought that the system would correct errors [Kohler and
Cooper, 1945, p. 285].4
Standard Costing: There was universal agreement among all ob-
servers that the war negatively impacted standard costs, what-
ever the state of the art in the prewar milieu. Stempf [1943, p.
500; see also Wellington, 1945, p. 6] observed in the Journal of
Accountancy that “prewar standards have become relatively
meaningless, and, in general, industry has been forced to fall
back on actual costs”. It is easy to understand why standard
costing was not appropriate in the industrial environment of
World War II, even apart from the government’s preference for
dealing with actual costs. Factors included inexperienced work-
ers, high labor turnover, unfamiliar products, lack of time-study
engineers, material shortages, uncontrollable prices, small-lot
emergency purchases, frequent specification changes, new in-
spection requirements, numerous artificial controls, etc. [Hoyt,
1943, p. 93; Caminez, 1944, p. 146]. Burke [1944, p. 253] put the
blame squarely on the head of government:
4 Although it is not directly relevant to costing practice during the war,
renegotiation apparently did not reward the efficient producers as many had
expected [Wellington, 1945, p. 4].
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Standard costs have received a definite setback in favor
of actual costs. The existence of CPFF [contract-plus-
fixed-fee] contracts and the manufacture of new prod-
ucts under rapidly changing conditions have been fac-
tors in this trend, but a more basic reason is the
universal insistence of government officials on costs
that are near actual as possible. Standard costs were
accepted only where they could be converted to actual
by the application of actual variance percentages.
The post-war NACA Committee on Research [1947, p. 919] like-
wise confirmed the requirement of actual costs as the basis for
CPFF contracts, renegotiation, and termination.
Kohler and Cooper [1945, p. 306] concluded their 41-page
survey of World War II accounting in the Accounting Review by
observing that “accounting practice suffered perceptibly and
even degenerated as the result of the war”. However, Bullis
viewed this retreat as an opportunity to advance the craft. “The
postwar period will provide greater opportunity for accounting
than any previous period in history” [Bullis, 1945, p. 17]. Unfor-
tunately, he had said almost the exact thing in his NACA presi-
dential address in 1933 on the occasion of the passage of the
National Industrial Recovery Act [Fleischman and Tyson, 1999,
pp. 52-53].
THE SPERRY CORPORATION AND ITS ARCHIVES
Sperry’s archive (76 linear feet) is housed at the Hagley
Museum in Wilmington, Delaware. Although voluminous by vir-
tue of the lengthy, chronological run of the holdings (1910-
1970), the collection is incomplete from a cost accounting per-
spective. Following the formation of Sperry Corporation in
1933, the most complete set of surviving records emanates from
the Planning Department for 1935-1960, compiled by F.S.
Hodgman. Unfortunately, Planning was a component of the En-
gineering Division and, as such, was staffed by engineers rather
than accountants.
According to a provenance note written by the Hagley staff,
the Sperry records at the Hagley were assembled by the Adver-
tising and Public Relations Departments. “Unfortunately, given
the way it was assembled, the original provenance was de-
stroyed as documents were pulled out of context and filed into a
Public Relations’ Department vertical file” [Acc 1915, #060].
Many of the surviving documents related to Sperry’s prewar
story are contained in a file titled “National Defense – Mobiliza-
tion Plans Survey of Emergency Procurement Requirements
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1938-1939”. The perilous situation with respect to record sur-
vival is illustrated by Lea’s (vice president of sales) claim in 1956
that he staged an eleventh-hour rescue of these materials prior
to their destruction [Acc 1915, box 53, folder 8]. As might be
expected, the archive is far more complete in terms of newspa-
per articles, in-house newsletters, and publicity pieces than it is
in terms of cost and accounting records. Furthermore, after the
formation of Sperry Corporation, the types of surviving records
in the archive changed radically. For the earlier period, a
smaller volume of materials exists, but what is there is of a more
traditional accounting type. During the World War II era, by
contrast, most existing records were generated at the corporate
level (Board of Directors’ minutes, correspondence with govern-
ment, planning). As previously mentioned, only the Planning
Department’s records have been preserved in toto, at least in the
Hagley collection. Notwithstanding the incomplete holdings spe-
cifically related to cost accounting, there is still much to be
learned about this leading governmental contractor.
Sperry Corporation Prior to World War II: Elmer A. Sperry (1860-
1930) started his entrepreneurial career while studying electrical
engineering at Cornell University. His invention of a modified
dynamo to increase the output of electric current resulted in a
contract to build a generating station for Syracuse’s new, down-
town, arc-lighting system. At 21, Sperry had already attained a
national reputation. It was during his work on electrical systems
that he developed and patented an automatic, electromagnetic
regulator. Based on a closed feedback loop, the regulator could
shut down all the lamps in an arc-lighting system in the event of
an electrical overload. Although he left the field of electrical
generation and manufacture in 1889, the concept of an auto-
matic feedback loop, combined with a mechanism of self-correc-
tion, formed the basis for many of the inventions that would
make Sperry successful and support the U.S. military in two
world wars.
Sperry founded Sperry Gyroscope in Brooklyn, N.Y. in
1910, ostensibly to provide a business setting for the application
of Leon Foucault’s 1854 invention of the gyroscope to the avia-
tion and maritime industries.5 Using both Foucault’s gyroscope
5 Elmer’s son Lawrence, the developer of the gyrostabilizer, founded his own
company (Lawrence Sperry Aircraft) in 1915, but the enterprise failed after its
founder perished in an airplane accident in 1924.
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and his own automatic guidance and feedback control technol-
ogy, Sperry developed a ship’s gyroscope that would control the
ship’s engine and steering mechanism, automatically holding
the ship on a predetermined course [“Safety-Minded Genius,”
Acc 1915, #056].
Working closely with the U.S. Navy, Sperry installed the
first ship’s gyroscope on the battleship U.S.S. Delaware in 1911.
By 1915, the marine gyroscope was standard equipment on all
naval vessels. In 1913, the first gyrostabilizer, controlling pitch
and yaw as well as speed and direction, was installed on the
U.S.S. Worden. The new technology was quickly adopted by
commercial steamship companies as well [Acc 1915, #060].
Sperry Gyroscope established a subsidiary in London in
1915 to service the Allies in World War I. In 1929, the elder
Sperry sold his company to Clement Keys, the president of
Curtiss Aero and Motor. In 1933, General Motors absorbed the
Curtiss-Keys combination, but the Sperry Corporation was cre-
ated as a management and holding company. At this time, Ford
Instruments became a part of the conglomerate, with subse-
quent expansion to include Waterbury Tool (1935), Vickers, Inc.
(1937), New Holland Farm Machinery (1947), and Dillinger
Manufacturing (1948), precedent to the formation of Sperry-
Rand in 1955, and thence into Unisys in 1986. In the years
between the two world wars, Sperry and his engineers developed
the automatic pilot, the first airplane stabilizer, gyrostabilized
bomb sights, and automatic-fire control systems. By the 1920s,
Sperry Corporation had become known as the “Brain Mill for
the Military”.
In the 1930s and the 1940s, Sperry engineers worked with
researchers at Stanford University and MIT to develop the mi-
crowave technology that forms the foundation of modern radar
systems. At the beginning of World War II, Sperry was supply-
ing approximately 100 highly technical products to the U.S.
military, including directors (automated firing devices), sound
locators, high-intensity search lights, gyropilots, bomb sights,
gyrocompasses, range finders, and automatic gyrohorizons [Acc
1915, #053].
Business Organization: A 1931 organization chart shows Sperry’s
367 employees divided into four large divisions: Sales, Engineer-
ing, Factory, and Finance with 58, 62, 138, and 99 employees
respectively. There were only ten employees at the corporate
level, a remarkably lean organizational structure by modern
standards. Of the 58 members of the Sales Division, 33 were
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service representatives located around the country. Engineering
was divided both by function (specifications, standards, re-
search, and drafting) and by product line (gyrocompass,
gyropilot, searchlight, etc.). The Factory Division, by far the
largest, was subdivided by functional activities (pattern making,
inspection, plating, tool making, grinding, etc.). All facets of in-
ventory control were handled by Production Control, a depart-
ment within the Factory Division.
The 99 members of the Finance Division performed the
treasury and internal audit functions. The Treasurer’s Office had
a small number of employees performing typical clerical func-
tions, but was comprised mainly of people who would most
likely be categorized as maintenance in modern organizations.
The auditor’s function was comprised of 22 people (number of
employees in parentheses), including the auditor (1), general
accounting (6), cost accounting (12), and estimating and price
making (3) [“Organization Chart, Sperry Gyroscope Company,
Inc., November 19, 1931,” Acc 915, #025].
New Sperry products began in the Methods Department
where the actual process of manufacture would be designed,
including the selection of machine tools that would be most
suitable, the proper sequence of manufacturing steps, and engi-
neering estimates of the time required for the different opera-
tions. This work was then codified on “operations sheets”. Once
the Methods Department had completed its work, the factory
would be given permission to proceed, and the Production Con-
trol Department would assume responsibility for securing raw
materials and overseeing their proper use and control.
When production commenced, the Inspection Department
followed various pieces through the different departments to
ensure proper compliance with manufacturing specifications.
The completed apparatus would be checked at the time of ship-
ment, and the required information would be provided to the
Accounting Department for billing purposes. “Cost records care-
fully maintained and compared with estimates so that errors in
sales prices may be avoided in future work . . .” [Acc 1893, #044]
would appear to have been the task of the three individuals in
Estimating and Price Making in the Auditor’s Department, al-
though the documents do not specifically say so.
Record keeping at Sperry prior to the end of World War II
was largely a manual affair. Cost data were collected on ledger
sheets or cards, hand-ruled and handwritten during World War
I and pre-printed during World War II. Final reports were
prepared on manual typewriters with two-color ribbons so that
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totals appeared in red. Many input records (production figures,
journal entries, and others) were handwritten on the backs of
“scrap paper” and unused forms.
Cost Accounting at Sperry before the War: While it is unknown
how many accountants were employed in the earliest years, we
have seen there was a substantial complement of cost accoun-
tants responsible to the head internal auditor. It is also the case
that scientific management methods espoused by Taylor were
known to Sperry. A 1920 article in the firm’s newsletter,
authored by C.S. Doran, the general manager, discussed the ad-
vantages of a scientific layout of the factory and the utilization
of engineers to conduct time-studies and thereby establish opti-
mal work routines. Employee suggestions for both processes
were solicited. The Inspection Department was to maintain cost
records comparing actual production to estimates.
Perhaps the best indication of the early state of cost ac-
counting at Sperry Gyroscope in this era is contained in the
minutes of a conference of the leading executives on September
10, 1918. F.C. Pinkham, the chief financial officer, said that the
details of cost accounting had been worked out and that
operationalization would follow. R.E. Gillmor, second in com-
mand only to the senior Sperry, observed that the Cost Account-
ing Department had the staffing to collect masses of data but
that going forward the system should “answer three things” that
were apparently unanswered theretofore [Acc 1893, folder 9,
#045]:
 (a) It should be satisfactory to the manufacturing divi-
sion as a means of providing them information
wherewith to judge the performance of each de-
partment as far as the factory is concerned and
that department heads and supervisors can use.
(b) It should also satisfy the sales division and provide
them with all the information they need to fix
prices properly and see if a certain line of products
is profitable.
(c) It should provide a basis for the reports to the
board of managers to enable them to judge as to
the profitability of various lines.
Doran suggested that the expense of productive and non-
productive labor and materials be separated, that research and
development costs be segregated from manufacturing costs, and
that the cost accounting staff should visit each department to
89
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2003, Vol. 30, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2003
81Fleischman and Marquette: Cost Accounting at the Sperry Corporation
become familiar with the department’s functioning and its ac-
counting system.
Although cost keeping was moderately successful, the lan-
guage above suggests that early cost accounting at Sperry was
fairly rudimentary. This nascent state of Sperry’s accounting
was particularly evident in the area of overhead cost allocation.
In 1918, a dispute with Price Waterhouse over whether factory
overhead should be carried to cost of goods sold rather than
finished goods resulted in a change of auditors [Acc 1915, #049].
Sperry’s attempt to allocate overhead on the basis of direct-labor
dollars was not a success. During a period of several months in
1918, Sperry Aircraft angered the A.S. Heinrich Corporation, a
customer, by raising its application rate from 100% of direct-
labor cost to 125% on contracts and even noting that the new
rate “is abnormally low to allow on semi-experimental work of
this character” [Acc 1893, folder 9, #033]. Perhaps the culmina-
tion of the problem came in a “Jobs Completed” schedule for
May and June 1924 when the firm noted [Acc 1915, #016]:
Due to the fact that adding 100% of Productive Labor
as cost of Factory Overhead is not sufficient to cover
actual cost of Factory Overhead and also because ap-
parently the proper amount of Factory Overhead had
not been charged to the jobs completed before March
31, 1924, there had to be added to the cost of the above
jobs the sum of $2,543.12 as additional factory over-
head.
The magnitude of this adjustment is told by the fact that it took
the allocation to approximately 250% of direct-labor dollars.
C.W. Nutt, the auditing firm, suggested in its notes to the firm’s
financials for 1924 that 180% would have been a more reason-
able allocation than 100% [Acc 1915, #016].
Despite the overhead allocation difficulties, the Cost Ac-
counting Department did produce some wonderfully detailed
monthly reports. One such schedule, “Comparative Statement of
Productive Labor and Burden Expense by Productive Depart-
ments,” provided data (current month in black, the preceding in
red) for 47 departments. Data categories included the costs of
inspection and testing, idle time, deficient work, and burden
rate per hour for both the current month and year-to-date [Acc
1893, box 22]. Another monthly report contained data related to
specific product lines, including the percentage of total hours
devoted to each and the average rate per hour for manufac-
turing expenses and engineering/drafting [Acc 1893, box 22].
These monthly reports, truly impressive in their magnitude,
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were commented upon by Pinkham and sent directly to E.A.
Sperry.
Nevertheless, Gillmor’s observation that cost accounting
during the early years generated much data with basic questions
yet to be answered continued to hold through the Great Depres-
sion. The Cost Accounting Department was churning out
monthly reports that were superficially very impressive. How-
ever, the system was not able to address the vital problem of
overhead application. Moreover, there is no indication that stan-
dard costing was utilized despite the technique being the theo-
retical state of the art. The firm had the cost accounting staff, an
appreciation of cost accounting’s importance, and innovative
management that demanded the flow of cost accounting data.
Would the productive mandates of World War II, the closer
relationship with government, and the reorganization into
Sperry Corporation bring the benefits of the more sophisticated
cost accounting practice suggested by the literature?
The Road to World War II: On April 10, 1935, six years before
America’s entry into World War II, R.B. Lea, vice president of
sales, and L.B. “Bo” Coon, the planning manager, met with rep-
resentatives of the Munitions Board, inaugurating a series of
conferences to discuss the types and quantities of armaments
that would be required once war broke out (always referred to
as “M Day”).6 Lea claimed that Sperry was much more
proactively involved in planning than other munitions providers.
The archive contains a remarkable document, dated March
16, 1936, in which were recorded the Sperry products required
by various governmental agencies with data provided as to the
quantities needed and the monthly units anticipated, reflecting a
learning curve. Recipients of this output included the Ordnance
Department, the Corps of Engineers, the Air Corps, the Bureau
of Navigation, the Bureau of Ordnance, the Bureau of Engineer-
ing, and the Bureau of Aeronautics.
Acting out of fear that Sperry might be commandeered dur-
ing wartime, Lea went to Colonel H.K. Rutherford, Director of
Planning for the U.S. Ordnance Department, to request updated
specifics as to what each governmental bureau would require.
6 Many of the documents that relate the prewar story are contained in a file
titled “National Defense —Mobilization Plans Survey of Emergency Procure-
ment Requirements 1938-39” [Acc 1915, box 53, folder 8]. Unless otherwise
cited, documents referenced in this section can be found at this location.
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Perhaps as a result of that visit, Sperry commenced the
operationalization of its “Emergency Procurement Plan” in fall
1938. Coon sent Lea an “Outline Procedure” on October 20 in
which he elaborated how Sperry would calculate the direct-
labor needs, the required machinery, the assembling capability,
the non-productive labor, the appropriate floor space, and other
miscellaneous requirements to attain the level of production
specified in 1936. Additional data were now provided as to man-
power requirements, machinery and floor-space needs, subcon-
tractor assistance, and sources of supply for direct materials.
While these calculations related to capacity constraints rather
than to costs, time allowances from the files of the Estimating
Department and cost figures from recent orders were deployed.
One gets the impression that time-studies had been undertaken
to assess how long machine functions were to take, but that
these data had not been incorporated into a standard costing
system. Moreover, Sperry was apparently in arrears in terms of
physical layout. In his cover letter, Coon wrote: “No consider-
ation has been given in any of these write-ups as to different
methods of tooling or rearrangement of factory departments for
conveyerizing (sic) of modern production methods. This could
also be done in a detailed study”.
Based upon Sperry’s Emergency Procurement Plan, Colonel
Rutherford, in April 1939, supplied a revised schedule of emer-
gency requirements that has not survived in the file although the
transmittal letter has. Lea, in his 1956 recollection [Acc 1915,
box 53, folder 8], wrote of the high praise Sperry received for
planning work that the Munitions Board “used in encouraging
other companies to make specific plans and studies for M Day
requirements”. When the U.S. finally entered the war two years
later, this planning was obsolete for the most part as Sperry was
now called upon to produce “quite a different set of apparatus”
than had been envisioned.
A more sophisticated planning process was reflected in cer-
tain documents contained in a file entitled “War Plans 1935-
1938” [Acc 1915, box 53, file 5]. On July 11, 1935, Sperry was
sent an “Accepted Schedule of Production” from the Ordnance
Department of the War Department for 600 M3 directors, at a
unit price of $38,000, with ten to be delivered four months after
the procurement order, 20 in the fifth month, and 30 for months
six through 24. On July 30, 1935, Coon sent to Lea and others
three alternative plans for producing 100 “Antiaircraft Directors
M3.” According to Plan 1, there would be no change in existing
equipment, layout, or tooling. The schedule would be:
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1 – 9 months 0 13th month 4
10th month 2 14th month 5
11th month 3 15th – 27th month 6
12th month 3 28th month  5
Total 100
Under Plan 2, there would be an outlay of $300,000 for tool
design, layout alteration, new machine tool equipment, etc. Pro-
duction would then be:
1 – 12 months 0
13th month 5
14th month 10
15th month 10
16th – 20th months 5
Total 100
Plan 3 required an outlay of $55,000 beyond Plan 2, producing
the result:
0 – 12 months  0
13th month 5
14th month  10
15th month  20
16th month and beyond  30
Total 100 in 171⁄2 months
Coon’s plans were provided as schedules for the time it would
take to produce 100 directors under peacetime (Plan 1) and two
emergency scenarios (Plans 2 and 3). It was estimated that a
peacetime production plan would save eight months for the first
100 directors in contrast to commencing production from
ground zero. It is not known how the Ordnance Department
responded to these data. While this particular production/learn-
ing curve exercise is the most complex, it is by no means an
isolated negotiation.7
This theme of the advantages to be gained from peacetime
production was underscored in a letter from R.E. Gillmor to the
National Research Council, Committee on Aircraft Production,
on April 26, 1940 [Acc 1915, box 40, #026]. Sperry’s general
manager addressed the issue of productive capacity and unit
7 The materials estimation process was likewise done with great care. There
exists an aluminum study for 100 directors dated November 25, 1938. It includes
a standard scrap calculation per pound of finished product [Acc 1915, box 53,
folio 6, #059].
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cost under three conditions which he labeled “normal,” “emer-
gency,” and “war”. Increased unit cost under “normal” condi-
tions would result only from increased product quality. In
“emergency” situations, cost increases would be a function of
relatively untrained workers and the need to write off special
tool investment. Finally, in “war” unit cost increases would re-
sult from overtime and other wasteful methods. Gillmor urged
that these cost increases “could be ameliorated by looking upon
national defense as a continuing problem,” thereby smoothing
distinctions among these conditions.
SPERRY DURING WORLD WAR II
As a leading contractor, Sperry was intimately involved in
the system established by the government to regulate war-mate-
riel provisioning. The archive contains many references to the
renegotiation process. The minutes of Board of Directors’ meet-
ings suggest that Sperry considered itself the “leader” in renego-
tiation [Acc 1910, box 23, vol. 9]. The claim was made in the
August 29, 1945 minutes that Sperry was the first to propose
renegotiation and to reduce prices voluntarily. The first mention
of renegotiation in the minutes occurred on April 14, 1942,
when the firm agreed to renegotiate because its subcontractors
were making excessive profits in light of the lower production
costs associated with a “considerably expanded rate”. It is un-
clear, however, whether these savings were the result of a learn-
ing curve, capacity considerations, or both [Acc 1910, box 23,
vol. 7, no. 1]. In a document called “Report for 1943 Renegotia-
tion” [Acc 1915, box 82, p. 3], Sperry called it company “policy”
to lower the prices of its products when manufacturing experi-
ence, reflected by reduced prime costs, was gained. Initial ceil-
ing prices on new products were lowered to a firm price, most
frequently retroactive to first delivery. It is difficult to assess the
magnitude of repayments to the government as they were in a
state of flux since price reductions could take place years after
the point of sale. However, one Sperry document called “The
Story of the Sperry Corporation” alleged that through the end of
1943, $128 million had been returned to the government
through the renegotiation process [Acc 1915, box 40, #023, p.
57].
In 1943, the U.S. military asked its prime contractors to
prepare histories of the various products they supplied. The
Sperry archive contains a document that provided precise in-
structions as to how these histories were to be prepared. The
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first section was to be a description of the product, the process
of its development and initial production, the contribution of
the product to the war effort (including its limitations), and the
anticipated “continuation of improvement” through research
and development. A second section supplied the sales price by
contracts, labor costs over time, and additional information to
track efficiency as reflected in lower product cost and sales
prices. Most statistically complex was the concluding section on
production history. Here manufacturing accomplishments and
difficulties, relations with prime and subcontractors that had
participated in the product’s manufacture, quantities required,
and associated delivery schedules and contract performance
were to be discussed. A number of these individual product his-
tories have survived [Acc 1915, box 40, #029]. What is interest-
ing about them is their reflection of time rather than cost man-
agement, a more contemporary manufacturing philosophy. It is
not to be suggested that Sperry was 40 years ahead of its time.
As the company itself observed, its was not a typical manufac-
turing environment because of the precision instrumentation re-
quired for products with hundreds of moving parts [Acc 1915,
box 40, #029].
Despite the sophistication of Sperry’s planning and renego-
tiation processes, the firm had many of the same complaints
about contracting issues with the government that were refer-
enced in the cost accounting literature of the period. In a March
17, 1943 statement submitted by Sperry Corporation to Mr. S.C.
Coleman of the U.S. Navy, a Sperry representative explained
that while the company understood the necessity for speed, that
pressure to get war materiel “into production before design and
tooling is complete . . . [resulted in] a continuous series of
changes . . .” As an example, Sperry cited a product placed into
production only six months earlier that had undergone 1,489
changes in a single month [Acc 1915, #029]. In April 1940,
Gillmor complained to the National Research Council about the
“useless perfectionism” of governmental quality inspectors [Acc
1915, box 40, #026]. In the same correspondence, Gillmor
launched a protest against the auditors of the War, Navy, and
Treasury Departments who disallowed certain items of over-
head, such as selling expense. In general, Gillmor was protesting
a fixed limit on profits, urging that “profit limitation provides
every incentive for increasing costs and none for decreasing
them”.
Sperry was keenly aware of the importance of the design
phase of operations as we have seen in describing the activities
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of the Methods Department. The complaint was lodged that the
pressures of wartime militated against thorough trials being
conducted before product launch [Acc 1915, box 40, #024]. A
rather amusing, undated, handwritten page appears in a file
entitled “World War II Renegotiation of Government Contracts,
1942” [Acc 1915, box 40, #031]. The anonymous author averred
that in the 20 years leading up to 1935, research and develop-
ment failures had cost Sperry $1.3 million in losses. It was noted
that the company maintained a museum of these costly failures.
Finally, the company was most concerned about losses it
anticipated as a result of the termination of contracts as the war
ran down. This was a realistic concern. Table 1 below provides
some indication of the investment in men, material, and equip-
ment that Sperry made during, and specifically for, the war [Acc
1910, #024, figures rounded]:
TABLE 1
Sperry World War II Statistics
Land and Machinery and
Employees Buildings   Equipment
January 1, 1940 5,400 $1,308,000 $2,411,000
Wartime peak 56,000 5,926,000 4,376,000
December 31, 1945 15,000 1,694,000 1,902,000
The government, however, was not willing to allow these
future costs to be factored into pricing or negotiation. Costs
here included inventory buildups of wartime products unsuit-
able for sale in peacetime, the consolidation of plants as de-
mand decreased, the cost of retooling for peacetime, and the
cost of superfluous fixed assets. T.A. Morgan, the president of
Sperry Corporation, complained to the House Committee on
Naval Affairs that the various price adjustment boards with
which the firm had to deal did not allow a provision for reserves
for termination expenses as a current cost in renegotiation [Acc
1915, box 40, #026]. These termination issues were fully dis-
cussed in “The Story of the Sperry Corporation” [Acc 1915, box
40, #023, p. 62].
Sperry’s wartime contribution was significant. By 1943, the
company was manufacturing 300 different products for the war
effort, two-thirds of which had been developed within the prior
ten years. The following excerpt from an internal Sperry docu-
ment [Acc 1915, #023] provides a picture of how some of these
products worked together:
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The sound locator picks up approaching planes before
they are visible and determines their exact position,
speed, and direction of flight. . . . Simultaneously, the
anti-aircraft director, functioning as a computing
mechanism, determines the direction, elevation, and
setting required to aim the anti-aircraft gun at the ap-
proaching airplane and transmits this information au-
tomatically to the guns through a remote control sys-
tem.
Not only did Sperry invent and manufacture these products
during the six-year period from 1939 to 1945, Sperry also ran in-
house schools where they housed, fed, and trained over 77,000
military and naval personnel in the use and maintenance of
Sperry equipment.
Subcontracting: A very significant aspect of Sperry’s relationship
to the U.S. military in World War II was the firm’s role in defin-
ing a model for subcontracting. The archive contains an exten-
sive file of articles and other publicity regarding Sperry and
subcontracting [Acc 1915, box 40]. The firm’s Publicity Depart-
ment was quite expert in placing articles in a wide variety of
periodicals that published information about Sperry’s contribu-
tion to the war effort. The details were typically the same, fea-
turing Sperry’s pioneering efforts to establish a subcontracting
network and, subsequently, to institute quality-control proce-
dures for its supply of component parts.
Sperry’s subcontracting for government provisioning com-
menced long before the outbreak of hostilities, as had the plan-
ning processes for “M Day”. Sperry surveyed 1,000 New York
City area firms in spring 1937 in order to evaluate those most fit
for a subcontracting relationship [Norcross, 1941, p. 77]. The
first subcontract was negotiated in 1937 with the American
Machine & Foundry Co. (AMF) and called for 2,000 machine
hours of work. AMF, a manufacturer of bakery and tobacco-
processing equipment, would eventually dedicate 90-95% of its
capacity to 13 government contractors, without ever having a
direct defense contract [Gesner and Beckley, 1941]. From this
modest beginning, Sperry’s outsourcing grew exponentially,
reaching 486,000 machine hours per month from 145 sources by
October 1941 [Morgan, 1941, p. 7]. A report of November 29,
1943 averred that 50% of the dollar value of Sperry’s shipments
was materials either subcontracted or bought from suppliers,
and that 35% of all man-hours charged were from subcon-
tracted work. Even at those levels, the volume of subcontracting
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was down from peak levels the year before [Acc 1915, box 40,
#027].
More significant than the volume of Sperry’s subcontracting
was the relationship between the firm and other munitions
manufacturers, both prime and subcontractors. Prime contrac-
tors were those that delivered entire instruments to the military
and held contracts directly from some government agency for
that provisioning. Included were such industrial giants as Ford,
National Cash Register, IBM, and Chrysler. The minutes of the
March 6, 1942 Board of Directors’ meeting contained approval
for a policy that granted prime contractors and their subcon-
tractors licenses to manufacture certain patented items without
royalty for the duration of the war. This resolution was reiter-
ated at the March 18 meeting, along with Sperry’s commitment
to provide engineering and manufacturing assistance at cost
[Acc 1910, box 23, vol. 7, no. 1]. By the end of the war, 140
Sperry products were being manufactured by 26 prime contrac-
tors under a royalty-free plan [Acc 1910, box 23, vol. 8, minutes
of August 29, 1945].
Equally significant were the relationships the corporation
forged with its suppliers. As early as September 1938, with the
articulation of the “Emergency Procurement Plan” Sperry had
identified the shortfalls of direct labor, machine equipment, and
floor space required for the volume of armaments the govern-
ment was requesting. At that time, 14 subcontractors had been
selected on the basis of past experience that “were qualified and
trained to our close tolerances and the Sperry standard of
work . . .” [Acc 1915, box 53, folder 8, #053]. By spring 1939, the
company expected to inform the War Department of additional
subcontractors that were currently being investigated. As of Au-
gust 28, 1939, a finalized list of subcontractors had been devel-
oped with both additions to, and deletions from, an original list
of 32 previously articulated [Acc 1915, box 53, folder 8]. By
1943, the number was to grow to 500 [“Report for 1943 Renego-
tiations,” p. 22, Acc 1915, box 82].8
According to an article that appeared in the New York World
Telegram, Sperry required 60,000-70,000 parts, almost 50% of
which were farmed out to 76 subcontractors. The paper quotes a
spokesman from the N.J. Gear and Manufacturing Company
[Williams, 1941]:
8 A “Report on Subcontracting.” dated November 1943 [Acc 1915, box 40,
#027], claimed that the number had not changed materially since 1941, but that
new firms had been added and old ones weeded out.
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[Our] first attempts at Sperry Gears were mostly re-
jected. Then the Sperry Engineers came . . . and assisted
. . . in adjusting…machines to close tolerances. . . . After
six months of patient toil [we were able] to produce
gears that passed inspection. I learned . . . that when
Sperry engineers said ‘one one-thousandth of an inch,’
they mean one one-thousandth of an inch.
The significance of Sperry’s subcontracting operations is
demonstrated by the fact that the gyroscope subsidiary alone
had a staff of 150 people employed to handle the details of
external relations [Morgan, 1941, p. 7]. L.B. Coon [1941], the
planning manager, wrote an informative article for Mechanical
Engineering in which he discussed how to establish a subcon-
tracting organization. A separate subcontracts department, it
was recommended, should be established with reporting respon-
sibility to the planning manager. This department should in-
clude methods engineers to supervise data collection on the sub-
contractors’ capacities in terms of machine time and floor space,
a corps of clerical workers to provide monthly reports, and a
group of production expediters (“follow-up” men) to circulate
among the subcontractors to ensure compliance to schedules.
There were also to be inspectors at the suppliers’ installations to
ensure the quality of component parts. Sperry learned early on
that it was expeditious and cost/beneficial to locate the inspec-
tion process at the source of supply. The prime contractor’s
methods department would be deployed to provide details as to
how work should be performed and how much time should be
allowed for various functions. Cost accountants would be in-
volved in helping to establish price quotations based upon the
subcontractor’s actual cost experience. Coon observed that sub-
contractors tended to under-quote prices in order to get rela-
tionships established. The subcontracted price would be estab-
lished by determining a money rate per hour for each plant,
taking into account individual wage scales, burden rates, and
reasonable profit, and then multiplying that rate by the prede-
termined time estimate.
In summary, Coon [1941, p. 516] advanced six points to
define all subcontracting operations:
1. Preliminary planning is essential for determining subcon-
tract requirement.
2. The regular organization is not adapted to absorbing the
subcontract program. Greater control can be obtained
through the medium of a special structure.
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3. A systematic and thorough training period will pay divi-
dends.
4. Evolve a flexible system of cost control which will ensure a
fair profit to the subcontractor, without necessitating
lengthy and time-taking negotiations.
5. Maintain close personal contact between both organizations
to insure delivery and cost control.
6. Do not in any case ‘walk away’ from the subcontractor’s
internal difficulties. Accept them as your own and lend as-
sistance.
A more widely circulated set of principles for Sperry’s sub-
contracting process was its twelve-step “creed” (Exhibit 1)
[Norcross, 1941, p. 77; Morgan, 1941, p. 8]:
Reprinted by permission of Unisys Corporation. All rights reserved.
Reproduced courtesy of the Hagley Museum and Library
EXHIBIT 1
Sperry received full credit for its subcontracting network.
For example, Farming Out Bulletin No. 5 of the U.S. Labor Divi-
sion (1941) contained a full description of the system in “Sub-
contracting Methods of the Sperry Gyroscope Co.” [Acc 1915,
box 40, #023, pp. 19-27]. The November 6, 1941 edition of the
Utica Observer Dispatch proclaimed: “The Sperry Company is
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pointed to as the prize exhibit of how subcontracting can best be
done” [Acc 1915, box 40, #023].
Growth: The Sperry archive contains a plethora of statistical
data charting the meteoric growth of the company as a result of
the World War II experience. In addition to its own employees,
an April 1942 document that placed the then Sperry labor force
at 25,000 estimated an additional 75,000 employees at the plants
of prime contractors and subcontractors working on Sperry
products [Acc 1915, box 40, #013]. Other personnel growth
numbers from 1943 measured an increase in engineering and
research from 600 to 4,000, of licensed engineers from 120 to
680, and of women in the work force from 10% to 43% [Acc
1915, box 82, pp. 25-26]. Other growth indicators were net in-
come and sales. Table 2 below illustrates as well the low mar-
gins government contractors were permitted during the war
[Acc 1915, box 55, files 1-4]:
TABLE 2
Sperry Sales Revenue and Net Income
Year Sales Net Income Margin
1933 $213,571,630 $2,495,630 13.88%
1936 15,220,446 2,570,568 16.89
1939 24,827,498 5,462,060 11.00
1942  249,318,939  5,777,961 2.32
1945  217,452,692  6,954,438 3.20
1948  120,859,852  8,770,552 7.26
Research and Development: New product development was an
essential component of Sperry’s operations. In point of fact, the
company claimed that, “we are the only company in the country
which maintained continuous research on military instrumenta-
tion between the last war and this” [Acc 1915, box 40, #024].
According to the same source, 1,700 people were employed in
the research organization, “engaged solely on new develop-
ments”.9 At the beginning of World War II, Sperry estimated
that 85% of its sales revenue came from products developed
during the Depression decade [Acc 1915, box 53, folder 7, #057].
During the war itself, Sperry expended $35 million on research
and development, with the government funding 45% of the cost.
One hundred and forty new products resulted [Acc 1910, vol. 9,
9 A March 1943 report to the Navy put the number engaged in research at
1,600 [Acc 1915, Box 40, #026].
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#052, minutes of August 29, 1945]. A lengthy list of new prod-
ucts developed during the 1930s and the early war years are
provided in a February 1944 document, “Nature of Pre-War
Business . . .” [Acc 1915, box 40, #030].10 They included the auto-
matic pilot, radar-detection equipment, engine-control instru-
ments, radio-navigation systems, power controls for land and
naval guns, electronic telescopes, and many others [Acc 1910,
#024].
A typed listing of “experimental expenses” for 1925-1946
was compiled with 1947 and 1948 handwritten at the bottom
[Acc 1915, box 53, folder 14, #055]. The impact of World War II
on R&D is immediately apparent as reflected in Table 3:
TABLE 3
Experimental Expenses
1937 $183,831 1943 $2,563,295
1938 269,739 1944 3,799,707
1939 459,233 1945 3,287,095
1940 571,356 1946 2,864,299
1941 1,363,753 1947 843,989
1942 1,383,129 1948 565,713
There have survived in the archive monthly reports on re-
search and development contracts undertaken with the military
during the war [Acc 1915, box 53, folder 17, #055]. These reports
are typed on huge folio pages with numerous data categories.
The contract price is given, along with the costs-to-date divided
into factory labor & burden, engineering labor & burden, design
labor & burden, and material and sundry expense. Information
is provided for those contracts where expenditure had exceeded
contract price, both for the current year-to-date and for prior
years. Current costs are recorded for the month of the report
and for year-to-date. Finally, there is a schedule of engineer-
ing and development expense generated by the Engineering
Division, referenced as “Schedule X”. Here the budget for the
specific subdivision is provided (e.g., aeronautical, armament,
marine), along with the amounts authorized for specific jobs.
Actual expenses are recorded for (1) shop labor & overhead, (2)
material, (3) engineering labor & overhead (4) drafting labor &
overhead, (5) sundries, and (6) air lab & marine lab [Acc 1915,
box 53, folder 14, #055]. The amount of detail maintained on
10 Morgan wrote to the House Committee on Naval Affairs in July 1943 to
the effect that Sperry was producing 300 different war products [Acc 1915, box
40, #026].
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research and development expenditures is one of the most im-
pressive aspects of the Sperry archive.
Labor Control: The Sperry Corporation had an exceptionally
structured organizational plan. Gillmor [1941, p. 4] described
how “all lines of authority and responsibility are clearly shown
on the Organization Chart mounted in the Executive Offices”.
More importantly, the Sperry organization plan was detailed in
four manuals. The “Organization Manual” defined the distribu-
tion of responsibility and was, in the first instance, the afore-
mentioned chart in narrative form. The “Standard Practice
Manual” defined operating procedures, including detailed in-
structions as to how work was to be performed. This specificity
for job functions seems very much in the scientific management
tradition. The most interesting of the manuals was the “Salary
and Wages Administration Manual”. Gillmor averred that the
skills and characteristics required for each occupation were de-
scribed, along with the procedures for rating performance and
determining eligibility for promotion. Individual workers were
to submit to semi-annual reviews by a committee comprising
the department head, the division chief, and a member of the
Personnel Department, although no evidence survives that these
evaluations were ever undertaken. There also existed an “Ac-
counting Manual”, about which Gillmor [1941, p. 4] only ob-
served that it “specifies the distribution of operating expenses by
responsibility”. It is unfortunate that none of these manuals has
survived in the archive.
It would appear that a structure existed for labor control,
both through the definition of tasks and the establishment of
performance standards subject to semi-annual review. However,
we have no evidence that the system functioned as theoretically
envisioned. In point of fact, an anonymous, undated collection
of comments maintained in a miscellaneous file indicates that
labor “control” was very different from that envisioned by Tay-
lor [“What the Company Does”, Acc 1915, box 40, #024]. On the
“nature of discipline” the author observed:
. . . not to be associated with severity or punishment,
but with the Biblical origin of the word which means
the processes of training by which the individual be-
comes a disciple for that in which he believes and a
disciple of his leader, able to carry on without direction.
Perhaps a more compelling illustration that the system was not
functioning according to Taylorite principles is contained in the
following damning quotation from the same source:
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An explanation that operation sheet times are at present
nothing more than very approximate guesses and likely
to be one-quarter of the time necessary or four times
the time necessary. Practically all of them have had to
be determined hurriedly with no opportunity to observe
the operation in practice and often times without know-
ing the particular machine tool that will be used. They
serve one important purpose, and that is that on the
average over several hundred operations they are very
close to correct and provide a good guide for estimating
costs and for scheduling. When it comes to a particular
operation, however, the worker is his own best judge as
to what the time should be and as to whether he is
doing well or badly. Eventually the times will be cor-
rect, as we are now making studies of the operations on
the job, but it will take months to accomplish this.
The impact of World War II on the labor force is reflected in
Exhibit 2 [Acc 1915, box 53, folder 7, #057] where 56.6% of
Sperry’s employees had less than a year’s experience with the
firm.
There is evidence that, during the war, statistics were main-
tained to curb absenteeism with chronic offenders terminated
[Acc 1915, box 53, folio 8, # 053]. A report of the Industrial
Relations Research Department for February 1944 compared
worker termination rates to other companies and found condi-
tions at Sperry favorable on that parameter [Acc 1915, box 40,
#029]. However, wartime dislocations militated against more ef-
fective forms of labor control. In Gillmor’s 1940 letter to the
National Research Council [Acc 1915, box 40, #026], the general
manager related how the firm had to take complex tasks that
skilled operatives would perform and break them down into
simple, repetitive tasks appropriate for lower-skilled workers.
Amazingly, the deskilling process described predated America’s
entrance into the war by 20 months!
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
In terms of Sperry’s cost accounting, the company had
adopted a number of state-of-the-art methodologies reflecting
scientific management theory. The company had deployed time-
study to determine scientifically the processes for accomplishing
tasks, with rules for work collected into manuals. Sperry had a
Methods Department almost from its inception that issued in-
structions on manufacturing methods and time allowances for
various operations taken in sequence. The advice of shop-floor
workers was solicited in the process [Mills, 1920, p. 12], with the
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resulting procedures subsequently codified into the Standard
Practices Manual. A report to the Navy in March 1943 discussed
how standardized practices had grown since 1937 because of
labor turnover and expansion and how 15 industrial engineers
in the Organization and Procedures Department and 50 in
Manufacturing Engineering were attempting to cope with these
issues on an ongoing basis [Acc 2925, box 40, #026].
Procedures were also codified for the evaluation and reward
of operatives, although again, evidence does not exist of their
utilization. Sperry also approached the question of physical
plant layout in engineering terms. However, there is no evidence
that the company ever instituted a standard costing/variance
analysis system as part of its package of scientific management
methodologies.
World War II represented a step backwards for Sperry’s
scientific management in that labor-force shortfalls and in-
experience rendered older, time-study-based routines and evalu-
ation techniques dead letters. Only further study will reveal
whether the prewar measures were recaptured post-1945. Al-
though Sperry did not have a standard costing system in place
itself, the costing literature of the period indicates just how det-
rimental an effect the wartime experience had on companies
that did have such a system. The impact of the war on Sperry’s
labor-control processes serves as an indication of how World
War II dislocations were dysfunctional to purposeful cost ac-
counting, at least historically.
It is true that governmental contracting can spawn a greater
costing awareness, featuring the expansion of cost accounting
departments to generate the masses of data needed for contract
pricing [see also Anderson, 2003 for corresponding develop-
ments in Australia during World War II]. However, this exercise
was rather low-level and artificial costing, particularly because
governmental costing exclusions (as in TD 5000) are inappropri-
ate for peacetime.
Sperry was not alone in its failure to have an adequate
system of cost control. M.L. Black and H.B. Eversole of the
OPA were quoted in the “Cost Current” section of the NACA
Bulletin [1946, Vol. 28, No. 8, p. 517]: “The predominance, in
systems, of process or actual costs and, in overhead distribution
methods, of direct labor costs suggests the standard costs and
more studied application of overhead are still in the earlier
stages of adoption with respect to industry as a whole”.
The OPA’s chief accountant, H.F. Taggart, attempted to
quantify the problem. He estimated that only 15% of the
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country’s manufacturing companies had cost systems worthy of
the name, representing approximately 25% of total industrial
output [New York Certified Public Accountant, 1947, p. 1444].11
Notwithstanding its spotty record in adopting scientific
management techniques, the Sperry Corporation was a very in-
novative and sophisticated enterprise. It had a distinctive vision
of its future, reflected by exceptional planning processes. Ex-
hibit 3 is a sales forecast for 1945 and 1946 that typifies graphic
presentations common in the archive. It is interesting to note
that Sperry anticipated the war’s termination as indicated by the
decline of sales from $13 million in June 1945 to $8 million in
September 1946. It should also be noted that the graph reflects
the phasing out of old products and the introduction of new
ones [Acc 1915, box 53, folder 7, #057].
An interoffice memo from F.S. Hodgman of the Engineering
Division to Lea in 1939 advised that, henceforth, costs were
going to be investigated by individual product lines rather than
at more macro-levels. In addition to allocating a share of com-
mon costs, the plan called for costing out the design phase [Acc
1915, box 53, folder 5]. As early as 1941, the company began to
reserve one percent of sales to cover postwar readjustment of
facilities and personnel [Acc 1910, series I, volume 6, minutes of
March 31 and June 13, 1941].
The experience at Sperry Corporation cannot be generalized
uncritically to other wars or other companies. The pressure at
Sperry was probably greater. Sperry’s ability to create new in-
struments and new equipment actually widened the military’s
tactical options. To the extent that Sperry instrumentation sup-
ported expanding military capabilities, it was significant in al-
lowing the military to continually alter its weaponry and, hence,
to respond quickly to the changing tactics of the Axis Powers.
Nevertheless, inspection of industry-based articles in the NACA
Bulletins and Yearbooks from 1938 to 1945 did not unearth any
articles claiming that the war had advanced the practice of cost
accounting. At best, the majority of the articles remained “tuto-
rial” in nature, supporting the claim that sophisticated cost ac-
counting was still not generally practiced.
11 The NACA’s Committee on Research undertook a substantial project on
standard costing that was published in five installments in the NACA Bulletin in
1948 [Vol. 29, Nos. 11, 14, 19; Vol. 30, Nos. 3, 8]. The study concentrated on how
standard costing was used in 72 manufacturing firms. The issues of the extent of
standard costing and the selection method that identified the surveyed firms
were not addressed.
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EXHIBIT 3
Sales Forecast, 1945-1946
Reprinted by permission of Unisys Corporation. All rights reserved.
Reproduced courtesy of the Hagley Museum and Library
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While we did not find advances in sophisticated cost ac-
counting techniques, what we did find in the Sperry archive was
equally interesting and rather unexpected. With parallels to
Japanese management innovations of the 1980s, Sperry realized
the advantages to be gained from managing time as distinct
from cost [Stalk and Hout, 1990; Blackburn, 1991]. As early as
1920, I.H. Mills [1920, p. 13], the factory superintendent, ob-
served in The Sperryscope:
The importance of time can scarcely be overempha-
sized. It forms the larger part of the cost of production
and when its value is fully appreciated, the way is
opened for economics of production which make it pos-
sible to conduct a business profitably and allow it to be
established on a sound financial basis. It is a widening
circle—economy in the use of time, lessens the cost of
production . . .
At a later point in time, it was disclosed in the Office of Produc-
tion Management’s piece on Sperry in the Farming Out Bulletin
that monthly variance reports that the firm demanded from its
subcontractors were measured in time rather than cost [Acc
1915, box 40, #023, p. 22].
Finally, what was most singular in the Sperry archive, in
our opinion, were certain techniques developed at Sperry that
sound strangely modern. These methods include a substantial
awareness of the product-launch component of operations, fea-
turing an orientation toward research and development, the al-
location of design-phase costs to product, and the ramifications
of the learning curve [Tanaka, 1989; Cooper, 1995].
Sperry was in the vanguard of subcontracting expertise,
today’s outsourcing, albeit more as a function of capacity con-
straints than cost/benefit [Horngren et al., 2003]. This aspect of
Sperry’s operations could have constituted a primer for the pro-
liferation of outsourcing in today’s industrial sector. Perhaps
even more directly related is how the Sperry experience pre-
saged the influence that major companies, such as Toyota, exer-
cise over their suppliers in JIT environments today [Fruin and
Toshihiro, 1993].
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Abstract: The decades immediately following the Glorious Revolution
in 1688 witnessed a variety of political, social and structural re-
sponses to this cataclysmic event. In Ireland, religious conflict and
economic under-development, as well as the devastation of war from
1689 to 1691, combined to ensure that the Anglo-Irish body politic
found it difficult to capture the fruits of success from an English
polity that had gradually accreted to itself much of the political power
and economic wealth of the country. By 1704, however, the Anglo-
Irish had managed to appropriate to themselves some of the eco-
nomic and constitutional benefits of the Revolution by exploiting
various parliamentary practices and structures. One of their strategies
centered around developing and leveraging the role of the Public Ac-
counts Committee as a means of imposing accountability on the ex-
ecutive and its officials. To achieve this the members were required to
understand, contest and reconfigure official accounting information.
INTRODUCTION
The cultural construction of state power attends all imperial
projects [Said, 1993; Wilson, 1995; Landes, 1998]. An apprecia-
tion of this has allowed recent scholarship to map more compre-
hensively those cultural aspects of early modern European ex-
pansionism that both complemented and supplemented this
politico-military endeavor [Bowen, 1996]. One consequence is
that the entire experience of the colonized is now more capable
of being articulated within a literature that eschews the earlier
elision of socio-cultural aspects of the imperial process: defeated
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peoples encountered not only the might of armies but also the
tyranny of clerks. Thus, issues of language, religion, profession-
alisation and race are now regularly summoned to contour more
thoroughly the impact of colonization [Johnson and Caygill,
1971; Said, 1978, 1993; Johnson, 1982; Wilson, 1995; Bowen,
1996; Chua and Poullaos, 1998; Annisette, 2000].
As part of this process the ways in which accountants, ac-
counting information and accountability formed elements of the
armory of imperialism have begun to be explored [Tinker, 1980;
Chew and Greer, 1997]. Distinguishing between ‘hardwares’ of
imperialism, such as military arms, and ‘softwares,’ such as lan-
guage, disease and accounting [Fanon, 1963; Headrick, 1981,
1988; Miller and Rose, 1990; Said, 1993; Bell et al., 1995; Neu,
2000a, b] various authors have identified and tracked the man-
ner in which these technologies facilitated the process of con-
quest and colonization. The vocabulary of colonialism has been
useful, therefore, in contextualizing the manner in which ac-
counting helped to translate imperial objectives into practical
effect, in the process mediating the relationship between the
colonial power and the colonized [Davis and Huttenback, 1988;
Miller and Rose, 1990; Preston et al., 1997; Neu, 1999, 2000a, b].
This paper extends our understanding of the ways in which
accounting information can be used to affect the regulative and
distributive ambitions of powerful elites [Miller and Rose, 1990;
Preston et al., 1997]. It does so by recounting an episode in
which accounting information was not only used by the colonial
power to impose government from a distance, but was also suc-
cessfully employed by that power’s erstwhile agents to contest
legislative, jurisdictional and property rights [cf. Davie, 2000].
Consequently, it not only identifies accounting as a tool of colo-
nialism, but also elaborates upon the consequences of conflict
within the colonial power, where the principal and agent imag-
ine, construct and deconstruct tools of oppression for their own
purposes. Thus, it explores an area to which little attention has
been given: the conflicts existing between the metropolitan cen-
tre and a colonial elite - a conflict that was of relatively semantic
importance to the colonized – and the extent to which account-
ing information was used and exploited by the respective players
within this hierarchy of powers [Neu, 2000b]. Focusing on the
role of accountability and financial control in constituting rela-
tionships of domination and subordination, it describes a situa-
tion in which a politically and economically vulnerable colonial
elite succeeded in leveraging its command of budgetary proce-
dures and accounting detail to secure significant constitutional
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concessions. While presenting accounting information as one
means by which the relationship between colonizer and colo-
nized could be reinforced, therefore, it is primarily concerned
with the way in which those perceived by the defeated natives as
representatives of the imperial power marshaled accounting in-
formation to advance their claims to jurisdictional authority and
economic aggrandizement vis-à-vis the mother country.
OUTLINE
The period immediately following the Glorious Revolution
in England and the subsequent war in Ireland from 1689 to
1691, witnessed a struggle between the bodies politic in both
countries as each tried to appropriate the political and economic
spoils that followed the defeat of James II. For the parliament in
London, which had effectively legislated for Ireland for much of
the previous three decades, it offered the opportunity to copper-
fasten its claims to legislative and judicial supremacy over Ire-
land. For the minority Anglican Anglo-Irish community, the tra-
ditional representatives of the colonial power, it presented an
opportunity to exploit its loyalty to the Williamite cause with a
view to shaping a political and constitutional settlement for Ire-
land that would secure its ascendancy over not only the defeated
Catholic population, but also its erstwhile allies, the dissenting
Protestant community. The ambitions of the Anglo-Irish could
only be secured, however, if the legislative and jurisdictional
supremacy of the Irish parliament, which they controlled, could
be reasserted. This required that the more ‘patriotic’ members of
the Anglo-Irish body politic gradually regain power and influ-
ence over Ireland’s affairs from the mother parliament in Lon-
don [Hayton, 1987; Connolly, 1992; Bartlett, 1992; O’Regan,
2000; Barnard, 2003].
This paper recounts one aspect of this ongoing struggle, one
in which accounting information and issues of accountability,
transparency and financial control emerged as proxies by which
the broader constitutional agenda was advanced. In essence, as
one means by which they sought to re-assert their legislative
prerogative, some members of the Irish parliament attempted to
exploit their part in the cumbersome process by which the
Money bill [or “supply”] was determined. Their strategy revolved
around developing the importance and independence of the
Public Accounts Committee. Their aim was to control and
strengthen the role of this committee in the supply process such
that the English parliament and executive would be forced to
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concede the Irish parliament’s demands for more regular sit-
tings. By reversing the marginalization of the Irish parliament
that had occurred over recent decades, they hoped to advance
their more immediate goal of ensuring that the Anglo-Irish com-
munity would play a central role in determining the post-
Revolution constitutional and land settlements for Ireland.
Realizing this ambition required a degree of political and
financial sophistication not previously evidenced by these
Anglo-Irish politicians as they sought to counter moves by the
English authorities to retain control over the budgetary and fis-
cal systems. As part of this endeavor they were required to un-
derstand, contest and reconfigure financial information and
forecasts presented by the English government and officials. In
this, the members of the Irish parliament were facilitated by a
confluence of the interests of a powerful Anglo-Irish Whig fac-
tion as well as the idiosyncrasies of the Irish political system. By
1704 they had successfully secured a scheme that placed the
Public Accounts Committee at the centre of the fiscal process.
Much to the chagrin of the English body politic, this ensured
that issues of accountability, transparency and control became
central to the manner in which the relationship between the
English and Irish parliaments would henceforth be mediated.
The paper is divided into four sections. The first section
outlines the background which gave rise to Ireland’s unique con-
stitutional status vis-à-vis England and the political and eco-
nomic conditions within which the resulting constitutional con-
flict was played out. The second section traces the emergence of
the Public Accounts Committee in William III’s first Irish parlia-
ment in 1692 and its evolution during William’s second Irish
parliament from 1695 to 1699 when a compromise was achieved
in relation to the granting of supply. The third section deals with
the parliament of 1703-04 during which the Public Accounts
Committee became a critical element in the attempt by Anglo-
Irish Whig ‘patriots’ to ensure a greater degree of control over
the legislative and judicial process. The final section provides
some concluding observations.
BACKGROUND
Originally invaded in the 12th century by a Norman force
that had the blessing of both the king of England and the pope,
Ireland’s history had been intricately intertwined since that
point with that of its larger neighbor. For four hundred years
the pattern was one of gradual subjugation of the native Gaelic
117
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2003, Vol. 30, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2003
109O’Regan: Accountability and Financial Control as ‘Patriotic’ Strategies
population by an increasingly dominant English interest that
couched its actions in terms of an obligation to ‘civilize’ unruly
natives [Canny, 1988; Leerssen, 1988; Said, 1993]. With Henry
VIII’s repudiation of the temporal authority of the pope, the
struggle in Ireland assumed a religious dimension. Positions of
authority and influence were now only entrusted to those who
supported the new state Anglican Church. By the time of Eliza-
beth I’s death in 1603, a small but politically and militarily
dominant Anglican, Anglo-Irish minority, had secured political
and economic control. And while this Anglo-Irish elite sought to
parade their own parliament and constitutional history as evi-
dence of sovereignty, Ireland nevertheless exhibited many of the
hallmarks of a colonial outpost [Bottigheimer, 1992; York, 1994;
McLoughlin, 1999].1
A series of ‘plantations’ over the course of the 17th century,
in which tens of thousands of Protestant settlers were planted
into Ireland, especially in the Northeast corner, complicated the
ethnic, religious and political mix further. The bulk of those
settled in the Northeast hailed from Scotland and traced their
Protestant heritage to a dissenting Presbyterian tradition that
made them suspect even to the Anglican authorities in Dublin.
Both Anglican and dissenting traditions were united, however,
in their hatred and fear of the numerically superior native
Gaelic Catholic population. On two occasions during the 17th
century this fragile Protestant alliance had occasion to be tested.
When the Catholic population rebelled in 1641 and again in
1688, the Protestant minority, reinforced from England, suc-
ceeded in overturning initial Catholic gains. The war from 1689
to 1691, which saw the Catholic population summarily defeated,
laid the basis for over a century of Protestant ascendancy. One
immediate consequence was a land settlement under which the
1 On the one hand, the Anglo-Irish political nation liked to present Ireland as
a sovereign kingdom answerable to the monarch as king of Ireland, with its own
parliament, Privy Council and executive. However, the reality, as the English
parliament constantly liked to remind its Irish counterpart, was that effective
political and military power and authority resided in London. Thus, while the
Irish parliament claimed independence, various statutes, particularly Poynings’
Law, effectively neutralized its capacity to initiate legislation, and the English
House of Lords regularly overturned decisions made by the Irish Lords. Like-
wise the ‘chief executive’ of the Irish government, the Lord Lieutenant, was
appointed by the king at the behest of the English government, while the Irish
Privy Council and executive were comprised of English placemen and individual
Irishmen considered loyal to whichever political faction happened to be in
power in London [Connolly, 1992; York, 1994; Hayton, 1995; McLoughlin,
1999].
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native Catholic majority retained less than one seventh of the
land. This subjugation was codified into a legal scheme known
as the ‘Penal Laws’ in which religious affiliation was assumed to
be a proxy for ethnicity and political loyalty [Foster, 1988;
Connolly, 1992; Bartlett, 1992; O’Regan, 2000].
While Ireland was seeking to recover from the devastating
effects of war and the resulting economic stagnation, England
was experiencing a financial transformation facilitated in part
by the Glorious Revolution. The growth in indirect taxation, the
professionalisation of the treasury and the emergence of embry-
onic forms of credit financing provided the context within
which the increased financial demands that accompanied pro-
longed war with France could be satisfied by a resurgent parlia-
ment and a nascent financial market. By 1695, the English par-
liament had seized to itself an authority to influence financial
policy to an extent unimaginable under the Stuarts [Dickson,
1967; Brewer, 1989; Neal, 1990; Braddick, 1994, 1996].
In stark contrast, Ireland was little affected by the changes
in the financial system and outlook then occurring in England
[Kiernan, 1930; McGrath, 2000].2 There were a number of rea-
sons for this. One was the country’s stage of economic develop-
ment. A peripheral island without any central financial focus
such as that supplied by the City of London in England, Ireland
did not enjoy the level of economic, financial or political matu-
rity conducive to such an evolution. However, the country’s un-
developed financial and taxation structures could be traced, in
the main, to the almost feudal nature of its fiscal system and the
retarding effect of the Restoration Settlement that had accompa-
nied the accession of Charles II in 1660. The primary means by
which the Irish civil and military costs [or ‘establishments’] were
financed was the hereditary revenue, a perpetual revenue stream
available to the crown without parliamentary consent. The prin-
cipal sources were various crown rents, drink licenses and other
casual duties. However, as part of the settlement under which
Charles II assumed the throne, in 1666 the Irish parliament
granted additional quit rents, customs, duties, taxes and licenses
2 While considerable attention has been paid to the English public revenue
in the 17th and early 18th centuries, little work has been done on its Irish
equivalent. One of the most comprehensive studies remains Kiernan’s [1930] A
History of the Financial Administration of Ireland to 1817. This has only recently
been supplanted by Ivar McGrath, [2000] The Making of the Eighteenth Century
Irish Constitution, which places the revenue and supply functions at the centre
of the constitutional process. I would like to thank Ivar for his comments and
observations on an earlier draft of this paper.
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to the crown in perpetuity. An improving economy, together
with a Stuart policy for Ireland which placed a premium on
ensuring that it was neither a drain on resources nor a source of
unease, meant that the monarch was soon in a position to gov-
ern the country without having to consider recalling parliament
to augment supply. The result of the Irish parliament’s largesse,
therefore, was that Ireland was governed for the following 26
years without a parliament in Dublin. In the interim the mother
parliament in London managed to advance its claim to judicial
supremacy over the Irish parliament [Connolly, 1992; Bartlett,
1992; McGrath, 2000; O’Regan, 2000].
Such a situation could only continue while these hereditary
revenues exceeded the establishment. But one obvious and im-
mediate effect of the war of 1689-91 was that costs increased
dramatically at a time when revenues were almost non-existent.
In these circumstances the initiative returned to the Irish parlia-
ment, since only an increase in the range and/or rates of the
hereditary revenue would allow the civil and military establish-
ments to be met. By early 1692 the new monarchs, William and
Mary, were left with little option but to summon parliament to
meet in Dublin later that year [Hayton, 1981, 1995; Bartlett,
1992; Connolly, 1992].
THE PARLIAMENTS OF 1692 AND 1695-1699:
SOLE RIGHT, ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPROMISE
Those who gathered in Dublin in October 1692 for the first
Irish parliament in almost thirty years knew well that their ca-
pacity to reap the rewards of victory over James was linked to
their ability to re-establish the sovereignty of the Irish parlia-
ment in matters relating to Ireland. The lesson from the lengthy
break between parliaments was that this, in turn, was related to
the level of control that members could establish over the deter-
mination of the quantum and the length of supply. Thus, Anglo-
Irish interests would be best served by ensuring that supply was
only granted for a limited period, preferably two years, and at
relatively low levels [Conolly, 1992; McGrath, 2000].
However, an issue of more immediate concern to members
was the post-Revolution land settlement. When, in the first ses-
sion, the government managed to stymie debate on this, they
expressed their resentment in other ways. In particular, they
attempted to obstruct various measures intended to alleviate the
immediate financial crisis. This was evident at first when the
Commons came to deal with the Money bill. Contention on this
120
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 30 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 10
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol30/iss2/10
Accounting Historians Journal, December 2003112
issue centered on the question of ‘sole right’, i.e. the claim by the
Irish Commons as a sovereign parliament to have the ‘sole right’
to initiate legislation in this area. As evidence that the executive
could by no means presume a pliant parliament in voting a
supply sufficient to cover the Civil and Military establishments,
the members first insisted that they be given access to the vari-
ous financial and accounting records on which the calculations
of revenue and establishment costs were based. On October 12 a
committee was appointed ‘to search precedents how the com-
mittee of grievances may come at records, accompts and papers
in the hands of any of their majesties officers of the revenue and
others’ [Commons Journal Ireland [hereafter: CJI] 12 Oct. 1692].
This led to demands by members that full accounts be laid be-
fore the House. Reluctant revenue officials eventually acceded.
This in turn prompted further disputes between the members
and the executive with regard to both the quantum and the
length of supply. Only after the intervention of the monarch
were the members persuaded to grant additional duties. How-
ever, while allowing certain duties to be increased, members
refused to consider more than a two-year supply [CJI, 12 Oct.
1692; Bartlett, 1992; O’Regan, 2000].
In 1695, when a similar dispute threatened, a compromise
initiated by Lord Deputy Capel, whereby the government was
seen to retain the right to initiate the process, while the Irish
Commons was given the right to determine the ways and means
by which an additional supply was to be collected, ensured that
the ‘sole right’ issue was defused [CJI, 6 Sept. 1695]. Under this
scheme the government drafted and presented an initial supply
bill for one year. The significance of this lay in the fact that the
crown was seen to have initiated the process. The compromise
then allowed the Commons to raise Heads of a bill for the col-
lection of more substantial additional duties over subsequent
years. The result was a Commons inspired supply bill that, while
signaling the unhappiness of members at parallel initiatives of
the English parliament in relation to duties on woolen exports
from Ireland, provided the government with a significant
amount of additional income. Indeed, so successful was this
compromise that it was repeated in 1697 and again in 1699,
despite the fact that, in a maneuver opposed by those champion-
ing greater Irish parliamentary sovereignty, the executive did
manage to secure various additional duties on tobacco and some
other goods for a period of four years from 1699 [CJI, 21 Jan.
1699; McGrath, 2000].
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THE PARLIAMENT OF 1703-1704:
SECURING ACCOUNTABILITY
The additional hereditary revenues and duties granted in
1699 meant that the revenue would be in surplus up to and
including 1702. By 1703, however, unless parliament was sum-
moned and additional supplies granted, the cost of the establish-
ment would begin to exceed income. There were a number of
reasons, not related to the financial situation, why the ministry
in London found that this long interval suited its purposes.
These could be traced to the worsening relations between the
two parliaments that had followed the dissolution of William’s
second Irish parliament in 1699. For a start, the constitutional
fracas over legislative and judicial supremacy between London
and Dublin had escalated into a full-scale legal and political
cause celebre [O’Regan, 2000]. On the one hand a series of court
cases initiated in Ireland sought to have the jurisdictional pre-
rogative of the Irish parliament clearly established. On the other
hand the English parliament took every opportunity to encour-
age plaintiffs to appeal decisions of the Irish Lords to England
where the authority of the English Lords was promptly re-as-
serted. These tensions were fuelled by a series of pamphlets and
books that were unabashed in their championing of the appel-
late jurisdiction of the Dublin parliament [Foster, 1988; Kelly,
1988; Connolly, 1992; O’Regan, 2000].
The English parliament had also been to the fore in several
other episodes that had further soured relations. The passage of
a series of mercantilist laws in London had effectively ruined a
healthy Irish woolens trade in order to satisfy an English west-
country lobby. The linen trade, introduced into Ireland and
funded by a series of Linen Acts, was perceived by a generally
unappreciative populace to be an inappropriate and insufficient
replacement. Anglo-Irish grievances had been aggravated fur-
ther by the Act of Resumption passed in London in April 1700
that had voided many of the land settlements concluded over the
previous decade [Kelly, 1980; Connolly, 1992; Bartlett, 1992].
Apart altogether from the constitutional implications of such a
statute, the manner in which the Commissioners of Forfeiture
had gone about their business had inspired accusations of
corruption and favoritism. The fact that individuals such as Alan
Brodrick and William Conolly, the principal parliamentary
managers in Ireland, had been deprived of some of their lands
meant that this anger was bound to be reflected in the members’
attitude to the government’s parliamentary program whenever
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parliament eventually reconvened. There was also strong resent-
ment that the establishment was being further burdened by the
upkeep of several regiments based in the West Indies, as well as
the seemingly profligate manner in which the construction of
new barracks was being managed. The general economic mal-
aise that had begun in mid-1701 merely compounded Irish poli-
ticians’ and merchants’ sense of being seriously disadvantaged
by a constitutional arrangement that seemed to allow Irish po-
litical and economic priorities to be subordinated to the whims
and avarice of disparate English interest groups [Foster, 1988;
Bartlett, 1992; Connolly, 1992].
Ever alert to the potential for Irish politics and politicians to
complicate the domestic situation, English ministers were un-
willing to bring upon themselves, until absolutely necessary, the
disaffection that they were sure would follow the summoning of
a new Irish parliament. With the additional duties due to expire
by mid-1703, however, it eventually became counter-productive
for the ministry to defer summoning members to meet. In early
1703, therefore, it was announced by Queen Anne that a parlia-
ment was to be summoned to assemble in Dublin that autumn.
As this was the first parliament of the new monarch’s reign it
would be preceded by an election [Connolly, 1992; Bartlett, 1992].
Anglo-Irish politicians preparing for parliament in Dublin
in the autumn of 1703 were conscious of how their power had
again been eroded by the time-lag between parliaments, an in-
terval that had only been made possible by the generosity of the
previous parliament. Those attuned to the constitutional aspects
of the ongoing struggle were determined to ensure that this did
not occur again. Much depended, therefore, upon the ability of
the members, particularly in the Commons, to ensure that there
was no repeat of the carelessness of their predecessors in terms
of either the quantum or the length of supply. This would re-
quire that Anglo-Irish politicians seize greater control over the
supply process, investigate official calculations of budgetary
projections more closely and ensure that the Civil and Military
establishments were scrutinized assiduously [Connolly, 1992;
Bartlett, 1992; O’Regan, 2000].
This keener espousal of the place of parliament within the
body politic coincided with the emergence of the Brodrick fam-
ily and its ‘Cork Squadron’ as a significant force in the Irish
House of Commons. Growing out of a general unhappiness at
the gradual marginalization of the Anglo-Irish interest in Irish
polity, this had crystallized by the early 1700s into a quasi-
Whiggish position on the importance of parliament and the
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need for accountability of the executive in Dublin, its officers
and placemen. It marked the beginning of almost thirty years of
influence on the part of Alan Brodrick and various members of
his family. The fact that this faction found itself opposed by a
series of governments in London controlled by Marlborough,
Godolphin and Harley that were at least sympathetic to the
Tories, and which were in turn supported by an Irish ‘Court’
faction in parliament as well as an embryonic Irish Church
party, increased the likelihood of conflict [Jones, 1978; Kenyon,
1978; Holmes, 1987; Connolly, 1992].
The members of the Irish Commons were by now well
aware that the issues of legislative supremacy, economic influ-
ence and supply were inter-linked, and, prompted by Brodrick, a
small majority appeared willing to press for change. Since re-
cent sessions had made it clear that parliaments in Dublin were
only summoned when supply needed to be secured, it was obvi-
ous that supply bills of shorter duration would result in the
more regular convening of members. It was imperative, there-
fore, that those orchestrating the ‘patriotic’ stance ensure that
the process by which supply was granted be managed more
closely than before. This would necessitate the diligent attention
of various parliamentary managers, as well as careful scrutiny of
both the supply process and the officials responsible for its for-
mulation and management. In fact, what resulted was a system
for determining supply that represented a subtle but significant
shift in emphasis from the compromise of the 1695-99 parlia-
ment. It succeeded in further securing the role of the Irish Com-
mons in the supply process, while at the same time not trespass-
ing on the prerogative powers of the crown. The crucial factor
would be a keenly managed Public Accounts Committee whose
Whig members would succeed in imposing a degree of account-
ability and financial control not seen before in Ireland. In this
the capacity of the members to marshal, contest and manipulate
accounting information would be crucial. And it was a process
in which various members who were accomptants would play a
key role [McGrath, 2000].
Parliamentary Preliminaries: The advice to the government in
London from the executive in Dublin prior to parliament con-
vening had been that it should seek to continue the pattern
established in 1695-1699 by introducing the initial supply bill
providing for an extension of additional duties for one year. The
Commons could then introduce a bill for further additional
duties covering at least one extra year, and possibly two. This
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process, while tortuous, would at least allow the government to
argue that the right to initiate the supply process remained with
the executive and the crown. It was obvious, therefore, that the
government’s own officials had accepted the 1695 compromise
as a workable solution to the supply conundrum, one that might
ensure that the supply question would not prejudice debates on
constitutional grievances or complicate other items of business.
Brodrick, however, was determined to see that these arrange-
ments were modified more to parliament’s advantage. In various
meetings with the Dublin executive he argued that the Irish
Parliament had by now established its ‘sole right’ in the area of
supply and that the whole matter should be left to the Com-
mons. He warned that the political and economic climates were
such that any other approach might see supply rejected alto-
gether. In any case, he considered it unlikely that supply would
be granted for more than a one-year period. In response, Lord
Lieutenant Ormonde let it be known that, while he would at-
tempt to continue the 1695 compromise, he expected the Com-
mons to reciprocate with additional duties for a further two-
year period [Anon. [Brodrick, St.J.], 1701; Victory, 1989;
McGrath, 2000].
The Dublin executive’s carefully arranged plan ran into im-
mediate difficulties when the London government refused to
endorse any plan that did not explicitly guarantee more than a
one-year supply. Determined to ensure that the Irish Whigs
would not be allowed to exploit this issue to ensure more regu-
lar sessions, the government in London countered Brodrick’s
lobbying by insisting that a three-year supply bill be introduced
at the start of the session. However, a series of warnings from
Ormonde in Dublin that a more conciliatory approach would be
required eventually persuaded the government in London to be
less confrontational. In accordance with protocol, by late July a
one-year Money bill had been forwarded from London. The un-
derstanding in England was that this would lead to a further
supply bill from the Commons in Dublin that would augment
supply and extend it for a period of more than one year. In the
meantime, officials in both London and Dublin assumed that
they had secured Brodrick’s compliance by virtue of their prom-
ise to support his candidature for the position of Speaker of the
House of Commons, a post that brought with it considerable
power and patronage [Connolly, 1992; McGrath, 2000; O’Regan,
2000].
There were some indications that this consensus might
break down shortly before parliament convened. In particular,
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rumors that the ministry in London would seek an additional
supply over three years of £210,000 on the basis of a £70,000 per
annum increase in the additional duties, had begun to circulate.
It caused many parliamentary leaders to balk. In fact, this was
merely a ploy to make the government’s actual intentions seem
more palatable. Without informing the executive in Dublin, the
London government had quietly explored the possibility of se-
curing a two-year supply, seeking £50,000 per annum in addi-
tional duties, while at the same time requiring that the parlia-
ment undertake to pay off an opening debt at 30 September
1703, which government officials estimated at £103,368. In ef-
fect, they were asking for almost the same amount over a two-
year period as had been mooted for the three-year supply
[McGrath, 2000].
While calculated to intimidate the Irish members, the En-
glish government’s disingenuous policy was merely complicat-
ing an already fraught situation. Conscious of the widespread
nature of the discontent, Ormonde had already informed his
superiors in London that a pliant parliament should by no
means be presumed. There were persistent rumors that the
Anglo-Irish were organizing to obstruct government business
unless their grievances were addressed. If some additional legis-
lation acceptable to the members were not offered, then there
would be considerable difficulty in securing the passage of any
supply. One measure that the Lord Lieutenant had suggested
was a bill disabling Catholics further in the matter of inheriting
land. This would be especially appreciated in the light of the
many claims submitted by Catholics to the Commissioners of
Forfeiture. To assist the London government in its deliberations
a bill intended to satisfy this purpose had been framed by the
Privy Council in Dublin and forwarded to England. A second
bill, designed to impose severe penalties on Catholic priests who
came into Ireland from abroad, had also been enclosed. How-
ever, in England there was resistance to the measures proposed
to the extent that when parliament convened in Ireland in Sep-
tember neither of the two bills forwarded by the Irish Privy
Council to London had been returned. Only after repeated calls
from the Dublin executive was the bill ‘to prevent priests coming
in’ sent back. The more contentious bill ‘to prevent the further
growth of popery’, which was intended to disable Catholics from
retaining or inheriting certain lands, was withheld pending fur-
ther consideration. As a result an impatient Irish Commons, in
which Brodrick’s Cork Squadron was beginning to prove very
difficult, framed an even more vindictive bill. It was forwarded
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to England with the explicit threat that any amendment to its
contents would jeopardize supply [Connolly, 1992; O’Regan,
2000].
Contesting Financial Information and ‘Great Discoveries’: The
centrality of supply, and the difficulties that the government
anticipated were hinted at in the Lord Lieutenant’s opening
speech to the new parliament on 24 September, when he alluded
to an opening deficit that had accrued as a result of additional
expenditure incurred by the government on the island’s security:
. . . the Government has expended a very considerable
sum toward the building of the Barracks, more than
was given by the Parliament for that purpose; and when
you are fully informed of the particulars, I have no
doubt but you will give as great testimonies of respect
and affection to her Majesty as you have given to any of
her Royal Predecessors [CJI, 24 Sept. 1703].
To assist members he had ‘ordered all the accompts to be laid
before you, by which you will perceive’ that government protes-
tations of the existence of a sizeable opening deficit were accu-
rate. He was not reassured, however, by the rather curt response
from the members. While indicating a willingness ‘to do all in
our power, under our present circumstances, for discharging the
debts of the nation, and defraying the expense of the establish-
ment under the best of Queens and your Grace’s most happy
government’, they promised nothing by way of the quantum or
length of supply [CJI, 25 Sept. 1703].
The process of voting supply commenced on September 29
with the laying before the Commons of the revenue accounts
and records. This was followed by the nomination of various
members to the Public Accounts Committee. Despite consider-
able Court party opposition, Laurence Clayton, a close associate
of Speaker Brodrick, was appointed as chairman. Other sup-
porters of Brodrick, including his brother, Thomas and Oliver St
George also took key positions. Only at this point did the Com-
mons, acting as a supply committee of the whole house, vote to
receive the government’s own supply bill. The implication was
clear - members saw it as their right to initiate the supply pro-
cess. The intentions of the house became even more evident
when it voted to defer consideration of the amount of supply
until after a full investigation of the accounts by the newly
elected Public Accounts Committee. Essentially, the quantum
would not be discussed until the members had had an opportu-
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nity to examine the accounts for themselves [CJI, 29, 30 Sept,
1703; CJI, 2 Oct. 1703; McGrath, 2000].
This put the focus on the Public Accounts Committee and
its members in a way that had not occurred before. It also
meant that the members now had a forum which acted as a
proxy for other matters and which, properly managed, could be
used to place tangible constraints on the executive and its offi-
cials. In all of this the capacity of members to master and ma-
nipulate the mass of accounting data with which they would be
confronted would be a key factor in determining the success or
otherwise of the Whig strategy. In order to assist the committee
in analyzing and understanding the revenue accounts, particu-
larly the very detailed records presented by Sir William
Robinson, Deputy Vice-Treasurer, it was decided that ‘all mer-
chants and accomptants’ that were members of the Commons
would be automatically entitled to join the committee. It was
official recognition that individuals with the skills to audit and
investigate financial records had a role to play. It was also an
acknowledgement of the fact that, in an environment in which
‘gentlemanly’ status was seen as a crucial determinant of social
standing, their function was not perceived as being at odds with
respectability. Their skills would be needed, as Clayton had set
out a course of action that would involve intense scrutiny of
both officials and their records. Over a three-week period, mem-
bers would be required to sit through long hours of dreary com-
mittee work and undertake a thorough investigation of a volu-
minous quantity of vouchers, books and returns submitted by
revenue officials, Sheriffs and collectors. Clayton later described
the committee’s modus operandi:
In obedience to the order of this House, the Com-
mittee for taking into their consideration the public ac-
counts of the Nation have met and divided themselves
into several sub committees and have sat de die in diem
early and late both mornings and afternoons to give the
quicker dispatch to that great affair committed to their
charge. [Public Accounts Committee minutes, Frazer
Ms 10, 2/465/23, unfoliated [hereafter: PAC Minutes]].
The accounts received from the Deputy Vice-Treasurer ap-
peared, at first sight, to support the government’s case for an
immediate and substantial increase in the additional supply. His
schedule of charges for the nine months to Michaelmas 1703,
less payments made to date, indicated an amount outstanding of
£103,368, relating principally to pay arrears [see Exhibit 1].
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In yet another schedule he indicated that arrears would increase
substantially over subsequent years if additional duties were not
granted by parliament [see Exhibit 2].
Even allowing that the establishment remained the same as
for 1703, i.e., £325,947, projected income from the hereditary
revenue of £240,000 would leave a deficit for the forthcoming
year of almost £85,947. This would result in a total debt of just
over £275,000 after two years if no additional revenues were
granted. The various Public Accounts sub-committees for expen-
EXHIBIT 1
Arrears due to Clear the Civil and Military Lists
to 29 September 1703
Source: Commons Journals of Ireland, Appendix cv
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diture on the barracks, non-resident pensions, vouchers for all
payments, and examining the establishment, immediately sum-
moned revenue officials to provide documentation dating back
to 1694. These were to include information relating to the ways
in which individual collectors throughout the country managed
their affairs as well as vouchers, receipts and expenditure rolls
from the exchequer in Dublin Castle. When the revenue officials
delayed, the members threatened them with censure. News of
the activities of the various sub-committees began to filter back
to the Commons where Brodrick attempted to exploit matters by
allowing various motions condemning excess expenditure of
£60,000 on a new barracks, the imposition of additional non-
resident pensions, laxity in the issuance of receipts and an in-
crease in official salaries. The Speaker’s followers then at-
tempted to bring attention to specific additions to the pension
list. Government supporters countered that the House should
simply agree to provide for all pay arrears as well as the pro-
jected deficit. When this was defeated buoyant Whigs taunted
government supporters with threats of ‘great discoveries’ by the
Public Accounts Committee. With this attention returned to the
committee and its eagerly awaited first report [PAC Minutes,
passim; CJI, 30 Sept, 6 Oct, 1703; McGrath, 2000].
The Public Account Committee continued to meet daily
prior to a critical session of the House supply committee sched-
EXHIBIT 2
A State of the Present Revenue Debt due at
Michaelmas 1703 . . . (Extract)
Source: Commons Journals of Ireland, Appendix cvi
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uled for 7 October. Amid reports of alarming ‘discoveries’ in the
accounts, Whig members began to complain about delays on the
part of some officials in forwarding accounts, as well as of the
huge mass of documentation being submitted by others. Even
with the assistance of the newly recruited accomptants, it was
proving impossible to carry out more than a cursory audit.
Court supporters countered that Whigs were simply seeking ex-
cuses to prolong their investigation and proposed that a report
be drafted immediately. With the assistance of the Speaker, the
committee again secured more time to investigate the accounts
and records. At this point government officials intervened in an
attempt to broker a compromise. In a private meeting, Chief
Secretary Southwell reminded Brodrick that reports of his con-
duct had reached the queen, who had expressed annoyance that
a man entrusted with the position of Speaker was now working
to counter official policy. Brodrick replied that he was acting in
the interests of his country and refused to consider anything
other than a one-year supply. He intended, he warned, to exploit
the supply issue to ensure that there were annual parliaments in
Ireland, a view he repeated in private meetings with various
government officials [CJI, 20 Oct. 1703; PAC Minutes, passim.,
O’Regan, 2000; McGrath, 2000].
When the Public Accounts Committee convened on October
12 to finalize its first Report, it did so confident that it had the
support of the Speaker and the bulk of the speaking members of
the Irish Commons. Clayton began his presentation by com-
plaining of the difficulties presented by uncooperative officials
and the sheer mass of documentation they had had to work
through:
The Books are so very voluminous, the Articles so very
many, the papers that were necessary for our informa-
tion not being made up in time by the proper officers
but above all the shortness of the days given us to bring
in our report, rendered it impossible to give in a full
and exact account of the several branches of the
Establishment…[PAC Minutes].
Nevertheless, using figures provided by the revenue officials,
and by Sir William Robinson in particular, the committee had
managed to put together a detailed nine-page Report in draft
form that dealt with a range of items in considerable detail. It
was introduced by a rough outline of the financial position
drawn up by the committee that completely reconfigured the
accounting information provided by officials [see Exhibit 3].
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With a view to challenging the government’s contention that
substantial arrears existed, the committee proceeded to put to-
gether a statement that did not follow the traditional approach
of the Exchequer. For a start, opening cash amounts of £53,061
indicated as in the hands of collectors in records submitted by
officials were included as opening balances immediately avail-
able to the government. In fact, they were merely charges
against Collectors that were unlikely ever to be received by the
Exchequer. Furthermore, collection arrears of £43,200 were also
indicated as part of the government’s income, despite the fact
that many dated back to pre-war years and were unlikely ever to
be collected [McGrath, 2000]. By these and other means, includ-
ing incorporating several of Robinson’s own figures for receipts
and payments, the committee believed it had established that
the true position at September 30 was actually a surplus of
£79,661. This was radically at odds with the opening debt of
£103,368 put forward by the government. Even after allowing
for additional expenditures of £42,390 submitted by Robinson
just prior to the meeting, the committee was satisfied that the
state of the nation’s finances was far healthier than the executive
EXHIBIT 3
Report from the Committee to Examine Public Accounts
Source: Commons Journals of Ireland, Appendix cv
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was allowing [PAC Minutes; CJI, 12 Oct, 1703 and Appendices
cx-cxviii].
When the committee’s report was presented to the Com-
mons on October 13 Brodrick and the majority of speakers en-
thusiastically endorsed it. On a motion, members resolved that
the monies granted by the 1699 parliament had been sufficient
to clear all debts up to September 1703. There would be no
need, therefore, for additional duties to cover any arrears for the
period to date: government demands for sufficient funds to clear
the supposed opening deficit of £103,368 could be dismissed.
Furthermore, members refused to speculate on the amount that
would be required for 1703-04, as they would not allow their
investigations to be prejudiced by questions of the quantum. In
addition, they recommended that only additional duties suffi-
cient to cover ‘necessary branches of the establishment’ be
granted: the house was effectively allowing itself scope to con-
tinue to investigate the government’s expenditure and to deter-
mine for itself what was and what was not ‘necessary’ [CJI, 13,
14 Oct. 1703].
In the debates that followed the contributions of both
Whigs and Court party supporters were even more rancorous.
Whigs concentrated on the ‘designed fraud’ perpetrated by the
government and its officials in the accounting figures that un-
derpinned their calculations. This led them to propose that only
a one-year supply be granted, arguing that the annual parlia-
ments that would result were the best means of ensuring that
there would be no repeat of the deception now uncovered. How-
ever, in impugning the Lord Lieutenant, Brodrick pressed mat-
ters too far. Seizing the initiative, and persuading various mod-
erate members to support them, the Court party succeeding in
obtaining a small majority, 122-119, in favor of a counter mo-
tion that the supply be for two years. At Brodrick’s initiative,
Whigs once more rallied: the committee and its work was highly
commended and it was:
Resolved that the thanks of this House be given by the
Speaker to the committee appointed to inspect and ex-
amine the public Accompts of the nation, for their great
care and faithful and diligent discharge of the trust re-
posed in them, whereby they have saved the kingdom
the sum of £103,368/8/4 which by misrepresentation
was charged as a debt on the nation. And accordingly
Mr Speaker gave the thanks of the house to Major
Clayton, chairman, and the rest of the gentlemen of the
said committee.
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Nor could the Court party protect Vice-Treasurer Robinson,
who was declared unfit for any public employment and commit-
ted to the Constable of Dublin Castle where he was to be incar-
cerated [CJI, 14, 16 Oct. 1703; McGrath, 2000].
Encouraged by their success in recruiting those country
members who were anxious to bring the session to a conclusion
so that they could return to their properties, the Court party
immediately attempted to raise the matter of the quantum. They
suggested that an amount of £170,000 over two years would be
sufficient. This was a significant reduction on earlier demands
and an implicit acknowledgment that the Public Accounts
Committee’s actions had effectively sabotaged government at-
tempts to have the opening deficit covered by the supply pro-
cess. Whigs countered that this was presumptuous given that
other branches of the establishment remained to be examined
and so the total requirement could not yet be determined. Their
resistance was boosted by Brodrick who had initiated an Address
to the queen on the state of the nation. This reflected the anger
of the Anglo-Irish at the way in which corrupt officials and
forfeiture trustees had undermined Ireland’s constitution. It also
explicitly articulated the link between regular parliaments and
accountability that Whigs had been trying to establish:
The want of holding frequent parliaments in your
majesty’s Kingdom of Ireland has been a great encour-
agement to evil-minded men, who intend nothing but
their own gain, though accompanied with the ruin and
oppression of your majesty’s good subjects. Many civil
officers are arrived at such a pitch of corruption,
through hopes of impunity, as is almost insupportable;
thereby getting vast estates in a short time in a poor
country, and others in considerable civil employments,
do dwell and reside for the most part out of the king-
dom, thereby neglecting the personal attendance on
their duties; whilst in the meantime their offices (which
in effect are made mere sinecures) are but indifferently
executed, to the great detriment of your majesty’s good
subjects and the great failure of justice. So that we,
your majesty’s dutiful subjects, are fully convinced, that
nothing but frequent parliaments, with a permission for
them to sit and do business of the nation, can prevent
or reform so great and notorious abuses [CJI, 20 Oct.
1703].
Government Resistance and the Dilution of Controls: In the after-
math of several days of contention that had shown the Whig and
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Court parties to be roughly equal in strength, attention now
focused once again on the Public Accounts Committee, which
had undertaken to produce yet another report, this time in-
tended to focus specifically on ways in which the cost of the
establishment could be reduced [CJI, 14, 16 Oct. 1703; PAC Min-
utes; McGrath, 2000]. With a view to such a report, the commit-
tee had been continuing its investigations of the accounts and
various officials. The members focused in the main on the
charges on the establishment, and in particular on the large
number of pensions being paid to people outside of the country.
The intention was to reduce expenditure to such an extent that a
small supply would be sufficient to cover the establishment until
1705. On October 19 a second report from the Public Accounts
Committee was laid before the house. It listed a number of ex-
penditures with which the committee had problems. These
ranged from pensions paid to individuals living outside the king-
dom to the regium donum, a subvention paid to support dissent-
ing ministers. They amounted in total to £86,667.3 However,
when the Report was examined, government officials pointed
out that the bulk of these commitments were by patent, mean-
ing that they could not be reduced or removed. With this much
of the Whig impetus was lost [PAC Minutes; CJI, iii, Appendices
cxx-cxxii; McGrath, 2000].
The Dublin executive and Court party were now in the as-
cendant and Whig strategy was reduced to merely attempting to
so complicate the discussion on the quantum that the executive
would be forced to concede a lower figure. With the intention of
undermining the government’s proposal that £170,000 be ac-
cepted as the quantum, Clayton quickly put together a third
Report. With its various appendices, this Report contained de-
tails of a variety of expenditures and outlined several ways in
which the establishment might be reduced. The Commons re-
ceived it on October 22 and resolutions were passed approving
19 of the 21 recommendations. These called for reductions in, or
cancellations of, various pensions and other charges. By this late
stage, however, the Whig faction realized that there was little
prospect of further exploiting the supply process to achieve
broader political aims. When the committee returned to a
3 The following items were specifically identified as worthy of investigation:
Pensions to individuals who reside out of the kingdom: £14,613; pensions due in
respect of to French Regiments and officers, etc., £24,226 Half-pay officers,
£6,278; Quit Rent concessions granted to papists, £13,995; particular grants on
his majesty’s letters over and above the establishment, £27,555.
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discussion of quantum a compromise of £150,000 over two
years to September 1705 was quickly agreed. Significantly, and
much to the discomfort of Secretary Southwell, who envisaged a
repeat of the accounting techniques employed earlier by the
Public Accounts Committee to create projected surpluses, the
quantum was only approved subject to the provision that this
figure would be reduced by any amount that could subsequently
be shown as due from the government to the nation [PAC Min-
utes; CJI, 22, 25 Oct., 10 Nov. 1703 and Appendix cxxiii].
Once the length of supply and the quantum had been deter-
mined, questions relating to supply now moved out of the ambit
of the Public Accounts Committee and reverted to a ‘ways and
means committee’. And with the Court party in the ascendant,
additional excise duties were quickly agreed for a two-year pe-
riod from November 1703. Within days Heads of a Money bill
had been agreed and transmitted to England for the approval of
the Privy Council there. However, as Southwell had feared,
Whig members did succeed in insinuating into the budget a
projected surplus for Quit Rents, based on their own calcula-
tions, of £31,213 for the half-year to September 1703. Neverthe-
less, the initiative remained with the government and the Court
party. In early November the government secured an additional
excise of £30,000 on the second year as well as a renewal of
various other duties to the value of £8,000 [CJI, 8, 10, 12, Nov.
1703]. By the end of the month the principal heads of the Money
bill had been secured and the session was prorogued until the
New Year. When returned from England in February 1704 the
bill enjoyed an easy passage through the Lords and was eventu-
ally given the royal assent on March 4 [CJI, 4 Mar. 1704].
For an executive used to cajoling and bribing its way to
having its policies implemented, this had been a traumatic ses-
sion. Despite having been ultimately stymied in their ambition
to see the length of supply reduced to one year, the Whig fac-
tion, primarily by exploiting the possibilities offered by their
dominance of the Public Accounts Committee, had succeeded in
materially impacting the entire fiscal process. Thus, members’
authority to censure officials and access all accounts and vouch-
ers had been confirmed; the committee had secured the right to
determine what was and what was not ‘necessary’ expenditure;
and, most critically, official calculations of an opening debt had
effectively been dismissed, thus materially impacting the quan-
tum granted, while ongoing estimates of projected revenues and
expenditures were open to revision. Ormonde, who had been
both humiliated and weakened by the episode, was unable to
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refrain from indicating the executive’s disapproval. Conscious of
the subtle, if significant, change in procedures that had seen the
Irish parliament secure a greater level of accountability over the
actions of the executive, he alluded in his closing address to the
accounting policy instituted by the public accounts committee
in its assessment of government budgetary requirements as the
principal, if misguided, source of official anxiety:
It were indeed to be wished that you . . . could have now
provided for what is still owing to the civil and military
lists; and the rather, because the arrears (a state of
which the commissioners of the revenue were ordered
by me to lay before you at the opening of parliament)
must be applied to make good the deficiencies of the
current year, as has been done in former govern-
ments . . . [CJI, 4 March, 1704].
As the Lord Lieutenant and his executive saw it, the members of
the Public Accounts Committee had succeeded in introducing a
fundamental change into the nature of the relationship between
the government and the governed. And this had been achieved,
primarily, by forcing a change in the manner in which items
were accounted for - arrears were no longer to be ‘applied to
make good the deficiencies of the current year, as has been done
in former governments’, but incorporated as part of the pro-
jected income for future periods.
CONCLUSIONS
The parliament of 1703-1704 saw the evolution of a more
sophisticated process for formulating and securing supply. In
this the Public Accounts Committee was a central player, its
actions and reports shaping the eventual supply bill in terms of
both its quantum and longevity. And the functioning of the Pub-
lic Accounts Committee itself reflected a more focused and for-
malized approach to the task at hand, with accomptants re-
cruited to assist in the investigation and audit of government
records and officers. The financial reports that resulted, and the
accounting calculations underpinning them, were more exten-
sive and comprehensive than the Anglo-Irish polity had hereto-
fore produced. They were also instrumental in ensuring the cen-
trality of accounting information as a key, mediating factor in
the relationship between a government and those it preferred to
categorize as dependants, but who imagined themselves as
equals.
In securing a critical accountability and financial control
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function for the Public Accounts Committee, this Irish Whig
faction succeeded in changing the dynamics of the constitu-
tional arrangement between England and Ireland. Principles of
accountability and financial control were now firmly established
as part of the supply process. The colonial power could no
longer assume the pliant acquiescence of its erstwhile agents.
The ‘sole right’ and constitutional issues had been inextricably
linked and a forum in which the ambitions of the political na-
tion might be advanced had been identified and secured. By
exploiting and leveraging their command of accounting infor-
mation, parliamentary procedures and the simmering resent-
ment of the political nation, an Irish Whig faction had suc-
ceeded in appropriating to the Irish parliament various elements
of the Revolution Settlement that they believed to be rightfully
theirs.
This episode extends our understanding, therefore, of the
role of accounting information within the colonial context, in
particular as it is used to realize the regulative and distributive
ambitions of powerful elites. The language and impulses of colo-
nialism are useful in highlighting the fact that the fissiparous
tendencies of colonial enterprises are both constrained and un-
leashed by technologies of control such as accounting [Neu,
1999, 2000b]. Thus, accounting information can be shown to
represent not only a means of exerting control from a distance,
but also of subverting relationships within the hierarchy of pow-
ers that constitute the imperial force. Accounting information
not only inscribes and expresses the unequal power relations
that exist between the colonial power and the colonized [Tinker,
1980], but also represents a potent medium by which the con-
stantly mutating relationship that exists between the metropoli-
tan centre and its agents can be both imagined and mapped.
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ASSETS IN ACCOUNTING:
REALITY LOST
Abstract: While the contemporary view of assets in accounting is of
‘future economic benefits’, the appropriateness of this definition for
financial reporting purposes continues to be questioned. Samuelson
[1996, p. 156] argued that assets should be defined as ‘property rights’
while Schuetze [1993, p. 69] proposed that assets should be defined
simply as cash, claims to cash and items that could be sold separately
for cash. These notions are not new. Up until the latter part of the
19th century the emphasis in the accounting literature was on the
recording of ‘property’ or ‘effects’, commonly understood to be things
or rights which were exchangeable for cash. The aim of this paper is
to trace changes in the definitional concept of assets in an attempt to
discover why professional accounting bodies in the major English
speaking countries have adopted the problematic abstract ‘future ben-
efit’ notion, which is so far removed from the simple concept of assets
as exchangeable things or rights. It is suggested that in the future
financial reporting requirements for business entities include a state-
ment of ‘separably exchangeable property’ and legal obligations at the
reporting date.
INTRODUCTION
The starting point of any accounting, once the entity is de-
fined, is the identification of assets. Such a fundamental ele-
ment of accounting would be expected to be based on a straight-
forward definition. The following study shows that reality is
quite removed from such simplicity as accounting has moved
from commonly understood concepts of effects and property to
the abstract notion of future economic benefits.
The term ‘assets’ was rarely used in the accounting litera-
ture of the major English speaking countries until the latter part
of the 19th century. The words ‘property’ or ‘effects’ were most
commonly used and understood to mean things owned—the
wherewithal to meet financial obligations.
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Toward the end of the 19th century the term assets, which
was understood in commerce and law as meaning property
available for the payment of debts, began to feature prominently
in the accounting literature. Alongside the view that assets or
property represented what was owned there appeared a contrary
view of assets as representing deferred (unallocated) costs. Out-
lays which were argued not to relate solely to the current period
were reported in the balance sheet as assets, without regard for
whether such outlays represented assets in the commonly un-
derstood sense of rights of ownership or objects owned that
could be exchanged for cash. Subsequently, the notion that as-
sets were unallocated costs was popularized - especially by those
who argued that the focus of accounting should be on the profit
and loss statement. For example, Paton and Littleton [1940] em-
phasized the importance of the matching of efforts and accom-
plishments, as measured by costs and revenues [see also
Littleton, 1953, pp. 22-23; Engleman, 1954, p. 385]. The empha-
sis was on the allocation of revenues and expenses to accounting
periods to determine income. Solvency, or debt paying power,
was considered of secondary importance.
The changed emphasis was an important factor in the sub-
sequent adoption of the much broader concept of assets as rep-
resenting ‘service potential’, and more recently, ‘future economic
benefits’. This popular view of assets is reflected in the defini-
tions promulgated by professional accounting bodies in the
United States [Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB),
1980, para.19], United Kingdom [Accounting Standards Board
(ASB), 1999] and Australia [Australian Accounting Research
Foundation (AARF), 1992, para. 12].
This paper traces the change in underlying definitional con-
cepts through the accounting literature of those English speak-
ing countries where accounting concepts and standard setting
followed a similar model. The aim is to gain insight into why the
abstract notion of assets adopted in the concepts statements
issued in these countries has moved so far away from, and is so
out of step with, the legal and commonly understood notions of
assets as property available for the payment of debts, or ex-
changeable things or rights. The implications of this change are
discussed. On the basis of this historical analysis it is suggested
that along with other relevant information about resources and
liabilities, business entities should be required to produce a
statement of ‘separably exchangeable property’ and legal obliga-
tions at the reporting date.
The study is based on an investigation of the discourse of
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accountants in a randomly selected sample of English language
accounting literature, principally of the 18th, 19th and 20th cen-
turies.1 The emphasis is on the literature published in the UK
and the US and while differences in these environments are
considered important in the context of this study it is generally
assumed that this literature forms one whole.
ETYMOLOGY AND DEFINITION OF ‘ASSET’
The Oxford English Dictionary [OED] provides illustrations
of early English usage of the word asset dating back to 1531.2
The origin of the English use of the word asset was the Anglo-
French law phrase aver assetz meaning ‘to have sufficient’ to
meet certain claims. Assets then passed as a technical term into
the vernacular [OED, 1989, Vol. I, p. 710]. Used originally as a
legal term meaning sufficient estate or effects to satisfy a
testator’s debts and legacies, by the early 1800s the word was
used both in law and commerce in the sense of the effects of an
insolvent debtor or bankrupt applicable to the payment of debts.
The meaning was later extended to all the property of a person
or company which could be made liable for his or their debts
[OED, 1989, Vol. 1, p. 710], for example, in The History of British
India James Mill [1817] wrote: “The assets or effects of the Lon-
don Company in India fell short of the debts of that concern”. It
is significant that the word asset has retained its original mean-
ing at law – “property available for the payments of debts”
[Mozley and Whiteley’s Law Dictionary, 1977, p. 28; Jowitt’s Dic-
tionary of English Law, 1977, p.144; Osborn’s Concise Law Dic-
tionary, 1993, p. 32].
ETYMOLOGY AND DEFINITION
OF ‘EFFECTS’ AND ‘PROPERTY’
The use of the words ‘effects’ and ‘property’ in the context of
what is available to a person or organization to meet debts indi-
cates that these terms were used to represent things that be-
longed to, or were owned by, a person or organization. Owner-
ship underpins exchangeability and therefore debt paying
power. These terms gained ascendancy in the literature at differ-
ent times.
1 References are made to earlier works where relevant.
2 The English word asset was adopted from the Anglo-French word assets, a
later form of the Old french asez meaning ‘enough’. Asez derived from the Latin
ad satis - ‘to sufficient’ - meaning in sufficient quantity.
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According to the OED [1989, Vol. V, p. 79] the word ‘effects’
was used in the sense of one’s ‘goods and chattels’, and also
more broadly as in the phrase ‘to leave no effects’—to leave
nothing to one’s heirs. In the case of Hogan v. Jackson [1775 1
Cowp.299] Lord Mansfield stated that “real and personal effects
are synonymous to substance, which includes everything that
can be turned into money”. Early French regulation [Code
Savary, 1673], aimed at preventing fraudulent bankruptcies, re-
quired that merchants prepare regular statements of “effects
and debts”. In the case of bankruptcy these were used to deter-
mine the property available to creditors at the latest statement
date.
The word ‘property’, in its original sense, meant the condi-
tion of being owned or belonging to some person or persons, or
rights of ownership [OED, 1989, Vol. XII, p. 639]. Around the
17th century property also began to be used in the sense of:
“That which one owns; a thing or things belonging to or owned
by some person or persons; a possession (usually material), or
possessions collectively; (one’s) wealth or goods” [ibid.].3 The
French Code de Commerce, based on the earlier Savary Bill, re-
quired that an inventory of “property and debts” be made yearly
[Bulletin des Lois, 1807 cited in Howard, 1932, pp. 95-96]. If
these requirements were not met the merchant could be de-
clared bankrupt [Littleton, 1953, p. 84]. As with the earlier bill
the emphasis was on exchangeable things or rights.
Property is an interest recognized and protected by law; a
right or rights that can be enforced against others:
The right of property is best conceived not as a single
right but as a bundle of distinct rights, some or even
many of which may be relinquished temporarily with-
out loss of ownership. The kinds of rights which a right
of property confers over objects of that right vary ac-
cording to the nature of the object, but they normally
include the rights to possess, use, use up, abuse, lend,
let on hire, grant as security, gift, sell and bequeath the
object [The Oxford Companion to Law, 1980, p. 1007].4
An owner may surrender some of the rights attached to owner-
3 And in reference to a piece of land owned.
4 For similar definitions of Property and Ownership see Halsbury’s Laws of
England [1981, para.301 & 1127]; Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law [1977, p.
1447]; Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary [1986, p. 2057]; Austin [cited in Osborn’s
Concise Law Dictionary, 1983, p. 242] and The Oxford Companion to Law [1980,
p. 1008].
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ship, such as the right of possession, while retaining others:
“Ownership may be held by different persons for different inter-
ests, for example when a freehold owner grants a lease” [A Con-
cise Dictionary of Law, 1983, pp. 255-256].5
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ‘PROPERTY’ NOTION
IN ACCOUNTING
A review of the accounting literature, principally of the 18th
and 19th centuries, indicated that the word asset was rarely
used until the latter part of the 19th century.
‘Effects’6 was the word most commonly used in the 18th
century accounting literature. The role of accounts in recording
an inventory of all effects and debts to allow the determination
of the whole estate or financial state of affairs was emphasized
[see North 1714/1986, p. 119; Gordon,1765/1986, pp. 13,21;
Malcolm, 1731/1986, p. 2; Clark, 1732 cited in Foster, 1852/1976,
p. 15; Thompson, 1777/1984, pp. 67-68, Rolt, 1761 in Sheldahl,
1989, p. 101; Cronhelm, 1818/1978, p. 3; Montgomerie, 1858, p.
24]. Littleton [1946, pp. 340-341] suggested references to state-
ments of ‘effects and debts’ in early accounting manuals7 may
have been influenced by the early French regulation, and the
handbook of mercantile practice written by French author
Savary [1712] in which Savary expounded the regulation in ap-
propriate sections. The emphasis in the early regulation was on
solvency and this was clearly reflected in the accounting dis-
course of the 18th and 19th centuries. In this context effects,
and later property, represented what was owned—legally en-
forceable interests or rights, which was transferable or ex-
changeable and therefore applicable to the payment of debts.8
North’s description of the Personal Estate account empha-
sized this relationship between effects and debts: “The Personal
5 See Eglinton v. Norman, 46 L.J.Q.B. 559; see also Chauntler v. Robinson, 4
Ex. 163; Lister v. Lobley, 6L.J.K.B.200. and Russell v. Shenton, 3 Q.B.449.
6 See for example, Dodson [1757/1984, p. iii]; Gordon [1765/1986, p.59];
Malcolm [1731/1986, p. 3]; North [1714/1986, p. 118]; Dilworth [1794, p. 10];
Clark [1732 cited in Foster, 1852/1976, p. 15]; Postlethwayt [1751, p. 313]; Mair
[1786, p. 5] and Wicks [1797, p. 20]. See also the later works of Isler [1810 cited
in Foster 1852/1976, p. 21]; Cory [1839, p. 6]; Bennett [1842/1976, p. 38] and
Montgomerie [1858, p. 46].
7 Books describing or explaining the bookkeeping process.
8 See for example, North [1714/1986, pp. 118-119]; Malcolm [1731/1986, p.
20]; Dodson [1757/1984, p. iii]; Gordon [1765/1986, p. 59]; Mair [1786, p. 5];
Hamilton [1788/1982, pp. 266,268]; Thompson [1777/1984, pp. 5, 8]; Turner
[1794, pp. 6,14]; Morrison [1834, p. 63] and Montgomerie [1858, p. 46].
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Estate, this on the Cr. side will carry the inventory of all the
present Effects, and Dependencies, that are properly the
Accomptants own. . . . And the Dr. side . . . all that is owing, or
outgoing, from the proprietor, which may lessen his Interests in
Credit on the other side . . . so that here will at first be a perfect
synopsis of the personal estate” [North, 1714/1986, pp. 118-
119].9
Clarke [1732 quoted in Foster, 1852/1976, p. 15] wrote that
“the balance account will contain the particulars of my effects
and debts; the difference between the two sides, being my net
capital or deficiency”. Dodson was more explicit: “[L]et the Ac-
count of Stock be made Debtor, for all Sums due from the Accoun-
tant; and let it be made Creditor, for the ready Money, Goods and
Debts, that belong to him ... Hence … if the Debtor Side therof
exceeds the Creditor; the Balance will Shew how much he is in
Debt, more than his effects will pay” [Dodson, 1750/1984, p. iii,
original emphasis].10
These manuals [see also Dodson, p. i] illustrate the empha-
sis placed on knowing what means are available to pay debts,
what obligations exist, and whether one is in a better or worse
position than before. Other authors who articulated this role of
accounts include Jones [1796/1978, p. 21], Gordon [1765/1986,
p. 21], Hamilton [1788/1982, p. 268] and Mair [1793/1978, p.
1].11
The term ‘property’, which was also used in some 17th and
18th century accounting works, became more common in the
19th century literature. Those who wrote of accounting for
‘property’ included Kelly [1801, p. 7], Cronhelm [1818/1978, p.
1], Montgomerie [1858, p. 46], and Dyer [1897, p. 22].12 Many
9 For similar statements see also Malcolm [1731/1986, p. 20] and
Montgomerie [1858, p. 24].
10 Dodson [1750/1984, p. ii] described stock as “the Aggregate or Total of the
Accountant’s Estate or Effects, whatever be the nature, or kind of the Particu-
lars”.
11 This focus is consistent with the practice of closing the books of account
annually. In 1741 Mair wrote that “Merchants commonly once a year balance or
close their ledger, and raise from it the Materials of an Inventory to a new Set of
Books, for the ensuing Year”. Yamey [1940, p. 21] found that practice was not
uniform, however, of the six records of double entry that he examined covering
periods 1731 onwards five closed accounts and raised new balances annually.
The sixth balanced six times in nine years.
12 See also Monteage [1675 cited in Foster 1852/1976, p. 13]; Gordon [1765/
1986, p. 59]; Hamilton [1788/1982, p. 285]; Jones [1796/1978, p. 21]; Wicks
[1797, p. 15]; Isler [1810 cited in Foster 1852/1976, p. 21]; Morrison [1834, p.
43]; Mayhew [1884, p. 8]; and Thornton [1895].
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authors classified property or effects accounts as ‘real’ and ‘per-
sonal’, suggesting a legal influence: “Real accounts include all
accounts of effects or things which a person possesses”
[Mayhew, 1884, p. 176]; “Property accounts are by some termed
‘Real’, from the Latin word res meaning a thing” [Inglis, 1881, p.
5].13 Property, like effects, was used in the sense of things which
were exchangeable for money: “The Dr. side [of the Stock ac-
count] shows the debts due by you at the opening of the books;
the Cr. side your gross stock, or what you have in property and
debts due you. The difference between the two sides, if the Cr.
be the greater, is your nett stock, but if the Dr. be the greater of
the two, the balance is what you owe over what you have prop-
erty to meet” [Bennett, 1842/1976, p. 67].14
Cronhelm [1818/1978, p. 3] wrote of bookkeeping as a
record of all property, described as “Money, Goods convertible
to Money, and Personal Debts”.
The word asset was not used in the accounting literature
examined for this study until the middle of the 19th century. A
factor influencing the use of the word ‘asset’ in the accounting
literature may have been its use in the British Companies Acts
of 1856 and 1862. The model balance sheet contained the head-
ing ‘Assets and Property’. As with bankruptcy law legislators
were concerned with the availability of property or assets for the
payment of debts. Littleton [1946, p. 344] wrote that banks were
the first to use ‘assets’ regularly in statement headings, the Bank
of England using ‘Liabilities and Assets’ in 1839. This would be
consistent with an emphasis on solvency. In the 19th century
accounting literature ‘asset’ was used synonymously with ‘prop-
erty’. For example, Dyer [1897, p. 11] wrote “Capital is the ex-
cess of Assets over Liabilities, the excess of what I have and have
owing to me over what I owe. . . . My assets are my property -
what I already have, and what is owing to me”. Foster [1849, p.
3] wrote of “property or assets”. Other writers also described
assets in terms of ‘property’, or ‘property and money owing’ [de
Morgan, 1853/1982, p. 17; Crittenden, 1860, p. 120; Nelson,
1871, p. 10; Inglis, 1881, p. 103; Norton, 1894/1976, p. 11;
Thornton, 1895, p. 3; Sprague, 1880, p. 51].
13 See also Hamilton [1788/1982, p. 267]; Kelly [1801, p. 6]; Bennett [1842/
1976, p. 17] and Thornton [1895]. At law a distinction was made between ‘real’
and ‘personal’ property.
14 Similar descriptions are given by Gordon [1765/1986, pp. 7,57]; Dilworth
[1794, p. 10] and Dyer [1897, p. 22].
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With regard to the notion of assets as exchangeable prop-
erty, assets were described as “available means” [Crittenden,
1860, p. 120]; and “all the property and rights belonging to a
business that have a money value” [Lisle, 1900/1976, p. 67].
Cayley [1894, p. 20] wrote of “real assets”, or assets “capable of
realisation”, as opposed to items such as preliminary expenses
not written off which were “not real assets”. Carter [1890, p. 81]
wrote that the difference between a trader’s assets and liabilities
“is his CAPITAL, or, as may be the case, his uncovered debt”.
Dyer [1897, p. 16] explained: “I am solvent when my Assets at
least equal my Liabilities; insolvent when assets are less than
liabilities”. Cronhelm [1818/1978, p. 5], de Morgan [1853/1982,
p. 17] and Lisle [1900, p. 70] also described the deficit of assets
of a trading concern over liabilities as a measure of insolvency.
COSTS CARRIED FORWARD
Continued support for the simple notion of assets as ex-
changeable things or property can be found in the 20th century
accounting literature.15 However, during the latter part of the
19th century the emphasis moved away from property rights, to
cost and cost allocation. A new school of thought emerged
which challenged the conventional notion of assets and the
function of the balance sheet. A number of factors appear to
have contributed to this.
The accounting literature examined revealed the use of, and
strong support for, market values over several centuries.16 How-
ever, conventional accounting is firmly rooted in the historical
cost based record, despite its widely acknowledged inconsisten-
cies. The origins of recording assets at cost may be found in the
rules associated with double entry, and the personification of
15 Pixley [1906, p. 512 cited in Chambers, 1995, p. 420]; Sprague [1907/1972,
p. 44]; Cole [1908/1976, p. 50]; Paton, [1922/1973, p. 30]; Kester [1922, p. 14];
Cropper [1927, p. 661]; Rorem [1928/1982, p. 20]; Fieldhouse et al. [1930, p. 28];
Saliers [1935, p. 12]; Sanders et al. [1938/1968, p. 58]; AIA [1931, p. 10]; Cham-
bers [1966, p. 103]; Goldberg and Hill [1968, p. 17]; Dixon et al. [1966, p. 7];
Edwards et al. [1979, p. 68]; Sterling [1979, pp. 161,162]; Schuetze [1993] and
Samuelson [1996, p. 156]
16 For example see Hayes [1741, p. 79]; Hamilton [1788/1982, p. 285,  p. 28];
Kelly [1801, p. 120]; Foster [1837, p. 57]; Cory [1839, p. 28]; Bennett [1842/1976,
pp. 69,78]; Harris [1842, from Littleton, 1933, p. 151]; de Morgan [1853/1982, p.
9]; Montgomerie [1858, pp. 14, 44]; Fulton and Eastman [1872, pp. 133, 195];
Cayley [1894, p. 11]; Mason [1933, pp. 209-215]; Vance [1933, p. 224]; Ramsay
[1956, p. 198]; Chambers and Wolnizer [1991, p. 208]; Chambers [1994].
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accounts. It was not uncommon for early accounting teachers
and writers to present double entry accounting as a series of
rules.17 The personification of accounts was the basis for such
rules. For example Donn [1765, p. 5 cited in Jackson, 1956, p.
297] wrote: “As I may expect to make of my goods as much as
they cost me, they are in Effect the same to me as if their Value
was due to me from some person; and as, in such Case, that
Person would be Debtor, so I may make the Goods in my Pos-
session Debtor for their first cost”. Other writers to link account
personification to cost include Stevin [1604 cited in Littleton,
1933, pp. 49-50], King [1717, cited in Littleton, 1933, pp. 49-50],
Clark [1732 cited in Foster 1852/1976, p. 14], Malcolm [1731/
1986, p. 13], de Morgan [1853/1982, p. 13] and Sprague [1901,
XII/1984]. It could be surmised, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, that initial costs recorded were carried forward on
the closing of the books or into periodic summaries as part of
the ‘rules’ of double entry. It should also be noted that some
writers supported cost on the basis that it avoided the recogni-
tion of unrealized gains [see for example, Malcolm, 1731/1986,
p. 89].
A factor which promoted the use of cost, and thereby con-
tributed to the changing notion of assets, was the industrial
revolution. This encouraged companies with large capital invest-
ment, and led to uncertainty as to how to account for such long-
lived investment. Accounting for the effects of fluctuations in
values of long-lived assets on profit was considered by some to
be impractical [Garcke and Fells, 1887, p. 102; Matheson, 1893,
p. 15], and it was not uncommon for large limited liability com-
panies to carry long-lived assets, often not easily exchangeable,
in the accounts at cost indefinitely. However, in the UK during
the 1840’s large amounts of invested capital were lost to owners
as a result of railway companies paying dividends out of capital.
It was subsequently argued that a regular charge, a percentage
of cost, should be made out of profit for wear and tear on assets
‘occasioned by use’. The ‘depreciation’ charge was regarded as a
recoupment of capital outlay. Prior to the 19th century, depre-
ciation in accounting was commonly regarded as an adjustment
of value [Brief, 1966, p.15]. While some railroad companies in
the USA—as early as 1839—and the UK, adopted a form of cost-
based depreciation it was abandoned in most cases when such
17 For a discussion of this see Donn [1765 cited in Jackson, 1956, p. 5]; North
[1714, p. 10]; Foster [1863: p. 4]; and Littleton [1933, p. 49].
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provisions were found inadequate to replace fixed assets
[Pollins, 1956, p. 349].
Toward the end of the 19th century discussion of deprecia-
tion as cost recovery (to allow for the physical deterioration of
assets), extended beyond the railway context to encompass fac-
tories. Matheson [1893] outlined a variety of methods for sys-
tematically recognizing depreciation in factories [see also
Guthrie, 1883]. While systematic depreciation does not appear
to have been an accepted method in the UK or the USA at the
time18 the idea began to appear in the literature [Editorial, Ac-
countant, 1880, p. 5; Turner, 1894/1976, p. 547; Lewis, 1896, p.
389]. Depreciation was regarded as a measure of wear and tear.
With respect to properties not for sale but for business use,
Pilsen [1877, cited in Littleton, 1933, p. 226] proposed that an
entity “take off a percentage rate of total cost for wear and tear”.
Inglis [1881, p. 18] recommended a yearly deduction of 5 to 10
percent.19 While there were no legal requirements in the UK or
the USA to provide for depreciation the 1878 British tax law
permitted a deduction for “diminished value by wear and tear”
[see Lamb, 2002].
The Going Concern Notion: The cost allocation view of deprecia-
tion was consistent with the emerging going concern notion. In
1883 Guthrie [1883, p. 7] argued that the ‘going concern’ nature
of business justified ignoring fluctuations in the cost of plant
and other property; “matter and things fixed in a permanent
working position must not be treated in account as following the
fluctuations of the market” [Guthrie, 1883, p. 7]. This point was
made earlier by Lardner in his book Railway Economics [1850].
Dicksee [1892/1976] adopted a similar view with regard to cer-
tain parliamentary companies constituted for the purpose of un-
dertaking definite public works. He wrote that in order for the
capital expenditure account to show that the capital raised had
been spent only on the authorized works, it was necessary that
the actual amount expended on the works alone be debited to
the account, regardless of any fluctuations in value that might
18 See Garcke and Fells [1887, p. 101]; Hatfield [1909, p. 124]; Leake [1912,
pp. 3-4]; Hatfield [1927, p. 140] and Chatfield [1974, p. 233].
19 See also Murray [1885, p. 13]; Bogle [1889, p. 692]; Lewis [1896, p. 389]
and Matheson [1893/1976, pp. 24,55]. Later references to depreciation as a mea-
sure of wear and tear, and/or obsolesence, include Spicer and Pegler [1910, p.
33]; Montgomery [1912/1976, p. 119]; Carter [1923, p. 600] and Hatfield [1927/
1971, p. 76].
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afterwards occur. He argued that as it was contemplated that
these companies should ‘permanently’ carry on business, such
fluctuations could not in any way practically affect the company
and therefore consideration of such fluctuations was superflu-
ous [Dicksee, 1892/1976, p. 118]. Dicksee [1903/1976, p. 5] later
used this argument to justify ignoring fluctuations in the value
of the ‘fixed’ assets of non-public entities:
. . . these assets have been acquired, and are being per-
manently retained, not with a view to their being even-
tually realised at a profit in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, but with a view to their being used for the purpose
of enabling trading profits to be made in other ways. . . .
For practical purposes, therefore, these fluctuations
may fairly be said to be of no account (original empha-
sis).
The distinction between ‘fixed’ and ‘floating’ assets was com-
monly made by economists, and in some legal cases where the
payment of dividends was at issue.20 The continuing, or ‘going
concern’, nature of business was frequently volunteered as the
rationale for recording ‘fixed assets’ at cost.21 Changes in market
values were ignored on the basis that ‘realization was not con-
templated; such assets were bought to be used, not to be sold at
a profit’ [Chatfield, 1974, p. 234].22 This was an important factor
in the change in emphasis from exchangeable things to cost and
cost allocation.
Consistent with the focus on ‘value in use’ writers began to
describe depreciation as the allocation of the cost of an asset
over the period of its use. Pixley [1881, p. 118] noted that the
amount written off as depreciation was normally based on cost
“the object being to charge the Revenue Account of the period
with a proper sum for the use of the plant”. Ladelle [1890, p.
659] described the cost of an asset as “joint to the periods during
which it is in use” [see also Guthrie, 1883, p. 6]. Unrecovered
costs were to be carried forward and reported in balance sheets
20 See for example Verner vs The General and Commercial Investment Trust
63 LJ Ch 246 [1894].
21 See Lisle, 1900/1976, p. 53]; Montgomery [1912/1976, p. 119]; Esquerre
[1927, p. 173]; Leake [1929, p. 12]; Hatfield [1927, p. 76]; Kester [1930, pp. 542-
543]; Rowland and Magee [1934, p. 283]; Dohr [1941, p. 214]; May [1943, p. 86]
and Goldberg [1948, p. 45].
22 See also Montgomery [1912/1976, p. 119]; Esquerre [1927, p. 173];
Hatfield [1927]; Kester [1930, pp. 542-543]; Dohr [1941, p. 214] and Goldberg
[1948, p. 45].
152
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 30 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 10
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol30/iss2/10
Accounting Historians Journal, December 2003144
as assets. While it appears that “few accountants in 1900 saw
depreciation as an allocation problem” [Chatfield, 1974, p. 233]
the idea of depreciation as cost allocation gradually gained sup-
port. Hatfield [1927/1971, p. 131] wrote: “The cost of more per-
manent assets, serving for productive use during a period of
years, should be spread as an expense during the period of use”.
Other writers made similar statements.23 Hatfield [1927/1971,
pp. 140, 279] suggested that income-tax law stimulated the
adoption of systematic depreciation by companies in the US.
In common parlance to depreciate means to “diminish in
value” [OED, 1989, Vol. IV, p. 486]. While a diminution in value
is a result of real events and conditions, the allocation of the
cost of an asset over its useful life is an arbitrary process based
on estimates of the asset’s useful life, its residual value and the
pattern of benefits. The following references highlight the ambi-
guity of mixing systematic cost allocation with concepts of mar-
ket value. Spicer and Pegler [1910, p. 43] defined depreciation as
the “shrinking in value of an asset from any cause during a
period”. However, they went on to describe depreciation as a
process whereby the original cost of the asset is written off each
year [p. 43]. Leake [1912, p. 77] wrote: “It has been shown that
depreciation is the fall in exchangeable value of industrial plant
computed on the basis of cost expired during the period of its
use in seeking profits, and that this fall is due to natural decay,
wear and tear and obsolescence”.24 Smails [1927, p. 105] high-
lighted this confusion, by accountants, of cost and value: “Do we
not too often speak of depreciation as ‘shrinkage in value due to
wear and tear, obsolescence, etc.,’ leaving the layman (who in-
evitably associates the word ‘value’ with exchange value) to solve
the paradox of an asset bought in 1941 for $1000 shrinking in
value steadily at the rate of five per cent per annum and yet
possessing today a value of, say, $1050?”
In addition to the practical problems resulting from
accounting’s departure from reality, the resulting information
only served to confuse those it was designed to inform.
Assets as Deferred Costs: The idea that the cost of long-lived
assets should be spread over periods from which benefits are
derived transposed to other costs. The authorization of the car-
23 See Montgomery [1912/1976, p. 119]; Leake [1912, p. 79]; Smails [1927, p.
105] and Hatfield [1927/1971, p. 76].
24 See also Fieldhouse and Fieldhouse [1930, p. 76]; Saliers [1935, pp. 204-
205] and Dickinson [1913/1987, p. 153].
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rying forward of costs, “which may in Fairness be distributed
over several Years”, by the [UK] Companies Act, 1862 [sec.80]
may have contributed to this practice in the United Kingdom. As
Edwards and Webb [1982, p. 259] commented it is likely that
directors of early joint stock companies, in their search for guid-
ance on accounting matters, gave some attention to the prevail-
ing legal situation. Some public utility companies in the late
19th century began carrying forward a variety of costs such as
those of securing private Acts of Parliament, and fixed asset
construction costs. ‘Preliminary expenses’ and ‘goodwill’ began
to appear in balance sheets notwithstanding the disagreement
amongst accountants and in the courts as to whether ‘goodwill’
constituted property.25
Lord Eldon described goodwill as “nothing more than the
probability that the old customers would resort to the old
place”.26 However, during the 19th century courts began to rec-
ognize that certain rights attached to the carrying on of a busi-
ness or professional activity, and that these rights should be
protected.27 In some cases around the turn of the century judges
drew on accounting practice in determining whether goodwill
constituted property.28 In Re Leas Hotel Co29 it was held: “If as
regards a partnership the words ‘partnership assets’ or ‘effects’
cover goodwill, it would seem that the word ‘property’ must also
cover ‘goodwill’”. Such decisions were made in the context of
determining the rights of particular parties, such as the rights of
a deceased partner in relation to partnership assets, or the right
to use a business name. It was ascertained that accounting
goodwill represented expected financial benefits, not enforce-
able rights. It was held in Wilmot v Alton30 that ‘property’ did not
comprise future receipts in a person’s business: “There must be
a definite interest; a mere expectancy as distinguished from a
conditional interest is not a subject of property” [Jowitt’s Dictio-
nary of English Law, 1977, p. 1447]. On the occasions when the
25 Chatfield and Vangermeersch [1996, p. 282] suggests that goodwill was
first discussed in the accounting literature in the mid-1880s. Writers were con-
cerned with the valuation of goodwill on the retirement or death of a partner or
proprietor.
26 Crutwell v. Lye [1803] per Lord Eldon.
27 Such as the right to represent that you are carrying on a business which
has been carried on previously, and hence the right to prevent another person
from holding out that they are carrying on the business.
28 Public Trustee v Schultz [1964] 111 CLR 482.
29 [1902] 1 Ch. 332, per Kekewich, J., at pp. 333, 334.
30 Exp. Nichols, [1897] 1 Q.B. 17.
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courts held that goodwill in the accounts of a business was
property it must be assumed that this ‘goodwill’ was an enforce-
able right, or rights, attaching to the business, and not a ‘mere
expectancy’. However, these interpretations by the court may
have been seen as condoning the recording and subsequent re-
porting of amounts representing ‘goodwill’ as assets, despite the
different contexts.
Some accounting writers expressed concern at the record-
ing, or retaining, of ‘goodwill’ in the accounts of a business
[More, 1891, p. 286; Dicksee, 1897, p. 46]. Harris [1883, p. 10]
supported the recording of goodwill as an asset on the basis that
“it is worth money and could be converted into that commodity
whenever the owner liked to sell”. However, goodwill was
deemed inseparable from a business and only exchangeable as
part of the whole. Where goodwill had been paid for it was
assumed that the goodwill was of value and therefore had a
rightful place on the balance sheet [Roth, 1929, p. 103; Dicksee,
1910]. Dicksee [1892/1976, p. 27] described the amount re-
corded in the accounts as goodwill as “absolutely meaning-
less”.31 However, he was not critical of the carrying forward of
such amounts as assets. By 1900 balance sheets included many
items that were “not strictly assets (such as expenditure being
spread over a period)” and items that were “not really liabilities”
[Dawson, 1900, p. 131. See also Pixley, 1906, p. 512 cited in
Chambers, 1995, p. 411; Dicksee, 1910, pp. 218-219]. A move
away from the view of assets as property and the growing em-
phasis on costs enabled costs per se to be considered as assets.
The idea was introduced that an asset was something of value
for the reason that it would provide a benefit in the future.
Definitions of assets in terms of costs and unexpired costs
began to appear in the literature during the early 20th century.
The commonly understood notion of assets as exchangeable
property was ignored: “[T]he organisation expense of a corpora-
tion . . . is not property owned nor legal rights to property, nor
does it strictly represent a prepaid service . . . Nevertheless, it is
accepted by accountants as a proper asset if other treatment
would result in a violation of any accounting principle”
[Couchman, 1924/1982, p. 28]. Mason stated that “the asset ac-
count may well be thought of as a deferred charge to opera-
tions” [1937, p. 13]. According to Gilman “That portion of an
31 Thornton [1895, p. 158] made the same comment in relation to prelimi-
nary expenses.
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expenditure the beneficial effect of which is expected to be expe-
rienced measurably in future fiscal periods is commonly called
an ‘asset’” [1939, p. 292]. Some writers suggested that the term
‘assets’ be dropped and a more descriptive term such as deferred
charges, unallocated costs, or debit balances be adopted [Edito-
rial, Australian Accountant, 1936, p. 75; Fitzgerald, 1938, p. 86;
Whitney, 1941, p. 430].
The deferred cost concept was considered deficient in a
number of respects. Vatter [1947, p. 15] argued: “The definition
of an asset in terms of unamortised cost is weak in that it does
not include all the things that are commonly regarded as assets;
further, it does not specify the underlying thread of relation-
ships- the basic uniformity of substance with which assets and
related terms are concerned”.
Such definitions exclude from assets all items which are not
represented by ‘costs’ and which are not subject to amortization.
Financial claims cannot be fitted into the pattern of amortiza-
tion which is suggested by such a definition of assets. Cash,
bank deposits, and receivables are indisputably assets but they
are not ‘costs’; they do not represent charges awaiting future
revenue. Definitions of assets as deferred charges or unamor-
tized costs do not take into account how they are to be applied
as there is no defined basis for determining what portion of the
cost should be recorded as an asset and what portion of the cost
should be treated as an expense. Deferred costs are not repre-
sentative of actual conditions or events. It is easy to note the
criticism: “Obviously, accountants cannot determine what part
of the original cost of depreciating assets ought to be written
off” [Whitney, 1941, p. 430. See also Kelley, 1941, p. 511].
Shift in Emphasis to the Profit and Loss Statement: This empha-
sis on cost based accounting was consistent with a reduced fo-
cus on the information value of the balance sheet. There is evi-
dence of the shift in attention away from the balance sheet to
the profit and loss statement throughout the accounting litera-
ture.32 Canning [1929b, p. 8] was an early advocate of income as
the central concept of accounting [see also Carter, 1910, p. 562].
The failure of the balance sheet to present a current assessment
of the present value of the proprietors’ worth was one explana-
32 May [1943, p. 5] and Gilman [1939, p. 28] comment on the shift in empha-
sis. See also Sprouse [1970, p. 92]; Hylton [1965, p. 824]; Sprouse and Moonitz,
[1962, p. 4]; American Institute of Certified Public Accountants [1953a, p. 7] and
Most [1977, p. 214].
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tion offered for the shift [Editorial, Accountant, 1946, pp. 293-
294]. It was the perceived decision making needs of investors for
information relating to the entity’s future cash flows or earning
power that was emphasized in the accounting literature [Ameri-
can Institute of Accountants (AIA), 1934, p. 5; Nelson, 1947, p.
348; May, 1943/1972, p. 5; Backer, 1966, p. 441]. Previts and
Merino [1998, p. 278] concluded that “by the end of the 1930’s
the NYSE, the SEC and CPAs had come to the view that inves-
tors were primarily interested in ‘future income’ and the income
statement must be the focal point of accounting”. The Special
Committee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges of the AIA
[1934, p. 10] asserted that “earning capacity is the fact of crucial
importance in the valuation of an industrial enterprise, and that
therefore the income statement is usually far more important
than the balance sheet”.
The focus on income was particularly evident in the work of
Paton and Littleton [1940] who emphasized the importance of
the matching of efforts and accomplishments, or costs and
revenues—a principle endorsed by the American Accounting As-
sociation [AAA, 1941, p. 55]. The matching of effort and accom-
plishment was elevated to an imperative of income determina-
tion: “[I]f a given procedure can be asserted to conform to the
matching concept, nothing else need be said; the matter is
settled and the procedure is justified” [Hylton, 1965, p. 824]. The
matching process resulted in balance sheets that were “simply
the connecting links of a series of income statements” [Dohr,
1941, p. 218]. The headings ‘assets’ and ‘liabilities’ were consid-
ered totally misleading. Items so described were merely items
left over from the calculation of profit.33 The Committee on
Cooperation with Stock Exchanges [AIA, 1934] declared that to
speak of the balance sheet as reflecting the values of assets and
liabilities on a particular date seems “to involve a misconception
of the nature of the balance sheet”. Kollaritsch [1960, p. 488,
original emphasis] wrote: “[the purpose of] the general balance
sheet ... is not to reveal the financial position, but rather it is to
show the deferred charges and the unconsumed or unappor-
tioned values for future operations and their financing”.34
33 See Cropper [1927, p. 127]; Parkinson [1931, p. 546]; Smith [1931] and
Tovey [1946, p. 2].
34 According to Bottrill [1973, p. 143] this was also the view taken by the
Company Law Revision Committee of England [1945]. See also Sanders,
Hatfield and Moore [1938/1968, p. 59]; AIA [1940, p. 2]; Paton and Littleton
[1940/1970, p. 67]; Baxter and Davidson [1962, p. viii]; Anthony [1983, p. 269].
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Perceptions of accounting as essentially an allocation pro-
cess were manifested in the Tentative Statement issued by the
AAA in 1936 [AAA, 1936, p. 61]. This was the first of a series of
statements issued between 1936 and 1948 that developed the
historic cost allocation model [Paton and Littleton, 1940; AAA,
1948; AIA, 1941]. In Accounting Research Bulletin No. 9 [AIA,
1941, p. 70] it was stated that any expenditure which is properly
applicable to the future is presumptive grounds for carrying the
balance forward [See also AAA, 1948, p. 14]. However, there was
no accompanying explanation as to what expenditure would be
“properly applicable to the future”. Neither was an explanation
forthcoming in Accounting Terminology Bulletin No.1 in which
assets were defined as: “Something represented by a debit bal-
ance that is or would be properly carried forward upon a closing
of books of accounting … on the basis that it represents either a
property right or value acquired, or an expenditure made which
has created a property right, or is properly applicable to the
future” [American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA), 1953a, para. 26].35
The failure of the American accounting profession to ad-
dress the problems associated with the cost allocation doctrine
is evident from their second formal attempt to define assets
[Accounting Principles Board (APB), 1970, para. 132] which was
entirely dependent upon arbitrary accounting practice.36 De-
scriptions of assets in terms of ‘unexpired costs’ or ‘deferred
charges’ continued. For example: “A cost residue is the unex-
pired portion of a cost outlay; it may properly appear on the
asset side of the balance sheet” [Finney and Miller, 1963, p.
242]. Littleton [1953, pp. 87-89] described assets as productive
factors or invested costs.37
The change in emphasis from the balance sheet and sol-
vency, to cost allocation and income, lead to the next stage in
this definitional saga.
ASSETS AS SERVICE POTENTIAL
The shift in emphasis away from the balance sheet and debt
paying ability, to the profit and loss statement and future earn-
ing power, provides some explanation for the development of
35 This definition was a slightly modified version of the definition developed
by the Committee on Terminology in 1941 [AIA, 1941, p. 70].
36 The balance sheet as a list of leftovers, is also manifested in APB Statement
No.4 [Accounting Principles Board, 1970].
37 See also [Fitzgerald, 1963, p. 130]; Paton & Paton [1971, p. 7]
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the notion of assets as service potential or future economic ben-
efits. As cost allocations (such as depreciation), based on expec-
tations of future earnings and asset usage came to dominate
practice, the accounting profession struggled to provide a theo-
retically defensible definition of the unallocated costs reported
in the balance sheet. A criterion of service potential or future
economic benefit provided a rationale for most items appearing
under the asset heading in the balance sheet; not only items
with an ‘exchange’ value or a value to the entity as a ‘going
concern’ but also deferred charges. This notion was consistent
with the practice of carrying forward costs on the basis that they
related to future periods.
Influence of Economists: An explanation for the introduction
and subsequent adoption of the service potential definition may
be found through an examination of the influence of economists
on accounting thought. That accounting has much in common
with economics may be demonstrated by reference to two of the
most highly regarded economic thinkers. According to Marshall
“Economics ... examines that part of individual and social action
which is most closely connected with the attainment and with
the use of the material requisite of well being” [1947, p. 1]. Mill
stated “[T]he economic activity of man looks to a provision of
the material means to satisfy his wants and those of his house-
hold” [1909/1976, p. 4]. Both accounting and economics are
concerned with the transactions and events by which wants are
satisfied.
It is apparent from the literature examined that the intro-
duction, and subsequent general acceptance by the accounting
fraternity, of the definition of assets as ‘future service potential’
or economic benefit was influenced by accountants having
drawn, directly and indirectly, on the writings of economists, in
particular Fisher and Canning. Fisher and Canning’s influence
may also have extended through their teaching. Previts and Me-
rino [1998, p.51] suggested that a ‘California School’ of account-
ing theorists informed by the work of Fisher and Canning could
be identified.
Fisher [1906] was concerned to clarify the distinction be-
tween concepts of wealth and property. He described wealth as
“existing means toward future services”, and property as “consti-
tuting an interest in the present means” [pp. 33-34, original em-
phasis]. Other economists also defined wealth in terms of prop-
erty rights—rights or objects that are exchangeable for money
[Smith, 1893, p. 23; Seligman, 1907, p. 19; Mill, 1909/1976, pp.
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6, 9; Keynes, 1917, p. 95]. Fisher described services as the ben-
efits of wealth: “The services of an instrument of wealth are the
desirable changes effected (or the undesirable changes pre-
vented) by means of that instrument. For instance, the services
of a loom consist in changing yarn into cloth, or what is called
weaving. Similarly, a plow performs the service of changing the
soil in a particular manner” [p.19].38
There is similarity between Fisher’s concepts of wealth and
property, and the notion of assets that emphasizes legal sub-
stance—rights of ownership or objects owned. In promoting the
concept of capital as a “stock of wealth at an instant in time”
Fisher discussed the meaning of capital among businessmen,
referring to Sprague [1904] and others. Considering the capital
accounts employed in business, Fisher defined the assets or re-
sources of the owner as “all his property-rights” [p. 68]. “The
assets include both the property which makes good the liabili-
ties, and the property, if any, in excess of the liabilities” [p. 68].
He also wrote: “A wise merchant . . . will not only keep his assets
in excess of his liabilities by a safe margin, but will also see his
assets invested in the right form so as to enable him to cancel
each claim at the time and in the manner agreed upon” [p. 82].
Fisher emphasized the uncertainty associated with the ben-
efits of wealth, which “are always and necessarily future ser-
vices”. He stressed that services are a possible consequence of
wealth but the services are not wealth, “swift horses are wealth,
but not their swiftness” [Fisher, 1906, p. 39]. However, it was
Fisher’s [1906, p. 324] emphasis on the services to be derived
from wealth that is reputed to have influenced accounting writ-
ers.
In 1907 Sprague wrote that assets could be considered in
“one of seven ways”. He suggested that in one respect assets are
a “storage of services to be received” [p. 46]. Fisher’s influence is
clearly evident when Sprague wrote: “a disservice (to use Profes-
sor Fisher’s word) may have occurred through various causes, so
that the services once anticipated appear impossible of entire
realization” [p. 46, emphasis added]. He also commented on the
view, put forward by Fisher [1906], that all assets are capital.
Given Sprague’s references to Fisher [1906], who based his
framework of ideas on the notion of income as a “stream of
services through time”, and defined the value of any capital
38 This idea can be found in the works of other economists, for example
Bohm-Bawerk [1891] and Seligman [1907, p. 16].
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good as “the discounted value of that income” [p. 223], we can
infer that with regard to his discussion of assets as a store of
services Sprague was influenced by Fisher’s writing. This infer-
ence is supported by the apparent lack of any reference in his
earlier writings to the ‘services’ aspect of assets.39 It was sug-
gested in Chatfield and Vangermeersch [1996, p. 549] that
Sprague’s book had a large impact upon the practice of account-
ing; that prior to this most of the books on bookkeeping were
practice manuals, whereas Sprague “attempted to explain the
‘why’ rather than just the ‘how’ of accounting. This was a depar-
ture from the traditional American or English approach, resem-
bling instead the approach used in Germany”. As Sprague had
spent some time in Germany he may also have been influenced
by German practice and ideas. Weigmann [1932] discussed legal
and economic concepts of the balance sheet in Germany. He
made reference to the dynamic view of the purpose of the bal-
ance sheet discussed in an article by Schmalenbach in 1920.
According to this view “property and debts were regarded as
expenses and services which are already, or are still to be, ac-
counted for (as income-producing factors)” [Weigmann, 1932, p.
105].
Sprague [1907/1972] is cited frequently in the accounting
literature as ‘authority’ for the notion of assets as ‘stores of ser-
vices’. Paton and Stevenson [1916/1976] may have been influ-
enced by the writings of Sprague to which they refer. They in-
cluded in property or assets, services which represent a future
benefit [p. 21].40 Gilman [1939, p. 291] alleged Sprague referred
to assets as “a storage of services to be received”. Nelson [1935,
p. 314] wrote: “Sprague declares that assets are a storage of
services to be received” (emphasis added). Kelley [1935, p. 51],
revealing the influence of Sprague, described every asset of a
business as “in essence a storage of service”, and in a later work
defined an asset as “a storage of service, or anything that ren-
ders or is capable of rendering a service to the enterprise”
[Kelley, 1941, p. 511]. Sprague’s influence is also evident in
Paton’s later work with Littleton: “Behind accounting’s array of
39 This idea is not referred to in ‘The Algebra of Accounts’ printed in The
Book-keeper in which assets were described as resources, or property and debt-
ors [Sprague, 1880, p. 51], nor the lecture series ‘The General Principles of the
Science of Accounts’ in which assets were described as “property and debts due
us” [Sprague, 1901, III].
40 Paton [1922/1973, p. 107]; Couchman [1924/1982, p. 30] and Rorem [1928/
1982, p. 287] also wrote of the services to be derived from assets.
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figures, which laymen may think represent values or money, or,
at best, price, lie the tangible and intangible embodiments of
services” [Paton and Littleton, 1940/1970, p. 13]. They described
‘service’ as the “significant element behind the accounts” [p.13].
Expenses are described as “services received” [p. 26], the impli-
cation being that ‘assets’ are services yet to be received, or ex-
pected future services. Sprouse and Moonitz [1962, p. 19] re-
ferred to Sprague’s description of assets as “store of services”.
Moonitz and Jordan [1963, p. 162] professed that Sprague as-
serted that assets are a storage of services to be received. Kam
[1990, p. 102] wrote that Sprague saw an asset as a storage of
services to be received.
Staubus [1961, p. 29] also described assets as “stores of
services” and in a later work he listed the seven ways in which
Sprague proposed that assets could be considered. He described
the breadth of the listing as indicating a potential for confusion,
“and Sprague did not emphasize any one view enough to dispel
it” [1977, p. 122]. Miller and Islam [1988] presented the same
list. They wrote that “Sprague expressed some significant ideas
such as ‘all our ‘things’ may be looked upon as merely rights of
dominion” [p. 44] and assets “are a storage of services to be
received” [p. 46], and concluded: “But these ideas were given no
more stress than many other blurring notions” [p. 11]. These
conclusions would indicate that neither Staubus, nor Miller and
Islam, read Sprague closely. In his discussion of the balance
sheet Sprague emphasized the notion of property or assets as
something owned and/or rights of ownership, and its represen-
tation of debt paying ability. He wrote that the balance sheet
must comprise: “The values of assets, consisting of property and
claims, to which the person, or collection of persons, has title”
[1907, p. 30].41 He also wrote that the values on the asset side of
the balance sheet are composed of two classes: “Things and
rights”, or “Things belonging to us and debts owing to us”, or
again: “Possessions and Expectations”. “We shall see that these
classes imperceptibly blend into each other and that every asset
may be looked upon either as a ‘thing’ or as a ‘right’” [p. 44].
That exchangeability was considered an important characteris-
tic of assets is evident in the following quotation: “The personal-
ity of the proprietor, his skill, his experience, though important
elements of his capital, can never be brought into his balance
41 In previous writings Sprague described assets in terms of “property and
debts due” [Sprague, 1901/1984, lecture III, 1904/1984, p. 6].
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sheets. They cannot be bought nor sold and they only make
themselves manifest through the services which he does sell”
[Sprague, 1907, p. 36].42 Sprague stressed that “the aspect of
assets as the present worth of future services is entirely based
upon opinion” [1907, pp. 46-47].
More authoritative in developing this trend was the work of
Canning. As he acknowledged in the preface to his book The
Economics of Accountancy [1929a], Canning was strongly influ-
enced by the writings of fellow economist Fisher. Notwithstand-
ing, Canning sought to base his work on accounting practice.
Fisher’s influence is clearly evident throughout Canning’s book,
in which he attempted to clear away some of the confusion that
surrounded economists’ understanding of accounting concepts.
Fisher’s influence is clearly evident in Canning’s asset definition,
described as the professional accountant’s implied definition:
“An asset is any future service in money or any future service
convertible into money (except those services arising from con-
tracts the two sides of which are proportionately unperformed)
the beneficial interest in which is legally or equitably secured to
some person or set of persons. Such a service is an asset only to
that person or set of persons to whom it runs” [1929a, p. 22].
From his observation of accounting practice Canning con-
cluded that ownership, and therefore transferability, were not
essential to the existence of an asset. Canning stressed that the
essential idea of an asset is that it stands for a separable series
of future services. He linked the concept of a series of services
(Fisher’s income notion) with the concept of assets: “For income
in essence is services - the desired element in economic events.
Change the sign and you have the undesired element in eco-
nomic events, disservices, or expense. Consider the sources of
service and you think of tangible assets” [1929b, p. 8]. Under
Canning’s definition, an asset is not a resource, a right or an
object but a future service. In Canning’s words: “It is the antici-
pated service, the payment of money at some future time, that is
valued and that is fundamental to the existence of the asset” [p.
15]. He argued that one could have an enforceable right to the
services of a thing and have no asset: “The service must either be
itself a money income or it must have a money income conse-
quence” [p. 20].
As is clear from the previous discussion ‘future services’ was
not the accepted view of assets in accounting during the 1920s
42 See also Sprague [1907/1972, pp. 49-50].
163
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2003, Vol. 30, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2003
155Williams: Assets in Accounting: Reality Lost
and 30s.43 Canning’s influence can be found throughout the ac-
counting literature. Nelson [1935] relied heavily on Fisher and
Canning, citing them throughout his discussion. He argued:
“Wealth and property are evidence of an expectation, but they
are not assets . . . Assets are future enterprise services” [1935, p.
313]. Gilman [1939] referred extensively to Canning throughout
his book which was directed primarily to “the accountant in
search of accounting ‘principles’ articulating with present day
practice”. When discussing assets, Gilman quoted both Canning
and Sprague. He also quoted Perry Mason [1937, p. 13] who
described an investment in an asset as the price paid for a series
of future services.
Notwithstanding the above evidence, some authors have at-
tributed the introduction of the idea of assets as future services
to Vatter.44 Vatter [1947] described assets as “embodiments of
future want satisfaction in the form of service potentials that
may be transformed, exchanged, or stored against future events
. . . assets are service potentials, not physical things, legal rights,
or money claims” [p. 53]. Vatter was not the originator of this
notion as there is a clear link to the sources discussed above.
Vatter [p. 52] quoted Canning [1929a, p. 188] who had described
the essence of enterprise assets as constituting “the assured,
separable service-series” and Paton and Littleton’s reference to
“service” and “service potentialities”. Vatter [p. 54] suggested
that “there may be different aspects of service potentials that
ought to be considered”. However, he did not discuss these dif-
ferent aspects. Vatter was a member of the AAA which subse-
quently adopted the service potential notion.
During the 1960s and 1970s the notion of assets as future
services, or stores of services, was taken up with enthusiasm.
Finney and Miller [1963] and Paton and Paton [1971] were
among those to make the point that the notion of assets as
future benefits was becoming generally accepted.45 Staubus
[1961/1971, p. 29] noted that the ‘service’ aspect of assets had
been emphasized by other writers. He made specific reference to
Vatter [1947] and Paton and Littleton [1940/1970]. In a later
work Staubus [1977, p. 122] quoted Canning. Sprouse and
43 Canning [1929a, pp. 12-13] noted that asset definitions in accounting texts
were “confusingly diverse”.
44 See Kenley and Staubus [1972, p. 93] and Staubus [1977, p. 123].
45 See Sprouse [1970, p. 100]; Staubus [1977, p. 123]; Kenley and Staubus
[1972, p. 93]; Sorter and Horngren [1962, from Davidson et al, p. 194] and Lall
[1968, p. 133].
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Moonitz [1962, pp. 19-20] referred to Sprague’s ‘description’ of
assets as ‘store of services’; to Paton and Littleton’s statement
that service is the significant element behind the accounts; to
Vatter’s description of assets as ‘service potentials’; to the defini-
tion promulgated by the Committee on Terminology [AICPA,
1953a], in which assets were defined in terms of generally ac-
cepted accounting practice; and to the Committee on Concepts
and Standards of the AAA [1957, p. 538] which stated that assets
are “aggregates of service-potentials”. Sprouse and Moonitz [p.
20] adopted the majority view.
Moonitz and Jordan [1963, pp. 162-163] quoted Sprague:
assets were “a storage of services to be received”; Canning – “any
future service in money”; Vatter, “embodiments of future want
satisfaction”; and the AICPA [1953a]. They concluded that de-
spite some differences the definitions agreed on certain essen-
tials. They defined an asset as a “right, residing in the owner, to
prospective benefits” [p. 163]. The existence of some future ser-
vice or benefit is also the cornerstone of the definition proposed
by Kenley and Staubus [1972, p. 94].46
Professional Pronouncements: The economic benefits notion re-
flected a move away from an emphasis on legal form to eco-
nomic substance or rights. The subject of accounting for leases
demonstrated this. Concern for the economic substance of lease
transactions led to the issue of Bulletin No. 38 by the AICPA
Committee on Accounting Procedure in 1949. For a year or two
prior to the issue of the Bulletin a number of journal articles
had called attention to the growing importance of leases, some
writers advocating that leased assets and the related liability be
placed upon the balance sheet. A major argument was that the
accountant should look through the form of the transaction to
its substance [Myers, 1962, p. 2]. Myers [1962, p. 40] used
Canning’s asset definition to support the recording of leased
property as an asset. The recommendation of the Committee
was that the ‘leased’ property should be recorded as an asset
where it was clearly evident that the transaction involved was
“in substance a purchase”. This recommendation was restated in
46 Future benefits are also emphasised by Sorter and Horngren [1962, from
Davidson et al, 1964, p. 194]; Dixon, Hepworth and Paton [1966, p. 6]; Lall
[1968, p. 133]; Sprouse [1970, p. 100]; Sorter and Ingberman [1987, pp. 100-101]
and in a document published by Arthur Andersen and Co in 1984 [p. 24]. The
latter was in contrast to the definition proposed ten years earlier which specified
exchangeability as an essential asset characteristic [Arthur Andersen, 1974].
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Accounting Research Bulletin No.43 [AICPA, 1953b], and rein-
forced in APB Opinion No. 5 [APB, 1964, p. 30], in which it was
argued that the substance of the arrangement, rather than its
legal form, should determine the accounting treatment. It may
be noted that subsequently Substance over Form was included as
one of the basic features of financial accounting in APB State-
ment No 4 [APB, 1970]. It was argued that such an emphasis
resulted in information that “better reflects the economic activi-
ties represented” [APB, 1970, para.127].47
The adoption of the abstract future benefit concept of assets
in the pronouncements of accounting bodies is testament to the
extent of its general (but not universal) acceptance. In 1957 the
Committee on Concepts and Standards of the AAA, of which
Vatter was a member, abandoned the definition of assets as
‘rights in property’ [AAA, 1948, p. 14] in favor of an economic
notion of assets as “aggregates of service potential” [AAA, 1957,
p. 538]. What constituted service-potentials was not explained.
Prospective cash inflows, or future services, service potentials or
future economic benefits, were described as essential character-
istics of an asset in the FASB discussion memo Elements of
Financial Statements and Their Measurement [FASB, 1976]. The
definitions proposed by Canning [1929a], Vatter [1947], the AAA
[1957], Sprouse and Moonitz [1962], Mautz [1970], and in A
Statement of Basic Accounting Postulates and Principles [Study
Group at the University of Illinois, 1964, p. 60] were quoted. The
FASB codified this popular view of assets in Statement of Finan-
cial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No.6 [1985].48 Assets are de-
fined in that document as “probable future economic benefits
obtained or controlled by a particular entity as a result of past
transactions or events”.49
These professional pronouncements were supported in later
academic writing and Canning’s definition continues to be cited
as an authority for the definition of assets as service potential or
future economic benefits. Hendrikson [1977, p. 257] quoted
Canning and concluded that the emphasis on economic re-
sources representing service potentials or rights to prospective
benefits provides for an all-inclusive definition. Henderson and
Peirson [1984] discussed Canning’s asset definition at length.
47 See also AARF [1990c].
48 This followed a discussion memorandum in which service potential was
argued to be an essential characteristic of an asset [FASB, 1976, p. 60].
49 SFAC No. 6 replaces the earlier SFAC No. 3 [FASB, 1980] which contained
the same definition of assets.
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They concluded, without critique: “There is no reason to believe
that the characteristics of an asset identified in 1929 are not the
same as the characteristics of an asset in contemporary account-
ing” [p. 30]. They proceeded to define an asset “as that term is
understood in contemporary accounting” in the same terms as
Canning.50
Similar professional pronouncements followed in other
parts of the world. The professional accounting bodies in Aus-
tralia [AARF, 1992, para. 12] adopted a similar definition to that
promulgated in SFAC No.6.51 The UK Accounting Standards
Board [1999] also adopted the notion of assets as future ben-
efits.52
Measurement of Future Economic Benefits: While the service as-
pect of assets cannot be disputed, critical examination of this
notion of assets in the context of financial reporting reveals
considerable difficulty in rationalizing the concept.
The broader notion of assets as future economic benefits
was argued to be more consistent with the needs of users for
future oriented information as a basis for prediction [Canning,
1929a; Nelson, 1935; Kenley and Staubus, 1972, p. 93; Staubus,
1977, p. 119; Most, 1977, p. 217]. Kenley and Staubus [1972, p.
93] argued: “If a balance sheet is to be thought of as a useful
statement of financial position it should give a future-oriented
report of the current stocks of the wealth-related items it cov-
ers”. This is assumed to result in information that is indicative
of future cash flows and therefore useful in assessing short-term
debt paying ability, solvency, and the capacity to take advantage
of opportunities that may arise. However, the untenable conse-
quence of this emphasis on the future is that users are deprived
of reliable information about “current stocks of the wealth-re-
lated items”.
Supporters of the future benefits notion argue that the value
of any asset is the present value of its service potentials. “Con-
50 See also Kam [1990, pp. 102-104] who quotes Sprague [1907]; Canning
[1929a]; Paton and Littleton [1940]; Vatter [1947] and the AAA [1957].
51 The definition was recommended in a monograph prepared by Miller and
Islam [1988]. The definition of an asset adopted by the Australian Accounting
Standards Review Board, in Release 100, also focuses on future benefits [1985,
para. 38].
52 The definition proposed in ED 42 [ASC, 1988, para. 14] was almost identi-
cal to that in the American SFAC No.6 [FASB, 1985]. Solomons [1988, p. 20] and
the IASC [1988, para. 49] proposed similar definitions. These are quoted with
approval in ED 47 [ASC, 1990, Appendix, para.9].
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ceptually, this is the sum of the future market prices of all
streams of service to be derived, discounted by probability and
interest factors to their present worth” [AAA, 1957, p. 4].53 That
assets may have different kinds of service potential was recog-
nized in SFAC No.3 [FASB, 1980]. “Money . . . is valuable for
what it can buy”, money’s “command over resources” - its pur-
chasing power - is the basis of its value and future economic
benefits [FASB, 1980, para. 23]. “Assets other than cash benefit
a business enterprise by being exchanged for cash or other
goods or services, by being used to produce or otherwise in-
crease the value of other assets, or by being used to settle liabili-
ties” [FASB, 1980, para. 24]. Chambers suggested that a non-
monetary right or object may simultaneously have four kinds of
service potential: “It may be able to produce a certain quantity
of a class of products . . . It may serve as a liquidity reserve; it
may be sold if any circumstance, such as a liquidity crisis or a
change in output composition, justifies its sale. It may serve as
part of a borrowing base . . . And it may serve as a hedge against
inflation, to the extent that its resale price rises as the general
level of prices rises” [Chambers, 1975, p. 100].
If an asset can simultaneously have four kinds of service
potential no amount can be assigned which will represent the
sum of those service potentials. The service to be derived from
an asset in the future can only be imagined, it cannot be mea-
sured. Further, the benefits provided by a particular asset such
as the shelter provided by a building, or the lifting power of a
crane or hoist, cannot be disentangled from the benefits pro-
vided by a complex combination of assets that contribute to the
production of a product or service. An asset may be made to
yield quite different benefits depending on the way it is com-
bined with other assets. This is the essence of the following
quotations:
The economic theorist . . . will tell us that a capital in-
strument, for example, a lathe in a machine shop, de-
rives its value from the value of the lathe’s future ser-
vices and disservices - that the true valuation of the
machine is determined by capitalizing its future money
- valued service and disservice series. But unless the
service of the lathe consists of bringing in a sale price
either for the lathe itself or for a separately sold sched-
53 For further examples of this view see Rorem [1928/1982, p. 287] and
Staubus [1977, p. 140].
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ule of its technical services no series of future services
independently valued in money can exist outside the
imagination [Canning, 1929b, p. 5].
Even if the selling price of the product is ‘assured,’ the
portion of that selling price attributable to the particu-
lar input under examination - a raw material, an item
of supplies, a machine, - cannot be determined in any
objective way. This ‘allocation problem’, . . . is . . . a
weakness in the reliability of the discounted future cash
flow method’ [Staubus, 1977, p. 168].54
Given the uncertainties and subjectivity associated with estimat-
ing and valuing future services, accountants made the conve-
nient assumption that “the value of the asset is equal to its
money cost, less a deduction to provide for that proportion of its
power to render service which has been used up” [Kelley, 1935,
p. 51]. “Assuming a free market, acquisition cost expressed in
the bargained price of an asset is presumed to be a satisfactory
quantification of future service expectations at the time of ac-
quisition” [AAA, 1957, p. 4].55 The AAA accepted the use of cost
as a surrogate measure without critical comment:
The value of an asset is the money equivalent of its
service potentials. Conceptually this is the sum of the
future market prices of all streams of service to be de-
rived, discounted . . . to their present worths. However,
this conception of value is an abstraction which yields
but limited practical basis for quantification. Conse-
quently, the measurement of assets is commonly made
by other more feasible means . . . Non-monetary assets
. . . are typically stated at acquisition cost or some de-
rivative therof [AAA, 1957, p. 4].56
The notion of assets as future economic benefits is completely at
odds with the recording of assets at historical cost. There is no
evidence to suggest that cost represents or is equivalent to any
expected physical or financial benefit. As Schuetze [1993, p. 69]
argued, “the probable future economic benefit of a successful,
direct-response advertising campaign may be many multiples of
the cost. The future benefit of a discovery of mineral deposits
54 See also Moonitz and Jordan [1963, p. 166] and Bottrill [1973, p. 146].
55 See also Dicksee [1903/1976, p. 26]; Paton [1922/1973, pp. 26, 345]; Rorem
[1928/1982, p. 313]; Saliers [1935, p. 390]; Paton [1948, p. 288]; Anton [1956, p.
119]; Sprouse and Moonitz [1962, p. 26] and Arthur Andersen [1974, p. 41].
56 See also Edwards [1938, p. 81]; Sprouse and Moonitz [1962, p. 25]; Sorter
and Horngren [1962]; Staubus [1977, p. 118].
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generally bears no relationship whatsoever to the costs of find-
ing the deposits. The future benefits of successful research and
development also bear little or no relationship to the costs in-
curred”. The probability that a past cost, or an unallocated (re-
sidual) cost will represent the expected future benefit is ex-
tremely remote. Decisions as to whether expenditures will result
in a future benefit rely on individual judgment. Estimates of the
extent of future benefits or services are personal, subjective and
changeable over time. So too, the determination of the extent to
which the cost or value of services have, or have not, been con-
sumed is necessarily ad hoc and dependent on individual judg-
ment.
While the emphasis on cost remains, an examination of
practice confirms that cost has not been accepted as a universal
surrogate for future economic benefits and highlights the ongo-
ing difficulty of rationalizing the measurement of ‘future ben-
efits’. With the shift in ideas away from assets as real means for
paying real debts to abstract notions of future benefits the valua-
tions appearing under the asset heading in periodic statements
became a diverse mixture of costs, unallocated costs, net realiz-
able values and money equivalents. While valuation at cost was
advocated for ‘fixed assets’, valuation at lower of cost or market
became the generally accepted practice in the case of invento-
ries.57 There is evidence that deficiencies in these valuation crite-
ria were acknowledged early in the move towards adopting the
future benefits definition. Dickinson [1913/1975, p. 117] ac-
cepted this practice for both inventories and investments despite
his contention that a balance sheet is required to show the true
financial position as a going concern, and that the inventory at
actual cost may represent more or less than the market value,
and, therefore, overstate or understate the assets [p. 94]. Mont-
gomery [1912/1976, p. 104] argued that placing “a higher value
on an inventory item than the price at which the same thing can
be duplicated in the open market . . . deceives the banker, credi-
tor, and stockholder who have a right to believe that the values
stated are real values as at the date of the balance sheet”. How-
ever, he advocated that “when purchases have been made in a
rising market and where the goods cannot be duplicated, except
57 The inconsistency of the lower of cost and market rule has attracted
strong criticism. See for example Paton and Stevenson [1916/1976, p. 104];
Paton [1922/1973, p. 453]; Hatfield [1927/1971, p. 251] and MacNeal [1939/1970,
p. 43].
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at a higher price . . . the conservative course is to carry the items
at cost and thus do away with the objectionable practice of
anticipating a profit” [p. 104].
Revaluation of non-current assets is permitted in some
countries, such as the UK and Australia. The revaluation by
companies of certain non-current assets, for example land and
buildings, is common practice in Australia.58 While AAS 10 Ac-
counting for the Revaluation of Non-Current Assets [AARF, 1981]
prescribes methods of accounting for the revaluation of non-
current assets it does not prescribe how or when assets should
be revalued except to require that non-current assets are to be
revalued downwards when their carrying amount is greater than
recoverable amount. There have, however, been moves by the
Australian accounting profession towards the reporting of mar-
ket prices for certain assets. In AAS 25 Financial Reporting by
Superannuation Plans [AARF, 1990a, para. 39] it is argued that
in the case of “defined benefit plans”59 measuring assets at net
market value as at the reporting date “provides more relevant
information to users about the resources available to pay ben-
efits than does the cost basis of measurement”. AAS 26 Financial
Reporting of General Insurance Activities [AARF, 1990b, para. 78]
requires that “Investments that are integral to the reporting
entity’s general insurance activities shall be measured at net
market values as at the reporting date”. It is commented that in
many cases the net market values of assets are far removed from
their costs. “This can be of major concern in relation to assets
held as investments which are integral to the reporting entity’s
general insurance activities because increments in the net mar-
ket values of such assets may be relied upon by insurers to meet
their liabilities for outstanding claims” [para. 88]. A wider cur-
rent issue is the valuation of financial instruments at fair value.
A Joint Working Group of national standard setters has pro-
posed that virtually all financial instruments be measured at fair
value; the UK ASB has issued a discussion paper on the subject;
and the FASB in the USA has issued a draft standard on the
valuation of derivatives. Thus the confusion in attempting to
link future benefits and balance sheet valuation continues.
58 See for example, Chambers [1957]; Standish [1972]; Gibson [1976]; Ryan
et al [1980] and Ryan et al [1993].
59 Defined in AAS 25 [para. 10] as “a superannuation plan where the
amounts to be paid to one or more members . . . are specified, or are deter-
mined, at least in part, by reference to a formula based on their years of mem-
bership and/or salary levels”.
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CONCLUSIONS
The accounting notion of assets has undergone considerable
change. Until the late 19th century, the words ‘property’ and
‘assets’ were used in the accounting literature in the sense of real
things, existing things or rights, which were exchangeable for
cash. In the latter part of the 19th century various ‘costs’ began
to appear under the asset heading in balance sheets. Definitions
of assets in terms of costs and unexpired costs began to appear
in the literature, and in professional pronouncements. The idea
that assets were a source of services appeared in the literature in
the early 20th century. The economic notion of assets as service
potential provided a rationale for all manner of items in the
balance sheet which were not assets in the commonly under-
stood sense, but which resulted from the carrying forward of
costs to future periods.
The broader notion of assets as future economic benefits
was argued to be more consistent with the needs of users for
information about the future. Relevance and reliability are cited
frequently as essential characteristics of accounting information
if it is to be useful for decision-making. However, with the
broadening of the notion of what constitutes an asset the bound-
ary around what is or is not an asset has become hazy and
ambiguous. Schuetze [1993, p. 67], former Chief Accountant of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, described the FASB’s
definition as:
. . . so complex, so open-ended, so all inclusive, and so
vague that we cannot use it to solve problems. It does
not require exchangeability, and therefore it allows all
expenditures to be considered for inclusion as assets.
The definition does not discriminate and help us to de-
cide whether something or anything is an asset. That
definition describes an empty box. A large empty box. A
large empty box with sideboards. Almost everything or
anything can be fit into it.
It is stated in SAC3 [AARF, 1990c] that reliability will be deter-
mined by the correspondence between what the information
conveys to users and the underlying transactions and events that
have occurred [para.16]. Future events are not representative of
existing conditions; they are not representative of “transactions
and events that have occurred”. The benefits expected to be de-
rived from assets are generally a result of combining those as-
sets with other assets to produce a particular output. The future
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benefits attached to a particular input cannot be determined in
an objective way.
If a definition is to have real world application it must be
defined in real world terms. Expected future benefits do not
have real world significance. As Schuetze [1993, pp. 69-70] ar-
gued:
Abstract future benefits cannot be sold, pledged, or
given away . . . I think that ordinary people who are not
accountants think that when they see an asset in a bal-
ance sheet that the asset is something real, and that it
represents value, that is, if it is not cash or a claim to
cash, that it can be sold separately for cash. Accounting
should result in financial statements that ordinary
people will understand and therefore be able to use to
make investment and credit decisions.
An accounting that is divorced from reality can only serve to
confuse. This examination of the historical development of what
constitutes an asset demonstrates that the ordinary person will
have misplaced their trust if they retain simple everyday notions
of what constitutes an asset.
The accounting profession continues to face significant
challenges in providing relevant information to a wider range of
users. In the past accountants have, for the most part, attempted
to address and take account of wide-ranging changes in busi-
ness’ activity within conventional financial statements. The bal-
ance sheet was traditionally a representation of a present state
of affairs. The balance sheet of today, due partly to the abandon-
ment of the property notion of assets, is a complex mixture of
the past, present and future. It does not have a clearly defined
purpose and might be argued to have outlived its usefulness.
All parties who have an interest in a commercial enterprise
are concerned about the ability of the entity to remain solvent.
For this reason it is argued that companies should present a
statement of ‘separably exchangeable property’ and legal obliga-
tions, at the reporting date. Consistent with this notion, ‘prop-
erty’ should be stated at current market values where these exist.
Where appropriate a range of values should be reported. This
clearly indicates to the users of financial statements that the
numbers in the accounting reports are not certain. Where an
active market for property does not exist that property should be
listed separately and clearly identified as valued at ‘estimated’
exchange value. Separate schedules could provide details of
shareholders equity, contingent liabilities, and additional rel-
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evant information about items such as leases, specialized equip-
ment, goodwill and other intangibles, which may add value to a
firm in the future.
“While financial statements should be presented in a man-
ner that will assist as much as possible in assessing the future
and its risks, the role of accounting and the resulting financial
statements is not to predict or to interpret the future” [Arthur
Andersen, 1974, p. 15]. The current emphasis on users’ needs for
information about future benefits, results in users’ needs for
reliable information about present means being ignored. Ac-
counting must focus on providing interested parties with infor-
mation which will “assist as much as possible in assessing the
future and its risks”.
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Abstract: This review essay suggests considerations to be addressed in
research design if research on a taxation subject is to succeed as rigor-
ous accounting research, well grounded in relevant historical scholar-
ship. Tax research must focus on substantive subjects that are recogniz-
able as “accounting”; the methods, approach, and exposition must be
“historical” to an acceptable standard; and the research must engage
with relevant portions of the existing body of accounting historical
scholarship. Further, scholarly engagement with the best researchers
and liveliest debates that the disciplines of accounting and history have
to offer will enrich the treatment of tax in accounting history.
INTRODUCTION
Taxation is a rich research field for accounting historians to
explore. There are many problems of tax measurement, report-
ing, and analysis that are central to the concerns of accounting
historians who wish to understand the interrelationships be-
tween taxation and accounting institutions and practice. Taxa-
tion is, however, a field in which the wider context of public
policy, law, and public administration presses insistently on the
development of measurement and reporting principles and tech-
niques, and their application and interpretation in practice. This
review essay suggests considerations that must be addressed in
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research design if the resulting research on a taxation subject is
to succeed as rigorous accounting research, well grounded in
relevant historical scholarship. To use an analogy, this is an
essay about where in general and how to aim the research “cam-
era”; it does not suggest how to shoot the photo, develop, ana-
lyze, or present it to the discerning public.
I will argue that the accounting historian who wishes to
tackle a taxation subject has two primary obligations when
framing the particular research questions to be explored. First,
the contribution to accounting history must be clear. Taxation is
a broad and complex subject. It may be approached in many
ways, from the political philosophy of its application to its eco-
nomic and social effects. These are important frames of refer-
ence for examining tax issues, but as accounting historians we
wish to know what is it about the research that extends our
historical understanding of accounting theory, practices, or in-
stitutions? Second, the links to a more general, but relevant,
history of taxation must be clear. How does the research draw
from and/or contribute to a wider tax history? Tax research
done in an accounting history context, just as much as account-
ing history more generally defined, represents a specialist angle
of analysis within wider fields of historical scholarship. The ac-
counting historian, just as much as any historian, has an obliga-
tion to engage with the rigorous and rich analysis of leading
historians in the wider fields. This is an important part of trac-
ing the gap in the historical literature that the specific research
will fill or begin to address.
In this essay, I will consider how influential monographs of
19th and 20th century taxation history written by Anglo/Ameri-
can historians might assist accounting historians to frame rel-
evant tax research questions. Three influential works of US eco-
nomic, legal, and political history will be considered (Elliot
Brownlee’s Federal Taxation in America [1996]; Robert Stanley’s
Dimensions of Law in the Service of Order [1993]; and Julian E.
Zelizer’s Taxing America [1998]). Two important works on Brit-
ish taxation history by the Cambridge economic and social his-
torian Martin Daunton will be reviewed: Trusting Leviathan
[2001] and Just Taxes [2002]. In each case, the essay will outline
the major research questions and debates that these important
works address in their general historical fields. Then, it will
consider the ways in which accounting historians might use
these works to assist in the exercise of framing their own re-
search questions.
185
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2003, Vol. 30, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2003
177Interfaces: Lamb: Questions of Taxation
OBLIGATION 1: CONTRIBUTION TO
ACCOUNTING HISTORY
A tax researcher writing in an accounting history context
faces a high threshold to acceptance that a piece of work makes
a contribution to accounting history. Success is associated with
making the fundamentals of one’s working assumptions and ap-
proach to research clear. First, there is a need to make clear
what the “accounting” is that the research explores. Next, there
is an obligation to adopt an “historical” method of research and
exposition. Finally, there is a requirement to ensure that “ac-
counting” plus “history” contributes to “accounting history”.
When a new piece of research extends or complements, as well
as critically interacts with, the existing body of related account-
ing historical research, then we can say that the tripartite
threshold of acceptance to accounting history has been met.
Accounting: As a generalization, we can say that accounting in-
volves processes of calculating, reporting, and evaluating finan-
cial transactions, performance, and events. Accounting pro-
cesses involve techniques, apply principles, and attract theories
of improvement and explanation. Accounting research focuses
on these processes, their outputs, and the institutions created
around them. Yet, it is my experience that the seemingly simple
question – “What is accounting?” – elicits two sequential re-
sponses. The first is a moment of hesitation and the second is a
definition tailored to a particular context. The hesitation seems
to me to reflect awareness of the many ways of defining ac-
counting, contingent on context, and the process of personal
choice. The range of definitions reflects the broad and changing
nature of the field. It also emphasizes the ontological and episte-
mological complexity that characterizes the accounting aca-
demic field.1
Accounting historians in general and those who write about
taxation in particular make choices about how they define “ac-
counting”. Sometimes those choices are implicit and taken for
granted. I argue that the accounting historical scholarship will
tend to be richer when the definition in a particular piece of
1 Much has been written on the ontological problem of accounting research
[see Chua, 1986 for a start] and the epistemological issues [Oldroyd, 1999 in this
journal represents a good place to begin]. Some of my own previous writing
[Lamb, 1999; Lamb and Lymer, 1999] has presented an analysis of the chal-
lenges of diversity of possible approaches with reference to tax research in the
accounting context.
186
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 30 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 10
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol30/iss2/10
Accounting Historians Journal, December 2003178
work is explicit. Clarity of approach will support – through the
researcher’s self-awareness and the reader’s sense-making pro-
cesses – the critical interaction between new research and exist-
ing research.
History: In many ways, we approach the challenge of being his-
torical in much the same way as we approach the challenge of
researching accounting. We generally accept that history in-
volves researching and writing about things of the past, so that
is what we do. However, the concept and practice of “history”
involves ontological and epistemological complexity too. To ig-
nore this complexity altogether cannot be an acceptable ap-
proach to historical research. The researcher must make
choices. If these are explicitly understood, the research can
make constructive connections to appropriate advice and mod-
els for conducting historical research that already exist in the
body of historical scholarship.2 If these are explicitly communi-
cated, then once again the reader’s ability to absorb, position,
and respond to the new work will be enhanced.
Accounting History: Given the ambiguities that exist around the
definition and scope of accounting and the diversity of the his-
torical discipline, it is not rocket science to deduce that the
specialist field of accounting history will be characterized by a
considerable degree of eclecticism. One comprehensive collec-
tion of accounting historical writings [Parker and Yamey, 1994]
refers to “the great variety of accounting history literature”
which encompasses “the ancient world; before double entry;
double entry; corporate accounting; local government account-
ing; cost and management accounting; accounting theory; ac-
counting in context” [p. 7]. This journal describes its scope as
“address[ing] the development of accounting thought and prac-
tice” and “embrac[ing] all subject matter related to accounting
history” [Statement of Policy]. Another specialist journal,
2 While there are numerous excellent pieces published in accounting histori-
cal journals on historical theories and methods [e.g. Carnegie and Napier, 1996;
Miller and Napier, 1993; Oldroyd, 1999; Previts, 1984; Previts et al., 1990a,
1990b], I would encourage researchers to read works within the wider historical
field. Debate over theory and methods will be more vigorous where many his-
torical specialist fields interact, rather than in one specialist field itself. The
work of Carr [1990] often serves as a starting place to address questions of
historical approach in general, but more contemporary debates and concerns
are addressed by Appleby et al. [1994], Evans [1997], Hunt [1989], and
Jordanova [2000].
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Accounting History, publishes work concerned with “exploring
the advent and development of accounting bodies, conventions,
ideas, practices and rules”.3 In the latter case, it is explicitly
stated that authors should “attempt to identify the individuals
and also the local, time-specific environmental factors which
affected accounting, and should endeavour to assess account-
ing’s impact on organisational and social functioning”.4
The obligation on the researcher who wishes to contribute
to this eclectic specialist field is to make clear both the nature of
the accounting that is explored, as well as the approach to his-
torical scholarship adopted. It is in this way that links are made
to the relevant parts of the existing body of literature and the
nature of the research contribution can be critically and con-
structively understood.
Tax Research in Published Accounting History: Tax research
studies have contributed to the body of published accounting
history in a variety of ways. For example, several papers pub-
lished in this journal have treated taxation as a distinct policy
and practice area. Broden and Loeb [1983] adopted an historical
approach to consider CPAs’ professional ethics in a tax practice
context. Cataldo [1995] explained the historical development of
the earned income tax credit. In the latter, general historical
sources are used to contextualize and aid interpretation of the
particular research study. Further papers seek to identify the
antecedents of modern US taxation [Crum, 1982; Kozub, 1983;
Samson, 1985; Wells and Flesher, 1999]. As well as constructing
an historical account by reference to primary sources (often leg-
islation and legislative records), some evidence is derived from
political, economic, and general histories of 19th century
America. The approach adopted is, in general, descriptive with
little critical reflection on the existing body of historical litera-
ture. In the case of Wells and Flesher [1999], the research objec-
tive is to derive lessons relevant to modern tax policymakers.
Other tax research papers published in the Accounting His-
torians Journal emphasize the ways in which the policies and
practices of taxation interact and overlap with those we readily
3 Its website commentary makes clear Accounting History’s willingness to
accept diverse approaches. It cites “biography, prosopography, business history
through accounting records, institutional theory, public sector accounting
history, comparative international accounting history and oral history”, as well
as case study “based on an individual, a firm or a book”; see http://
www.deakin.edu.au/fac_buslaw/sch_accfin /publications/abstracts.htm.
4 Referenced at footnote 3 supra.
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recognize as accounting. Jose and Moore [1998] published a
study of taxation in the Biblical Age in which clear aspects of
accounting (counting, measurement, and computation) are con-
sidered. However, studies by Ezzamel [2002] of ancient Egyp-
tian tax assessment and collection and Oldroyd [1995] of Roman
governmental accounting are better examples of how historical
work by specialist historians of the period may be used to criti-
cally ground the accounting historical study. Richard Macve’s
[1994] essay on Roman and Greek accounting and taxation is
another example of critical engagement with the work of a spe-
cialist historian of the period, in his case with the work of
Geoffrey de Ste. Croix the eminent Oxford historian of the Clas-
sical Age. Kern’s [2000] study of interactions between US tax
and accounting depreciation rules and conventions illuminates
important features of 20th century accounting history, as does
Edwards’ [1976] study for similar issues in 19th century Britain.
My own research extends Edwards’ work [Lamb, 2002] and
makes use of British economic and legal historical work to un-
derpin an analysis of the accounting content of tax legal cases.
Schultz and Johnson’s [1998] study of deferred taxation theory
and practice is well integrated in US financial reporting history;
research by Arnold and Webb [1989] covers some of the same
ground for the UK.
Some tax historical research published elsewhere in an aca-
demic accounting context satisfies the threshold demands of ac-
counting history with a more theoretical and critical engage-
ment with existing literature. Work published in Accounting,
Organizations and Society falls under this heading. Peter Miller’s
study [1990] of interrelations between accounting and the state
in 17th century France gives a high profile to taxation policies
and practices. It is a highly theorized study that engages with
both accounting theorizing and general historical research.
Eden et al.’s [2001] research on the diffusion of the arm’s length
principle for tax purposes in North America represents a more
contemporary accounting history, well-positioned in an interdis-
ciplinary theoretical literature. My own research [Lamb, 2001]
on how control of accounting calculation (of expenses, income,
and profit) was used to reinforce tax authorities’ powers to en-
force taxpayer compliance extends prior accounting theoriza-
tion and addresses a gap in the general historical literature. Tax
research studies with an accounting historical approach in Criti-
cal Perspectives on Accounting also achieved a critical engage-
ment with relevant accounting and historical literature. Boden’s
[1999] research on the financial reporting expected from the
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self-employed explores the tax accounting impositions in a
broad social and historical context. Boden et al.’s [1995] study of
tax, women, and citizenship is similarly rich in its historical
approach and critical engagement with existing literature.
OBLIGATION 2: MAPPING CONNECTIONS TO
THE WIDER SCHOLARSHIP ON TAXATION
I have argued so far that the tax researcher wishing to pub-
lish in the accounting history domain has a tripartite threshold
to achieve: the research must focus on substantive subjects that
are recognizable as “accounting”; the methods, approach, and
exposition must be “historical” to an acceptable standard; and
the research must engage with relevant portions of the existing
body of accounting historical scholarship. However, my argu-
ment does not stop there. If accounting history is to thrive as a
specialist field of both accounting and history, its researchers
must engage with the best researchers and liveliest debates that
the broader disciplines have to offer. The majority of research-
ers who publish accounting history teach accounting in ac-
counting departments and business schools. Many research con-
temporary, as well as historical, accounting subjects. Published
authors of this journal also publish in mainstream accounting
academic journals. All of these are reasons to suggest that ac-
counting historians have reasonable access to and familiarity
with seminal research and academic debates in the wider ac-
counting field. Fewer reasons exist to support a presumption
that accounting historians have similar institutionalized access
to and familiarity with the work and debates that are the shared
knowledge and current talk of university history departments.
Keeping up with and engaging with history, therefore, takes
even more conscious effort than does keeping up and engaging
with accounting scholarship.
My second argument, then, follows: To be of the highest
quality, tax research in accounting history must engage with
leading scholarship in the related fields of history. The rest of
this essay will consider some of that leading scholarship and
address the question of how the researcher draws from and/or
contribute to a wider tax history.
Taxation as a Central Focus of Historical Research: To a great
extent, taxation has been a subject notable for its near absence
in many fields of modern American and British history [e.g.
Davie, 1997; Lowe, 2003]. Five relatively recently published
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monographs have done a great deal to redress this imbalance
and demonstrate convincingly that taxation as a historical focus
can serve as the analytical basis to unpick and then knit together
more general histories of a period, a country, or a set of institu-
tions.
Taxation in US Historical Research: The economic historian
Elliot Brownlee’s Federal Taxation in America: A Short History
[1996] is the current starting place for a consideration of US
taxation. In this sense, it displaces earlier studies by Blakey and
Blakey [1940], Paul [1954], Ratner [1942], Seligman [1914],
Stein [1969], Taussig [1931], and Witte [1985]. The book consid-
ers the period 1789 to 1996. The author’s objective is to explain
how and why the federal government has crafted new tax re-
gimes in each of five great national emergencies: the Civil War,
World War I, the Great Depression, the New Deal, and World
War II. He argues that:
. . . [T]he introduction of new tax regimes has never
stood alone. Every new regime has always been an inte-
gral part of a larger transformation of government that,
in turn, was bound up in the resolution of a national
emergency. As such, each of the new regimes had a
reciprocal relationship with the larger transformation
of government. On the one hand, the tax regimes en-
hanced trust in the larger transformation of govern-
ment. . . . On the other hand, the new tax regimes re-
ceived support and legitimacy as a consequence of the
larger institutional transformation [p. 150].
Brownlee also reflects on the 1980s attempts at comprehen-
sive tax reform. It is his assessment that the 1980s tax reforms
did not amount to a break with the past as had been true of
earlier changes. Further, he holds out little prospect at the time
of his writing (during the 1996 presidential campaign) that ad-
vocates of radical reform of US federal taxation (e.g. the intro-
duction of a national sales tax or a flat tax) would get very far.
In the 1980s and the 1990s it was the absence of a great national
emergency that was a significant element of his explanation in
each case.5 One aspect of his extended argument is that during
the earlier US national emergencies, there had been an increase
5 It is an interesting and topical question, perhaps, if the wars of the early
21st century (against terrorism, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq) will prove another
“great national emergency” that engenders the necessary elements of a plan of
radical tax reform, strong presidential leadership of that reform, and enough
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in public trust and, thereby, an enhancement of the incumbent
president’s ability to lead radical tax reform:
. . . [A]ll earlier, transforming episodes of fiscal reform
have taken place in the context of public trust of the
federal government and augmented that trust. . . . Until
[public] trust returns and tax policy contributes to
building that trust, special-interest politics will con-
tinue to have great force in the shaping of taxation [pp.
150-151].
Brownlee’s book represents an excellent resource for histo-
rians of every stripe with an interest in the history of US federal
taxation.6 Although short (190 pages), it distils a vast amount of
the US historical scholarship that provides context and connec-
tion to, as well as episodes in, the long history of tax. It also
documents well the detail of that bibliographic review in its
copious footnotes.
Brownlee’s work is complemented by two other recent
monographs on US tax history. The first is Robert Stanley’s
Dimensions of Law in the Service of Order [1993]. It is described
by Brownlee [1996: 26 fn] as “the most informative scholarship
detailing the development of the income tax legislation between
the Civil War and World War I”. Its central consideration is
“whether the early history of federal income taxation might illu-
minate the developing structure of wealth and opportunity, and
so our polity, as successfully as the law of race or gender, crime
or labor” [p. vii]. Stanley demonstrates in his book that taxation
does indeed provide such a powerful lens. His study proceeds
chronologically. He starts with study of the first federal income
tax laws (1861-1872). He argues that an understanding of the
tax, even its first imposition, has to go beyond the circum-
stances of its birth as a “war tax”. The choice of an income tax,
rather than something else, reflects that “the function of the
nation’s first federal income tax laws was the deflation of
class-tinged dissent from the centrist program, through the
determined and skillful use of the powerful rhetorical and sym-
public trust in government to accept the changes. To date, it is possible to
interpret President George W. Bush’s large federal tax cuts in one of two ways:
business as usual in the special interest politics of US federal taxation, or the
first play in a radical reduction in the level of federal taxation and thereby the
size of the federal state.
6 One omission (noted by Davie [1997: 370]), however, is a complementary
statistical history of US federal taxation. One would need to piece together this
chronology from other sources, some of which are suggested by Davie.
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bolic appeal of the law itself” [p. 17]. Then he considers the
period that he refers to as “The Income Tax, Incorporated”
(1873-1881). This was, he argues, a period in which the useful-
ness of the income tax to politicians and special interest groups
on the right was developed in pragmatic and intellectual terms;
in contrast, it was a time of relative neglect of income tax by
elements on the left. Subsequent chapters of his book consider
the ways in which the income tax came to be associated with a
discourse of social and political reform (1881-1894); the at-
tempts to implement income tax in the 1890s and the constitu-
tional challenges that culminated in the Pollock decision (1894-
1900); and the route to the eventual “restoration” of the income
tax and agreement of the sixteenth amendment to the Constitu-
tion (1895-1913).
Stanley’s work is significant in large part because of the way
in which he enriches his study with theory and broadens his
approach by drawing on an interdisciplinary literature. He is
also unusually explicit in describing the adjustment of his ap-
proach during the process of research:
I began my historical research by focusing on statutes
and court decisions relating to income taxation, intend-
ing to look for factors which determined their form and
timing. . . . I expected to find the traditional panoply of
interest groups, party alignments, and ideologies, the
tax fitting congenially within these categories that our
society finds familiar.
Preliminary research led instead to a far murkier view.
. . . I began to realize that my difficulty lay less in the
data itself than in the attitude with which I was inter-
preting the data. The pluralism of our traditional histo-
riography and political theory was hindering, rather
than helping my effort. . . . [T]he meaning of the early
tax remained hidden from view . . . because of the spec-
tacles I had learned to use. . . .
[T]he lenses which finally revealed the meaning of early
income taxation – composed of assumptions about soci-
ety, the state, law, and history which depart from the
dominant progressive and pluralist view – generated
[an] untraditional interpretation of the meaning of law
in society . . . [p. viii].
The essence of Stanley’s argument is that the features and
early introductions and withdrawals of federal income tax were
directly related to the distribution and characteristics of wealth
and opportunity of the age. When levied at low rates on a very
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small tax base, the early income tax strengthened the status quo
and preserved existing imbalances of wealth and opportunity. In
this sense, it was a bulwark against pressure for social and po-
litical change. Income taxation did not emerge from a grassroots
movement, but from within the state itself. It was, he argues,
more a product of “centrism”, meaning “political officials acting
as relatively autonomous trustees on behalf of the most power-
ful segments of society through the use of multiple dimensions
of law” [p. ix]. He concludes that income tax was supported by
the state “because of its historically stabilizing rhetorical role”
[p. 230]:
To the centrist lawmakers whose creation it was, in-
come taxation represented not an expression of real
economic democracy through a reduced burden on the
poor and middle classes, but a rejection of the far more
fundamental institutional change advocated by intellec-
tuals and street dissidents of both left and right [pp.
230-231].
Stanley’s argument about the early US federal income tax
challenges more conventional interpretations. In part, it is be-
cause it draws its strength from and is located in a wider politi-
cal, social, and legal history. It is for this reason especially that it
deserves careful study by accounting historians.
The second complement to Brownlee’s short history of US
federal taxation is political historian Julian Zelizer’s monograph
Taxing America: Wilbur D. Mills, Congress, and the State, 1945-
1975 [1998]. This work is concerned with the way in which a
community of experts – legislators, tax policy analysts, tax pro-
fessionals – influenced how the modern US state “increased in
size and scope on an unprecedented scale in American life” [p.
3]. Zelizer’s research question is: “How did the American state
achieve what it did between 1945 and 1975, despite the nation’s
anti-statist culture and despite its fragmented political institu-
tions?” [p. 6]. He uses a focus on Wilbur Mills, Democratic sena-
tor from Arkansas (1938-1976) and Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee (1958-1974), to provide an histori-
cal narrative in which he answers his question.
There are four elements to Zelizer’s argument about the
development of the post-World War II, US state. First, the way
in which Congress wielded its taxing powers was an important
part of the explanation of achievement. “Taxation was central to
state-building” and Congress clung to its constitutional jurisdic-
tion to tax, even in times of crisis [p. 7]. Thus, understanding the
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interplay between congressional history and the development of
tax policy is crucial to a history of US state-building. In Mills,
the powerful chairman of the congressional tax-writing commit-
tee, these threads of history come together. Second, the forma-
tion of community of tax experts, in which Mills and congres-
sional leaders were prominent and authoritative, facilitated the
tax policy and tax setting roles Congress wished to protect. The
tax policy community “offered an arena where congressional
leaders would interact with other members of the state on a
regular basis”, thus helping to “facilitate policymaking despite
the fragmented nature of the state” [p. 8]. It was in this context
that a “culture of tax policy” emerged with “a distinct discourse
with its own vocabulary and conceptions of the political
economy, certain types of social interactions between members
of government, and established ways of learning the political
process” [p. 10]. Third, taxation policy was understood and used
as much more than revenue raising. “Through taxation, Mills
and the community were able to sell various economic and so-
cial programs [including Social Security and Medicare] within
the national anti-statist culture” [pp. 11-12]. Further, in eco-
nomic policy “Mills discerned that the manipulation of tax rates
and the creation of tax breaks enabled the government to help
manage the economy indirectly without infringing on the pre-
rogatives of economic institutions” [p. 14]. Fourth, some fiscal
conservatives – Mills among them – “entered into a fragile alli-
ance” with the state and liberal state-builders [p. 16]. For their
part, the fiscal conservatives imposed their views about “strict
adherence to balanced budgets” [ibid.]. They shaped tax policy
and the terms of fiscal discourse by expressing “ongoing con-
cern about the detrimental effect of deficits on consumer prices,
national savings, and the international stability of the dollar”;
thus they “tended to define policy debates in terms of budgetary
cost, tax burdens, and potential effect on the deficit” [p. 17].
Zelizer’s book helps explain the paradox of the growth of
the liberal state in post-World War II USA at the same time as
political institutions remain fragmented, the executive wing of
US government becomes more powerful, anti-statist sentiment
grows, and the tenets of fiscal conservatism are developed. This
knitting together of political, legislative, and economic analysis
is an important resource for accounting historians who wish to
understand the context in which particular tax policy, legisla-
tion, and practices emerged. The prominence of discourse and
technical policy communities in the story may well suggest to
accounting historians some of the ways in which this general
195
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2003, Vol. 30, no. 2
Published by eGrove, 2003
187Interfaces: Lamb: Questions of Taxation
history might lead to the more particular histories of tax ac-
counting, measuring, reporting, and analysis.
Taxation in British Historical Research: In a British historical
context, the economic and social historian Martin Daunton’s
two monographs – Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in
Britain, 1799-1914 [2001] and Just Taxes [2002] – have refash-
ioned the history of British income tax. What Daunton has done
that his predecessors have not is to use taxation as the focus for
a critical study of the power, practices, and structures of the
state and the economic and social forces with which it inter-
acted. Earlier comprehensive histories of British income tax –
notably Dowell [1965] and Sabine [1966] – adopted a compara-
tively uncritical approach to taxation as part of political history
and the administrative history of the state. One of the earlier,
most influential histories of taxation policy and practice – Kay
and King [1990] – was written by economists and focused in
detail on the post-World War II period. There is other research
by historians that is detailed and rich in its treatment of taxa-
tion, but none extends the treatment to the 20th century:
Braddick [1996] examines financing the state in the 17th cen-
tury; Brewer [1989] looks at creation of the “fiscal-military
state” in the 18th century; and O’Brien [1988] focuses on 19th
century tax policy and fiscal economics. Daunton’s two books
combine to form a unique study of British income tax over two
centuries.
Trusting Leviathan is a study of taxation in the “long” 19th
century, from Pitt’s introduction of income taxation in 1799 dur-
ing the Napoleonic Wars to the outbreak of World War I. It is, in
broad terms, a study of the creation of the Gladstonian fiscal
state. Daunton refers to this as “a story of fiscal containment”
because taxation was reduced from 20% of national income dur-
ing the early 19th century wars with France to approximately
10% in 1914 [p. x]. In a first statement which hints at the rich
comparative analysis7 that runs through the whole of the two
7 Any comparative history of taxation would need to consider Webber and
Wildavsky’s [1986] comprehensive history of taxation and expenditure. This
work focuses on the western world, but does not exclude excursions to the
taxation history of parts of the rest of the world. A narrower, but influential,
comparison is addressed in Steinmo [1996]. Picciotto’s [1992] legal history of
business taxation is a fine comparative study of the US and UK, with attention
paid as well to France and Germany. To the extent that a comparative history
considers theories and influential ideas and models of taxation, Groves [1974]
remains an excellent starting point.
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books, Daunton notes that in Britain “the level of taxation was
reduced and held down to a greater extent and for a longer
period of time than in most other European countries” [ibid.].
The story that the author tells is also a history of trust in that
during this same period “the fiscal system widely came to be
seen as ‘fair’ and equitable between interests, so helping to cre-
ate the high level of legitimacy which characterized the British
state in the second half of the nineteenth century and into the
twentieth century” [ibid.]. His research question is “what factors
affected the changing willingness of taxpayers to trust each
other and to trust the state, and for the state to trust taxpayers?”
[p. 12].
Daunton argues that the answer to his question about trust
can be articulated by reference to shifting balances between four
distinct variables. The first is the institutional and administra-
tive processes for revenue collection. His work (especially Chap-
ter 7 “The minimum of irritation’: fiscal administration and civil
society, 1842-1914”) offers a brilliant analysis of how seemingly
technical administrative matters derived from the higher drama
of matters of state “had much wider significance in exacerbating
or mitigating social and political tensions” [p. 12]. It is here that
he has much to say directly to accounting historians about mat-
ters of tax calculation, reporting, and collection.8 The second
variable in Daunton’s analysis is the relationship between rev-
enue and economic change. He refers to this as the way that
“handles” were attached by the tax system to particular elements
of the tax base:
Any tax system attaches a “handle” to different
forms of income or types of economic activity, such as
rent from agricultural land, profits from trade or the
consumption of goods and services which provide some
external indication of wealth. The way “handles” were
attached to the tax base affected the buoyancy of rev-
enue, and so influenced the ease with which govern-
ment expenditure could be increased [p. 13].
8 In my research [Lamb, 2002] about how the administrative power of the
19th century Inland Revenue was enhanced through judicial support for calcula-
tive principles and techniques devised by tax administrators, I have considered
some of the ways in which Daunton’s work supports an analysis of taxation
practice approached from another direction. I have also considered some of the
ways in which his top-down perspective glosses over some aspects of practice
that were significant for particular accounting and tax practice purposes.
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Just as Brownlee [1996] argues, the nature of “handles” that
were available or feasible was linked to levels and patterns of
economic development. Daunton’s third variable is the manner
in which new taxes were developed and fiscal reform under-
taken [p. 15]. He contrasts a “usual ‘churning’ of taxes” with the
“radical or ‘constitutional’ reform” of taxation that is “extremely
rare” [p. 16]. A factor behind this feature of British tax politics
was “the ability of permanent officials to shape the tax system
by limiting the room for manoeuvre of politicians” [p. 17].
Daunton’s fourth major variable in his shifting pattern of the
politics of taxation was the nature and manner of state spend-
ing:
Whether the tax system was considered to be equitable
or inequitable depended on whether the various inter-
ests and groups providing the revenue felt that the state
was spending ‘their’ money in a reasonable and appro-
priate way. . . . A high degree of trust in public or collec-
tive action therefore depended upon the creation of a
widely shared belief that the tax system was balanced
between interests, both in the way revenue was raised
and how it was spent [pp. 18-19].
In Just Taxes the stories of fiscal containment and trust shift
direction. We move from a story of an effective tax system in
which “balance and fairness” operated to one in which they do
not. From 1914, levels of taxation rose, reaching some 40% of
national income in World War II. Daunton argues that both
public trust in and the administrative competence of the state
both took a nosedive in the same period. Among the factors
explored to explain these changes is a substitution of “pragmatic
equality” for “principled equality”. Long evident needs for fun-
damental reform of aspects of the tax system were ignored in
the second half of the 20th century due to politicians’ lack of
courage in risking short-term political reaction for longer-term
economic and political gains. The result wa   s a fiscal system
that was no longer a stable base for the state. Instead, taxation
became a focus of political and social tension.
Given that Daunton’s focus in his two monographs is the
politics of taxation, much scope exists for other historians, in-
cluding accounting historians, to build on his work to study
other aspects of taxation. His is a top-down view and the roles
and activities of taxpayers and practitioners remain to be con-
sidered in detail.
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Alternative Approaches and Interpretations: The four historians
whose work has been introduced in the preceding sections to-
gether represent a fresh approach to the study of taxation as
central to a broader history and the range of considerations –
political, social, economic, legal, and technical – that must be
brought to bear in researching tax policy and practice. Part of
their careful scholarship is to distinguish their work from that of
previous and contemporary scholars of taxation. Brownlee’s
[1996] study is especially useful to accounting historians for its
appendix on historiography and bibliography. It analyzes and
categorizes all the substantial and significant histories of US
taxation then available. His analysis extends to the relatively
small historical literature that is internationally comparative in
focus.
Brownlee recognizes five approaches adopted by tax histori-
ans. The “progressives” present the long history of US federal
income taxation as a triumph of social justice and democratic
forces. Blakey and Blakey [1940], Paul [1954], Ratner [1942],
Seligman [1914], and Taussig [1931] represent this approach.
“That view regarded the reform movements that culminated in
the New Deal as an expression of social democracy and as a
stream of victories for working people – farmers and factory
laborers” [p. 160]. There are three types of “post-progressive”
historians according to Brownlee, all of whom focus on the
prominent role of special interests and social power relations in
explanations of how tax policy has developed. “Neocon-
servatives” tell a story of “democracy . . . subverted by narrowly
selfish tax-eaters” and “agents of the state who gain control of
the instruments of national communication, manipulate federal
power to discourage or suppress grassroots challenges to the
state, and cultivate a class of experts capable of designing taxes
whose effects are difficult to detect” [pp. 168-169]. “Capitalist-
state theorists” see democratic institutions as “captured by capi-
talists or their agents” [p. 168] and regard tax policy to advance
rationally the interests of capitalists. Brownlee places Stanley
[1993] in this category.9 “Pluralists” emphasize how “the multi-
plicity of contending groups shap[es] tax policy, and … detail
the ways in which the American political system encourages
9 Stanley, too, distinguishes his approach from the “progressives” and “plu-
ralists” and offers a careful study of earlier studies. This involves review of
underlying evidence and scrutiny of the assumptions and interpretations of ear-
lier scholars. The resulting analysis is theoretically very rich.
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fragmentation of the polity into local and special interests” [p.
165-166]. Witte [1985] is representative of this approach.10
Brownlee’s own approach is characterized as “democratic-
institutionalist”.11 By “democratic” he means that he “recognizes
the power of democratic forces outside the federal government
[and] stresses the potency of ideas as independent creative
forces” [p. 173]. In that, there is some link to the older “progres-
sive” tradition. However, he makes clear that the “institutional”
element of his approach marks a clear distinction from the
progressives: governmental institutions are regarded as having
influence in and of themselves in shaping taxation policy; his-
torical contingency [e.g. great national emergencies] plays an
important role in enabling and sometimes forcing change; and
economic development has shaped the organizational options
available to tax policymakers [pp. 173-175]. Zelizer [1998]12 and,
in the British context, Daunton [2001, 2002] adopt approaches
that place emphasis on the social and institutional elements of
an historical explanation for the development of taxation.
Daunton’s work represents another important source on ap-
proaches to historical scholarship. The first and final chapters in
Trusting Leviathan [2001] add to an understanding of the differ-
ent approaches to theory and methodology adopted by influen-
tial historians. It complements Brownlee’s work by a thorough
discussion of the influence of social theorists (e.g. the Virginia
School, Gramsci, Foucault) and approaches to history. Like
other historians discussed above (especially Stanley and
Zelizer), Daunton develops an historical analysis in which the
10 King’s [1993] fine study of US investment tax subsidies is another ex-
ample. Webber and Wildavsky’s [1986] comparative history of taxation and ex-
penditure in the Western World also adopts a pluralist approach. Political scien-
tist Steinmo’s [1993] study of the role of the state in Swedish, British, and US
tax policy is regarded by Brownlee [1996, p. 172] as one of the most influential
developments of the pluralist approach.
11 Brownlee’s [2003] approach to the history of taxation is developed by him
and his collaborators in an edited collection of historical work, first published in
1996, focused on the funding of the US state during and after World War II.
12 A new book of which Zelizer is an editor and contributing author [Novak
et al., 2003] considers taxation among other topics as part of “new directions” in
American political history. This focuses on “the relationship of citizens to the
government in a context where suspicion of a powerful state has been the over-
riding theme of American political culture” and “addresses the continually evolv-
ing mechanisms of democratic participation” [Jacobs and Zelizer, 2003, p. 1].
The methodological concerns of “the new institutionalism” and “sociocultural
political history” are explored by contributors to the volume.
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political discourse of taxation becomes an important element of
the story of change and stasis in taxation.
CONCLUSIONS
I have argued that for research on a taxation subject to
succeed as rigorous accounting research, well grounded in rel-
evant historical scholarship, research design must consciously
address several matters in framing the research problem. Tax
research must focus on substantive subjects that are recogniz-
able as “accounting”; the methods, approach, and exposition
must be “historical” to an acceptable standard; and the research
must engage with relevant portions of the existing body of ac-
counting historical scholarship. I have argued, further, that the
treatment of tax in accounting history will be more influential
inside and outside the specialist field of accounting history if
there is scholarly engagement with the best researchers and live-
liest debates that the disciplines of accounting and history have
to offer will enrich.
This essay has drawn researchers’ attention to some works
of historical scholarship in which taxation is the central focus
and that is recognized by historians as being of the highest qual-
ity that their discipline produces. Accounting historians of taxa-
tion can use the insights of historians such as Brownlee,
Stanley, Zelizer, and Daunton to frame their own concerns with
the policies, problems, and institutions of tax measurement, re-
porting, and analysis. There is much for us to research from an
accounting perspective that can help us tell historians, tax
policymakers, and practitioners of tax and accounting about
how taxation policy is implemented and works in practice;
about the behavioral effects that stem from interactions between
tax, accounting, and economic activity; and about how taxation
can be understood not just at the levels of discourse, politics, or
law, but in financial measures and the decisions of economic
actors. What is important is for accounting historians to develop
effective routines for staying abreast of how other historians are
thinking about the historical problems, including taxation, in
which we all have a common interest.13 Then, those accounting
13 It always helps to have practical means for doing quick surveys and keep-
ing up to date. Among the means that I would suggest for taxation research
follow. (1) Make regular reference to the US Tax History project supported by
Tax Analysts; see http://www.taxhistory.org/default.htm. (2) Seek guides to tax
history research prepared by law school libraries. The University of Connecticut
Law Library has produced one such summary recently; see http://www.law.
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historians will be in a position to supplement this historical
work and engage with it amidst the rich narratives, arguments,
and evidence that make up scholarship.
This review essay has sought to suggest how questions of
taxation might be effectively framed as accounting historical
research. To return to the analogy with which I started this
piece, my hope is that this essay may encourage tax researchers
to think anew about the technical specifications for the research
“camera” that they should seek to apply as well as about how
and where to aim the camera. It is now up to those individual
researchers to choose their subject, shoot the photos, develop
them, mount them, interpret them, and present them to an in-
terested accounting history audience.
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NOTICEBOARD
10th WORLD CONGRESS
OF ACCOUNTING HISTORIANS
ST. LOUIS/OXFORD, AUGUST 1-5, 2004
CALL FOR PAPERS
ONE — TWO — THREE
ONE CONFERENCE—TWO  LOCATIONS—THREE THEMES
The 10th World Congress of Accounting Historians will meet in the USA
with a dual venue of St. Louis, MO and Oxford, MS, from August 1-5, 2004. The
Congress will commence in St. Louis on August 1 to celebrate the centenary of
the first International Congress of Accountants that was held in  St. Louis in
1904 as a part of the World’s Fair commemorating the Louisiana Purchase and
Lewis & Clark Expedition. Sessions will be held at the St. Louis Mercantile
Library, which was founded in 1846. The headquarters hotel will be the Renais-
sance Airport Hotel. The Congress will then move by air-conditioned motor
coaches to Oxford, MS, on August 3 to give delegates an opportunity to visit the
National Library of the Accounting Profession at the University of Mississippi.
The Ole Miss Library is the largest accountancy library in the world. The Alumni
House Hotel will be the Congress headquarters. There will be activities during
the motor coach trip devoted to accounting history topics, such as featured
speakers and videotapes. After the Congress, delegates may proceed to Orlando,
FL, for the American Accounting Association meetings. It may be the most
convenient to continue your post-Congress air travel from nearby Memphis In-
ternational Airport.
Papers are invited on any accounting history topic. Papers are address any
of the three Congress themes are particularly desired. The three Congress
themes are:
1. International Congresses of Accountants
2. Accounting for Transportation and Financial Industries
3. Archival-Based Accounting Research
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESSES OF ACCOUNTANTS:
Since 2004 marks the centenary of the first International Congress of Ac-
countants in St. Louis, a major theme of the 10th World Congress of Accounting
Historians is scholarship on the sixteen International Congresses of Accoun-
tants, the nine International Congresses of Accounting Educators, and the nine
preceding World Congresses of Accounting Historians. There is a need to in-
crease the relatively limited scholarship about each of these congresses. The
dates and sites of these previous congresses are:
International Congresses of Accountants World Congresses of Accounting Historians
1904 St. Louis 1972 Sydney 1970 Brussels
1926 Amsterdam 1977 Munich 1976 Atlanta
1929 New York 1982 Mexico City 1980 London
1933 London 1987 Tokyo 1984 Pisa
1938 Berlin 1992 Washington 1988 Sydney
1952 London 1997 Paris 1992 Kyoto
1957 Amsterdam 2002 Hong Kong 1996 Kingston
1962 New York 2000 Madrid
1967 Paris 2002 Melbourne
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The International Congress of Accounting Educators started in 1962 and
were conducted just before or after the International Congresses of Accountants,
either in the same city or nearby. Leadership of the IAAER [International Asso-
ciation for Accounting Education and Research] will assist in reviewing papers
for this theme. Some examples of possible paper topics include (1) Examination
of a Specific Congress; (2) Continuity and Discontinuity of the Congresses; (3)
Concept of International Congresses; (4) Key Players at Each Congress (Biogra-
phies); (5) Seminal Papers; (6) Splitting the Congresses in 1962; (7) Continuing
Themes and Topics Across the Years; and (8) International Accounting Stan-
dards Movement.
ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSPORTATION AND FINANCIAL INDUSTRIES:
As the Gateway to the West, St. Louis is an appropriate venue for research
on accounting for railroads, canals, riverboats, stagecoaches, airlines, and auto-
mobiles. The Mercantile Library is also a repository of several transportation
collections. Thus, the Congress will highlight papers dealing with transportation-
related industries throughout the world. Papers can include analyses of financial
statements, accounting innovations, and the people who played a role in the
development of transportation accounting. Similarly, St. Louis has historically
been a financial center for Western development, so histories related to account-
ing for all types of financial institutions will be a focus of the Congress.
ARCHIVAL-BASED ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
Because the library at the University of Mississippi is a treasure trove of
accounting archival records, one of the Congress themes will be to emphasize
archival-based research. Such research can be based on any type of organiza-
tion. Examples include analyses of accounting innovations, diffusion of account-
ing innovations, impact of environment (such as war, depression, or competi-
tion) on accounting, impact of accounting on the environment, and examples of
company histories based on accounting records.
In addition to papers on the three Congress themes, papers on other topics
of accounting history are also welcome.
The 10th World Congress is sponsored by the Academy of Accounting
Historians. The co-conveners of the Congress of Richard Vangermeersch of the
University of Rhode Island, and Dale L. Flesher of the University of Mississippi.
Manuscripts for review should be sent to the following address:
Dr. Dale L. Flesher
Patterson School of Accountancy
University of Mississippi
University, MS 38677
E-mail: acdlf@olemiss.edu
Papers may be submitted in either hard copy or electronic format (elec-
tronic submissions should be in either WORD or WordPerfect format). All pa-
pers should be submitted in English. Special consideration will be accorded
those papers prepared by scholars who use English as a second language so as to
facilitate the broadest acceptance and presentation of materials. The Congress
program will focus around the best papers received. All papers will be double-
blind refereed and, subject to consent, the accepted papers will be published as
refereed Congress Proceedings on the Congress website. A hard-copy volume of
abstracts will also be distributed. The deadline for submissions is February 28,
2004. Earlier submissions are encouraged.
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EMERGING SCHOLAR’S COLLOQUIUM
APIRA 2004 SINGAPORE
2-3 July 2004
In association with:
The 4th Asia Pacific Interdisciplinary Research in Accounting Conference
and
Accounting Auditing & Accountability Journal
This forum is designed for doctoral degree students, new faculty and emerging
researchers. It will run immediately before the main APIRA 2004 conference
scheduled for 4-6 July 2004 and will be held at Singapore Management Univer-
sity.
It will provide participants with the opportunity to:
• discuss their research with peers and senior research faculty who will
lead the colloquium
• present their current research in small group settings
• network with scholars in their fields
• benefit from presentations and advice of leading scholars in subject areas
and methodological traditions supported by the APIRA 2004 conference
and Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal.
Senior faculty who will lead the colloquium will include
Professor Niamh Brennan, University College Dublin
Professor Trevor Hopper, University Manchester
Professor Kenneth Merchant, University of Southern California
Professor James Guthrie, Macquaire University, Sydney
Professor Lee Parker, The University of Adelaide
Further international professorial faculty will be announced in the coming
months.
The previous emerging scholars’ colloquium held before the APIRA Adelaide
2001 conference attracted 40 emerging scholars who were supported by 13 pro-
fessors as colloquium faculty. The feedback on that colloquium’s success was
outstanding. We expect the Singapore colloquium to follow on this successful
path.
Formal electronic application is required, and interested persons are advised
to apply early, to ensure admission. For further information, application forms
and instructions, please go to the Emerging Scholars’ Colloquium page on the
APIRA 2004 conference website:
http://www.accountancy.smu.edu.sg/Apira/colloquium.html
This is the premier emerging scholar forum in the Asia-Pacific region, drawing
together the strongest international cohort of scholars and faculty seen at any
one time in the region. It only occurs once every three years. If you are an
emerging scholar or the supervisor or head of school for eligible scholars, then
act on this opportunity without delay.
Further enquiries regarding the colloquium can be made through:
• Professor Lee Parker, the University of Adelaide,
Email: lee.parker@adelaide.edu.au
• Ms. Adelene Ang, Singapore Management University
Email: amlow@smu.edu.sg
208
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 30 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 10
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol30/iss2/10
Accounting Historians Journal, December 2003200
CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT & CALL FOR PAPERS
FOURTH ASIAN PACIFIC INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH IN
ACCOUNTING CONFERENCE
Singapore 4-6 July 2004
&
APIRA 2004 Emerging Scholars’ Colloquium
(2-3 July 2004)
Organised by Singapore Management University
(Supporting Organisation: Nanyang Business School,
Nanyang Technological University)
In association with Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
The triennial APIRA conference now moves to the “Lion City” Singapore, follow-
ing on from its predecessors in Sydney (1995), Osaka (198) and Adelaide (2001).
APIRA is the premier interdisciplinary accounting research conference in the
Asia-Pacific region, rotating in a three-year cycle with the European IPA and the
New York CPA conferences.
With a reputation for academic rigor, and the participation of accountancy’s
foremost thinks, APIRA 2004 promises to attract strong representation from
accounting researches the world over. Some of the most prolific researchers
from the United Kingdom, Europe, North America, the Asia-Pacific region, and
many other countries are represented in APIRA’s International Editorial Com-
mittee. A strong interdisciplinary program of research papers and forums ad-
dressing the relationships between accounting, auditing and accountability and
their social, institutional, economic and political environments will be included
in the program.
This interdisciplinary accounting conference is dedicated to the advancement of
accounting knowledge and practice. It provides a platform to discuss the interac-
tion between accounting/auditing and their social, economic, institutional and
political environments.
Conference sessions and papers will critique contemporary theory and practice,
examine historical and interdisciplinary dimensions of accounting, debate policy
alternatives, and explore new perspectives for understanding and change in the
accounting discipline.
Papers may explore policy alternatives and provide new perspectives for under-
standing the accounting discipline, covering the following themes:
• Accounting Communication
• Intellectual Capital
• Knowledge Management
• Risk Management
• Corporate Governance
• Social and Environmental Accounting
• Critical Financial Analysis
• Accounting and Gender and/or Feminist Theories
• Accounting and Accountability in the Public Sector
• Non-profit Organizations’ Accountability
• Accounting Policy and Standard Setting
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• Corporate Regulation and Accountability
• Accounting Professions
• New Forms of Accounting and Auditing
• Auditing and Accountability: Professional and Business Ethics
• Accounting in the Third World
• Accounting and the Public Interest
• Critical, Explanatory, Oral and Visual Approaches to Accounting History
• Critical and Ethnographic Case Studies of Accounting in Action
• Accounting and Management Planning and Control
• International Accounting and Globalisation
• Accounting and Technology
• Accounting and Culture
• Accounting and the Home
• Methodological and Theoretical Issues
APIRA 2004 will be held at the Grand Hyatt Singapore, and its associated
Emerging Scholars’ Colloquium (2-3 July) will be held at the beautiful Bukit
Timah campus of Singapore Management University. The conference’s plenary
speakers on the subjects of corporate governance and management control will
include Professors Niamh Brennan (University College Dublin), Trevor Hopper
(University of Manchester), and Ken Merchant (University of Southern Califor-
nia).
For full conference and colloquium details,
access the SINGAPORE APIRA website now!
http://www.accountancy.smu.edu.sg/Apira/index.htm
or
using www.Google.com, type in “APIRA 2004”
Key Dates:
• Deadline for electronic submission of papers : 30 January 2004
(only full papers considered for refereeing)
• Submission of Revised Paper : 30 April 2004
• Early Bird Conference Registration : 30 April 2004
Fees:
Early Bird Registration by : Full Registration (S$595)
30 April 2004 Full-time Postgraduate Student (S$365)
Emerging Scholar’s Colloquium (S$50)
Regular Registration after : Full Registration (S$695)
30 April 2004 Full-time Postgraduate Student (S$415)
Emerging Scholar’s Colloquium (S$60)
For further enquiries, please contact:
Ms Adelene Ang or Professor Lee D Parker
Singapore Management University The University of Adelaide
Email: aang@smu.edu.sg Email: aaaj@commerce.adelaide.edu.au
Conference co-chairs:
Professor Lee D Parker Associate Professor Low Aik Meng
The University of Adelaide Singapore Management University
Email: aaaj@commerce.adelaide.edu.au Email: amlow@smu.edu.sg
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CALL FOR PAPERS
The Academy of Accounting Historians and the Public Interest Section of the
American Accounting Association are jointly sponsoring a one-day conference
immediately preceding the Orlando National Convention of the AAA.
CONFERENCE PARTICULARS
Date:  Saturday, August 7, 2004
Venue: Orlando Marriott (AAA conference headquarters)
Time:  9:00AM-4:00PM
Cost:  approximately $35 (breakeven)
CPE:  Yes
CONFERENCE PAPERS
Papers may be submitted on any subject appropriate for the two sponsoring
organizations. They should conform to the style requirements of either of the
two journals mentioned below. Special consideration will be given to history
papers that relate to issues of public interest and to public-interest papers that
reference history. Typical topics might relate to accounting’s role in increasing
accountability and transparency in democratic societies and how the public
interest has been served or impaired historically by the actions of accounting
practitioners. Authors of accepted papers will be urged to submit their work to
the journals of the two sponsoring organizations – the Accounting Historians
Journal and Accounting and the Public Interest.
Papers should be submitted by June 1, 2004 in electronic form only, prepared
using Microsoft Word. Papers should be e-mailed to:
History Public Interest
Professor Richard Fleischman Professor C. Richard Baker
c/o Department of Accountancy c/o Department of Accounting & Finance
John Carroll University University of Massachusetts – Dartmouth
University Heights, OH 44118 North Dartmouth, MA 02747
(fleischman@jcu.edu) (rbaker@umassd.edu)
For further information, contact either Dick Fleischman at 216-397-4443 or
Richard Baker at 508-999-9243.
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Ashton C. Bishop, (James Madison University), 2001-2003
Edward N. Coffman (Virginia Commonwealth University), 2001-2003
Joann N. Cross (University of Wisconsin), 2003-2005
Dale L. Flesher (University of Mississippi), 2001-2003
O. Finley Graves (University of North Texas), 2002-2004
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Barbara Merino (University of North Texas), 2003-2005
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